Leahy v. Farmon
| Decision Date | 26 October 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. C 97-1407 PJH(PR).,C 97-1407 PJH(PR). |
| Citation | 177 F.Supp.2d 985 |
| Parties | Jennifer Gayle LEAHY, Petitioner, v. Teena FARMON Warden, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
This is a habeas corpus case filed by a state prisoner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The court ordered respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted. Respondent has filed an answer and a memorandum of points and authorities in support of it, and has lodged exhibits with the court. Petitioner has responded with a traverse.1 The matter is submitted.
Petitioner was convicted by a jury of first degree murder with special circumstances. She was sentenced to prison for life without possibility of parole. Her conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeal of California, Ex. E, and the Supreme Court of California denied review, Ex. G-1.2 As grounds for habeas relief she asserts that: (1) The prosecutor used peremptory challenges to discriminate against a native American prospective juror, in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986); and (2) her rights to due process and an unbiased jury were violated when the trial court refused her motion for a change of venue.
Defendants Stephen Duane Chiara, Richard Craig Kesser and Jennifer Gayle Leahy were convicted of the first degree murder of Kesser's former wife. As the Court of Appeal of California put it: "The prosecution theory was that Kesser, an angry and bitter ex-husband[,] plotted with Leahy, his fiancee, to hire Chiara, an acquaintance of Leahy's, to kill Kesser's former wife Mary in order to collect the proceeds of her insurance policy." Ex. E at 2. Petitioner's theory of defense was that although she was involved in a plan to hire Chiara, she thought the plan was to hire him to blow up his ex-wife's car, not to kill her. Id. at 9. An extensive summary of the evidence in trial court, none of which is disputed for purposes of this petition, which involves only pretrial matters, can be found in the opinion of the Court of Appeal. Id. at 2-10.
The petition in this case was filed after the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), so the provisions of that act apply to it. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997). Under the AEDPA a district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on the basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state court's adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
A state court decision is "contrary to" Supreme Court authority, that is, falls under the first clause of § 2254(d), only if "the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1518, 1523, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). A state court decision is an "unreasonable application of" Supreme Court authority, falls under the second clause of § 2254(d), if it correctly identifies the governing legal principle from the Supreme Court's decisions but "unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. The federal court on habeas review may not issue the writ "simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly." Id. at 1522. Rather, the application must be "objectively unreasonable" to support granting the writ. See id. at 1521-22. The writ may be granted under the "unreasonable application of" clause only when the court's "independent review of the legal question does not merely allow [the court] ultimately to conclude that the petitioner has the better of two reasonable legal arguments, but rather leaves [the court] with a `firm conviction' that one answer, the one rejected by the [state] court, was correct and the other, the application of the federal law that the court adopted, was erroneous—in other words that clear error occurred." Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1152-54 (9th Cir.2000).
As to issues of fact, under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) a federal habeas court may grant the writ if it concludes that the state court's adjudication of the claim resulted in a decision that "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.'" Torres v. Prunty, 223 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir.2000) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) and Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13, 120 S.Ct. 1495). The "clearly erroneous" standard of unreasonableness that applies in determining the "unreasonable application" of federal law under § 2254(d)(1) also applies in determining the "unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence" under § 2254(d)(2). See id. at 1107-08 (citing Van Tran, 212 F.3d at 1153-54). To grant relief under § 2254(d)(2), a federal court must be "left with a firm conviction that the determination made by the state court was wrong and that the one [petitioner] urges was correct." Id. at 1108 (quoting Van Tran, 212 F.3d at 1153-54) (internal quotation marks omitted).
A district court must presume correct any determination of a factual issue made by a state court unless the petitioner rebuts the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). This presumption is not altered by the fact that the finding was made by a state court of appeals, rather than by a state trial court. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546-47, 101 S.Ct. 764, 66 L.Ed.2d 722 (1981); Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir.), amended, 253 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir.2001). A petitioner must present clear and convincing evidence to overcome § 2254(e)(1)'s presumption of correctness; conclusory assertions will not do. Id.
a. Standard
The use of peremptory challenges by either the prosecution or defendant to exclude cognizable groups from a petit jury may violate the Equal Protection Clause. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 55-56, 112 S.Ct. 2348, 120 L.Ed.2d 33 (1992); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). Batson sets up a three-step process for a trial court's ruling on objections to peremptory challenges which the defendant asserts are racially motivated. First, the defendant must make a prima facie showing that the prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges on the basis of race. Id. at 96-97, 106 S.Ct. 1712. Second, if the requisite showing is made, the prosecutor must articulate a race-neutral explanation for striking the jurors in question. Id. at 97-98, 106 S.Ct. 1712. Finally, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has carried his or her burden of proving purposeful discrimination. Id. at 98, 106 S.Ct. 1712. In evaluating the race or gender neutrality explanation, the court must keep in mind that proof of discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 355-62, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991) ().
A federal habeas court need not dwell on the first step of the Batson analysis when, as here, the matter has proceeded to the second or third step. "Once a prosecutor has offered a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenges and the trial court has ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether the defendant has made a prima facie showing becomes moot." Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359, 111 S.Ct. 1859; cf. Stubbs v. Gomez, 189 F.3d 1099, 1104 (9th Cir.1999). "Whether the justification offered by a prosecutor is an adequate race-neutral explanation is a question of law." United States v. Bishop, 959 F.2d 820, 821 n. 1 (9th Cir.1992). The findings of the trial court on the issue of discriminatory intent are findings of fact entitled to the presumption of correctness in federal habeas review. See Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 769, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995).
b. Discussion
Petitioner argues three points in support of her Batson claim. First, she argues that the trial court erred at the second Batson step by failing to recognize that at least one of the reasons set forth by the prosecutor was not race-neutral. Traverse at 6. Second, she argues that the presence of even one non-neutral reason constitutes a Batson error. Traverse at 6. Third, petitioner claims that even if there was no error at the second step, there was error at third step because the prosecutor failed to rebut the prima facie case of racial bias. Traverse at 8.
Petitioner is partly right. The trial court did commit serious error in failing to recognize the bias inherent in one of the prosecutor's purportedly neutral reasons. However, the Court of Appeal recognized this error....
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