Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Perez
Decision Date | 20 November 1991 |
Docket Number | No. D-0584,D-0584 |
Citation | 819 S.W.2d 470 |
Parties | Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 12,977 LEAR SIEGLER, INC., Petitioner, v. Herlinda PEREZ, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Rafael Pablo Perez, Deceased, Marlo Perez and Roberto Perez, Respondents. |
Court | Texas Supreme Court |
In this personal injury action, we consider whether a fact issue was raised as to causation in a summary judgment proceeding. The trial court granted summary judgment in part on grounds that, as a matter of law, no causal connection existed between the product manufactured by Lear Siegler, Inc. and the injury. The court of appeals reversed and remanded, holding plaintiffs' evidence raised a fact issue that precluded summary judgment. 797 S.W.2d 222. Under the particular facts before us, we conclude that causation was negated as a matter of law. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and affirm the trial court's judgment.
Rafael Perez, while working for the Texas Highway Department, drove a truck pulling a flashing arrow sign behind a sweeping operation on Highway 83. The function of the sign, which was manufactured by Lear Siegler, was to warn traffic of the highway maintenance. Perez had stopped his vehicle on the traveled portion of the road when a vehicle approached. A van driven by Alfonso Lerma, who had fallen asleep at the wheel, struck the sign, which in turn struck Perez and knocked him through the air to the pavement several yards away. Perez sustained severe injuries from which he subsequently died.
Plaintiffs, who are Perez's survivors and legal representatives of his estate, sued the manufacturer on negligence and product liability theories. Lear Siegler moved for summary judgment on grounds that the sign, as a matter of law, did not cause the accident. In support of its motion, Lear Siegler offered an uncontradicted affidavit of an eyewitness to the accident stating that the sign was working properly when Lerma's vehicle and other traffic approached.
Plaintiffs, on the other hand, asserted that Perez stopped his truck because the sign malfunctioned, and the defect in the sign thereby placed Perez in the "zone of danger" of Lerma's oncoming vehicle. They submitted a co-employee's affidavit stating that the same warning sign had malfunctioned when he pulled it the day before the accident. The affidavit further stated that, because the wire connections from the sign to the generator worked loose in bumpy driving, it was necessary to get out of the truck and push the wire connections back together. Plaintiffs thus contended that the sign malfunctioned on the day of the accident, that the malfunction was the reason Perez stopped his truck and positioned himself near the sign, and that the eyewitness saw the sign working shortly before the accident because Perez had pushed the wires back or otherwise corrected the malfunction.
To be entitled to summary judgment, Lear Siegler had the burden to establish that there existed no genuine issue of fact thereby entitling it to judgment as a matter of law. City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Authority, 589 S.W.2d 671, 678 (Tex.1979). All doubts are resolved against the movant, and the reviewing court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movants. Cate v. Dover Corp., 790 S.W.2d 559, 562 (Tex.1990).
For a defendant to be entitled to summary judgment it must disprove, as a matter of law, one of the essential elements of each of plaintiffs' causes of action. Citizens First National Bank v. Cinco Exploration Co., 540 S.W.2d 292, 294 (Tex.1976). Lear Siegler moved for summary judgment on grounds that causation was negated as a matter of law. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, Lear Siegler failed to establish that a malfunction of the sign was not the reason Perez stopped his truck. We must determine, however, assuming the facts are as...
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