Leaman v. Coles

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: EVANS
• Citation: Leaman v. Coles, 115 Ohio App.3d 627, 685 N.E.2d 1294 (Ohio App. 1996)
• Decision Date: 20 November 1996
• Docket Number: No. 4-96-13,4-96-13
• Parties: LEAMAN, Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. COLES, Appellee and Cross-Appellant, et al. Third District, Defiance County

Page 627

115 Ohio App.3d 627

685 N.E.2d 1294

LEAMAN, Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. COLES, Appellee and Cross-Appellant, et al.

No. 4-96-13.

Court of Appeals of Ohio,

Third District, Defiance County.

Decided Nov. 20, 1996.

Eric A. Mertz, Defiance, for appellant and cross-appellee.

Stephen F. Kohrn, Defiance, for appellee and cross-appellant.

EVANS, Judge.

This an appeal by the plaintiff-appellant and cross-appellee Lonnie Leaman ("appellant"), from a judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Defiance County granting the defendant's motion in limine to exclude certain evidence from jury consideration. Defendant-appellee and cross-appellant Bobbie Coles ("appellee") cross-appeals from the trial court's finding that appellant was the prevailing party and the trial court's permitting appellant to present the deposition of a defense witness as evidence at trial.

On November 18, 1992, while stopped in traffic, appellant's automobile was struck in the rear by appellee's vehicle. Appellee admitted liability for the collision. The day after the accident, appellant experienced neck pain and sought treatment at a hospital emergency department. He thereafter developed complaints of right-shoulder, back and neck pain and received treatment from a chiropractor, who eventually referred appellant to an orthopedic surgeon for evaluation. The physician prescribed physical therapy.

Three months after the accident, while appellant was undergoing physical therapy, he reported to the therapist that he had slipped on the ice and fallen on his right shoulder. The record also contains evidence that appellant has been involved in two subsequent automobile accidents since the accident at issue in this case.

Because of appellant's continuing complaints of shoulder pain and a clicking or popping sound occurring upon certain shoulder movements, the physician, Dr. Reszel, performed a diagnostic arthroscopic surgery (the "first surgery") on appellant's shoulder. During that surgery, the doctor performed some "cleaning up" of fraying to the shoulder ligaments, which, according to Dr. Reszel, was a condition more likely to have resulted from repetitive movement than from a blow. However, Dr. Reszel had earlier surmised, pursuant to appellant's personally reported history, that the automobile accident had to have been the cause of the injury.

Some months after the first surgery, because appellant continued to suffer the same symptoms, Dr. Reszel referred appellant to a surgeon for another opinion, and also ordered further testing, including an MRI. Unexpectedly, the MRI revealed the presence of a large cyst in appellant's humerus, near the shoulder joint. There is no question that the cyst was not caused by the accident. As a result of the finding from the MRI, appellant was referred to Dr. Lanny Johnson, an orthopedic surgeon in Michigan who had developed a new procedure to perform arthroscopic bone grafts to "fill in" gaps in the bone which would be caused by surgery such as removal of a bone cyst or tumor. Dr. Johnson performed an arthroscopic excision of appellant's cyst and a transfer of bone cells to the cystic area from appellant's tibia in August 1994 (the "second surgery"). Although this surgery was successful, it apparently did nothing to eliminate appellant's pain and the "popping" in his shoulder, about which he continued to complain after recovering from the second surgery. Therefore, in August 1995, appellant underwent a third surgical procedure, which ultimately resolved most of appellant's symptoms.

On September 1, 1993, appellant filed this action, requesting recompense for all of his medical expenses incurred following the November 1992 accident and future medical expenses. Pursuant to a defense motion in limine, the trial judge denied admission of evidence concerning appellant's "second surgery," which was the cyst removal by Dr. Johnson. Appellant had argued that, but for the pain he was having from the accident, the cyst would not have been discovered and the second surgery would not have been performed.

Faced with copious conflicting testimony at trial, the jury ultimately found appellee liable for the accident and awarded appellant a total amount of $15,000. The trial court further assessed certain costs against appellee, in favor of appellant, the prevailing party in this case, with the "remaining expenses to be borne by the party incurring such expenses."

Appellant asserts one assignment of error, contending that the trial court erred in refusing to admit the medical bills related to the second surgery:

"The trial court erred by preventing the jury from considering the second surgery performed by Dr. Johnson and in addition, excluding medical bills associated with that surgery."

Appellant argues that his humeral cyst was discovered only as a result of tests performed to discover the cause of his pain, which possibly resulted from the November automobile accident and, therefore, the second surgery would never have been performed but for the accident. Thus, argues appellant, bills and charges related to the second surgery were relevant to appellant's request for compensation for injuries caused by appellee's negligence. We disagree.

The Supreme Court of Ohio has held as follows:

"Ordinarily, a trial court is vested with broad discretion in determining the admissibility of evidence in any particular case, so long as such discretion is exercised in line with the rules of procedure and evidence. The admission of relevant evidence pursuant to Evid.R. 401 rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. E.g., State v. Sage (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 173, 31 OBR 375, 510 N.E.2d 343, paragraph two of the syllabus. An appellate court which reviews the trial court's admission or exclusion of evidence must limit its review to whether the lower court abused its discretion. State v. Finnerty (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 104, 107, 543 N.E.2d 1233, 1237. As this court has noted many times, the term 'abuse of discretion' connotes more than an error of law; it implies that the court acted unreasonably, arbitrarily or unconscionably. E.g., Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 5 OBR 481, 482, 450 N.E.2d 1140, 1142." Rigby v. Lake Cty. (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 269, 271, 569 N.E.2d 1056, 1058.

Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to permit the admission of evidence demonstrating the costs involved in the second surgery on his shoulder. Appellee argues, however, that appellant's fallacious reasoning is analogous to the absurd hypothetical scenario wherein an injured plaintiff is "bumped on the chest in a minor fender-bender," and, due to a diagnostic x-ray or other test it is discovered that the plaintiff is suffering from lung cancer, "then the tortfeasor driver would be responsible for all subsequent cancer treatment because the chest pain from the accident resulted in the x-ray that led to the discovery of the cancer." We conclude that, as appellee is essentially pointing out, the treatment at issue is too far removed from the accident to be logically considered to have been "proximately caused" by...