Leak v. DeAngelo

• Docket Number: Civil Action 21-12327
• Decision Date: 21 April 2023
• Parties: MICHAEL LEAK, Plaintiff, v. JODI DeANGELO, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

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MICHAEL LEAK, Plaintiff, v. JODI DeANGELO, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 21-12327

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division

April 21, 2023

Terrence G. Berg, United States District Judge.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT IN PART AND DENY IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (ECF No. 31)

DAVID R. GRAND, United States Magistrate Judge

On September 23, 2021, plaintiff Michael Leak (“Leak”), an incarcerated person, filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1). At the time of the events at issue in his complaint Leak was confined at the Woodland Correctional Facility (“WCC”) in Whitmore Lake, Michigan. (Id., PageID.2, 26).

In his complaint, Leak brings First, Eight, and Fourteenth Amendment claims against three employees of the Michigan Department of Corrections (“MDOC”) who were employed at WCC at the time of the events in question: Warden Jodi DeAngelo (“Warden DeAngelo”); Corrections Officer Logan (“Officer Logan”); and Food Supervisor Gallimore (“Supervisor Gallimore”) (collectively “Defendants”). (Id., PageID.2-3). An Order of Reference was entered on April 18, 2022, referring all pretrial matters to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 636(b). (ECF No. 20).

Now pending before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment, which was filed by Defendants on December 5, 2022. (ECF No. 31).

Leak filed a response to this motion on December 19, 2022 (ECF No 33), and Defendants filed a reply on January 3, 2023 (ECF No. 35).^[1]

Having reviewed the pleadings and other papers on file, the Court finds that the facts and legal issues are adequately presented in the parties' briefs and on the record, and it declines to order a hearing at this time.

I. RECOMMENDATION

For the reasons set forth below, IT IS RECOMMENDED that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 31) be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

II. REPORT

A. The Claims in Leak's Complaint

As set forth above, at all relevant times, Leak was confined at WCC. In his complaint, he brings the following claims against Supervisor Gallimore, Officer Logan, and Warden DeAngelo in both their individual and official capacities:^[2]

• Leak alleges that Supervisor Gallimore was “found guilty”^[3] of abuse, retaliation, and threatening behavior against him, and violated the Prison Rape Elimination Act (“PREA”), 34 U.S.C. § 30302, et seq. (ECF No. 1, PageID.5). Leak asserts that Supervisor Gallimore's actions violated his First and Eighth Amendment rights. (Id., PageID.14).

• Leak alleges that Officer Logan abused his authority when he forced Leak to perform job duties that violated his “limited use of right arm” medical detail by giving him “a ‘direct order' to dump well over fifty trays full of food,” causing him “permanent injury,” in part in retaliation for complaints Leak voiced about Supervisor Gallimore. (Id.). Specifically, Leak contends that his right arm was “already broken,” and that dumping the trays caused “a loud popping sound from [his] right arm” which resulted in significant pain. (Id., PageID.15). Leak asserts that Officer Logan violated his First and Eighth Amendment rights.

• Leak alleges that Warden DeAngelo violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights by improperly investigating his allegations of abuse, retaliation, and physical injury. (Id., PageID.5). Leak further claims that Warden DeAngelo “became responsible for the due process violations when she failed to correct them in the course of performing her supervisory responsibilities .. ..” (Id., PageID.6).

In the instant motion, Defendants argue that Leak's complaint fails to state a claim or, alternatively, is subject to summary judgment. These arguments are addressed below.

B. Standard of Review

1. Motion to Dismiss

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) tests a complaint's legal sufficiency. Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The plausibility standard “does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal [conduct].” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. Put another way, the complaint's allegations “must do more than create speculation or suspicion of a legally cognizable cause of action; they must show entitlement to relief.” League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 527 (6th Cir. 2007) (emphasis in original) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56).

In deciding whether a plaintiff has set forth a “plausible” claim, a reviewing court must accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). This tenet, however, “is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice” to prevent a complaint from being dismissed on grounds that it fails to sufficiently comport with basic pleading requirements. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Howard v. City of Girard, Ohio, 346 Fed.Appx. 49, 51 (6th Cir. 2009). Furthermore, a court is not required to “create a claim which [a plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading[.]” Clark v. Nat'l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975). Ultimately, “[d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will ... be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

2. Summary Judgment

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, the Court will grant summary judgment if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see also Pittman v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 640 F.3d 716, 723 (6th Cir. 2011). A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the case under governing law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the Court assumes the truth of the non-moving party's evidence and construes all reasonable inferences from that evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Ciminillo v. Streicher, 434 F.3d 461, 464 (6th Cir. 2006).

The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the Court of the basis for its motion and must identify particular portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute as to any material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986); Alexander v. CareSource, 576 F.3d 551, 558 (6th Cir. 2009). “Once the moving party satisfies its burden, ‘the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth specific facts showing a triable issue.'” Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446, 453 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)). In response to a summary judgment motion, the opposing party may not rest on its pleadings, nor “‘rely on the hope that the trier of fact will disbelieve the movant's denial of a disputed fact' but must make an affirmative showing with proper evidence in order to defeat the motion.” Alexander, 576 F.3d at 558 (internal quotations omitted).

C. Analysis

1. Leak's Claims Against Supervisor Gallimore

As set forth above, Leak alleges that Supervisor Gallimore was “found guilty” of abuse, retaliation, threatening behavior, and “a P.R.E.A. inwhich [sic] was verbal.” (ECF No. 1, PageID.5). Specifically, Leak claims that he contacted the PREA hotline in January 2021 to report that Supervisor Gallimore had sexually harassed him on December 27, 2020. (Id., PageID.12, 14). He also claims that, at some unspecified point in time, Supervisor Gallimore called “people” - including Officer Logan - “telling them to check [him],” which “elivated [sic] [the PREA] complaint into retaliation against [Leak] for engaging in protected conduct.” (Id., PageID.14). These are the only allegations in Leak's complaint against Supervisor Gallimore, and it is these allegations that form the basis of his First and Eighth Amendment claims against her.

In their motion, Defendants argue that Leak's vague allegations against Supervisor Gallimore are insufficient to state a claim against her. (ECF No. 31, PageID.182). The Court agrees. As this Court has recognized, “it is fundamental that ‘[w]here a person is named as a defendant without an allegation of specific conduct, the complaint is subject to dismissal.'” Wilkins v Bush, No. 22-11937, 2023 WL 199258, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 17, 2023) (quoting Catanzaro v. Harry, 848 F.Supp.2d 780, 791 (W.D. Mich. 2012)). As the Sixth Circuit has explained, “damage claims against government officials arising from alleged violations of constitutional rights must allege, with particularity, facts that demonstrate what each defendant did to violate the asserted constitutional right.” Heyne v. Metro. Nashville Pub. Sch., 655 F.3d 556, 564 (...