Leap v. State

• Citation: 127 N.E. 274,189 Ind. 538
• Decision Date: 11 May 1920
• Docket Number: No. 23674.,23674.
• Parties: LEAP v. STATE.
• Court: Supreme Court of Indiana

189 Ind. 538

127 N.E. 274

LEAP

v.STATE.

No. 23674.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

May 11, 1920.

Appeal from Criminal Court, Marion County; J. A. Collins, Judge.

George Leap was convicted of grand larceny, and he appeals. Affirmed.

J. Herbert Hartman and William H. Faust, both of Indianapolis, for appellant.

Ele Stansbury and A. B. Cronk, both of Indianapolis, for the State.

LAIRY, J.

In the trial court appellant was charged by indictment with the crime of grand larceny. The property described in the indictment as the subject of the larceny was an automobile. A trial resulted in a verdict of guilty, on which the court passed judgment, imposing the penalty provided by the statute defining grand larceny. This appeal is taken from the judgment so rendered.

In 1917 the Legislature of this state passed an act, entitled “An act defining the crime of vehicle taking,” and providing a penalty. Acts 1917, p. 174. Section 1 of this act provides that whoever unlawfully, without the consent of the owner, takes, hauls, drives, or carries away any vehicle, automobile, car, truck, cycle, aeroplane, or airship, operated by electricity or steam or explosive power, or any accessory or appurtenance contained in, on, or forming a part thereof, of the value of $25 or more, shall be guilty of the crime of vehicle taking, and on conviction shall be imprisoned in the state prison, not less than six months nor more than five years, and be disfranchised and rendered incapable of holding any office of trust for any determinate period. Burns' 1918, § 2301c.

In the trial court appellant took the position that, since the passage of the act cited, no person could be prosecuted for the larceny of an automobile under the provisions of section 2269, Burns' 1914, defining grand larceny and fixing the penalty, for the reason that the later statute has specifically provided a lessor punishment for the larceny of an automobile. He asserts that he must be prosecuted under the later act, and, if convicted, his punishment must be fixed in accordance with its terms. The question was raised in the trial court by a motion in arrest of judgment and also by a motion to modify the judgment.

The position of appellant is untenable. The statute on which he relies does not define the crime of larceny of an automobile, or of any of the other vehicles mentioned therein. The felonious intent to deprive the owner of his property and convert the same to the use of the taker is an essential...