Leary v. Crapsey, 106
| Decision Date | 13 December 1977 |
| Docket Number | No. 106,D,106 |
| Citation | 566 F.2d 863 |
| Parties | Donna LEARY, James Leary, Bernice Henriksen, Mary Jane Wagner, Charles Smith, Frances Agnello, Joseph Parella, Willie Mathis, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Phoenix Unlimited, an unincorporated association, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Hetty Jean CRAPSEY, Harold A. Shay, James White, John J. Petrossi, Dwight Van DeVate, Thomas E. McGrath, Robert D. Waterman, William E. Hanson, Individually and in their official capacity as Commissioners of the Rochester-Genesee Regional Transportation Authority, John Garrity, Individually and in his official capacity as Resident Manager of the Regional Transit Service, Inc., William T. Coleman, Jr., Individually and in his capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of Transportation, Robert E. Patricelli, Individually and in his capacity as Administrator of the United States Urban Mass Transportation Administration, and their agents, employees, successors in office, assistants and all persons acting in concert or cooperation with them or at their direction or under their control, Defendants-Appellees. ocket 77-6072. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
Peter D. Braun, Rochester, N. Y. (Monroe County Legal Assistance Corp., Marianne Artusio, Rochester, N. Y., of counsel), for plaintiffs-appellants.
William K. Dorr, Rochester, N. Y. (Harris, Beach, Wilcox, Rubin & Levey, Rochester, N. Y., of counsel), for local defendants-appellees.
Glenn F. Wasserman, Atty. Advisor, Rochester, N. Y. (Richard J. Arcara, U. S. Atty., W. D. N. Y., Buffalo, N. Y., Gerald J. Houlihan, Asst. U. S. Atty., Rochester, N. Y., Robert W. Batchelder, Acting Asst. Chief Counsel, Urban Mass Transportation Administration, Washington, D. C., of counsel), for federal defendants-appellees.
Before FEINBERG, OAKES and GURFEIN, Circuit Judges.
The eight individual plaintiffs in this class action each suffer from severe physical handicaps; seven are confined to wheel chairs and the other must use crutches. 1 All plaintiffs appeal from a decision of the United States District Court for the Western District of New York granting summary judgment to defendants, various federal and local officials who are responsible for, or administer, mass transportation programs in the area of Rochester, New York. The complaint was filed in July 1976 and alleged that defendants' failure to provide plaintiffs an accessible bus transportation system violated the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, as amended, 49 U.S.C § 1601 et seq., and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, and various constitutional rights of plaintiffs. The complaint sought equitable and declaratory relief and damages.
The district judge, after enjoining discovery, granted summary judgment to defendants in March 1977, and dismissed the action. The judge's brief opinion held in conclusory fashion that defendants had not violated any federal statutory or constitutional provisions and that the action was barred by the doctrines of laches, primary jurisdiction and failure to exhaust administrative remedies. This appeal followed.
In the district court, defendants took the position that section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act did not create a private cause of action, a view which the district court apparently accepted sub silentio. 2 In this court, however, defendants concede that mobility-handicapped persons, who are denied the use of a public transportation system, do have a private cause of action under section 504. 3 The concession is well warranted. See Lloyd v. Regional Transportation Authority, 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977); United Handicapped Federation v. Andre, 558 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1977); Vanko v. Finley, No. C76-1305, 440 F.Supp. 656 (N.D.Ohio 1977); see also Kampmeier v. Nyquist, 553 F.2d 296, 299 (2d Cir. 1977). Defendants do not, however, concede that the facts in this case warrant the conclusion that defendants have violated plaintiffs' rights. Indeed, defendants overwhelm us with a wealth of information regarding the bus transportation system in Rochester, the relevant applications by the local defendants for federal funding and the details of subsequent administrative proceedings thereon, the applicable statutes and regulations, the state of technology regarding the manufacture of buses designed to aid the mobility-handicapped, 4 and the efforts of the local and federal defendants to meet various federal requirements, none of which was discussed in the summary disposition of the trial court. We are also told that two of the applications that plaintiffs attack are somewhere in the administrative process of the UMTA. 5 However, the district court opinion fails to inform us what has delayed action upon these applications 6 and whether the specific aid applied for is consistent with the newest regulations promulgated by the UMTA. 7 Appellees stress that these regulations were brought to the attention of the district court, but we cannot tell whether the judge considered them nowhere does the opinion analyze the "special efforts" of the local defendants in planning for the needs of the handicapped, which these regulations require.
In light of the above and since the two pending applications are part of the overall planning of the transportation system complained of, we think it appropriate to remand this case for a detailed examination 8 of the local defendants' special efforts, taking into consideration the new regulations and the development of Transbus. See United Handicapped Federation v. Andre, 558 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1977) (). Additionally, the district court may retain jurisdiction of this case pending final UMTA action on the applications still before it, cf. Bartels v. Biernat, 427 F.Supp. 226, 233 (E.D.Wis.1977), and if this action is found to be unduly delayed, the district court may compel agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(1). Furthermore, we hope that close supervision of this action by the...
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... ... 106 A brief overview of those sections must therefore preface further analysis ... 397, 99 S.Ct. 522 F. Supp. 212 2361, 60 L.Ed.2d 980 (1979); Leary v. Crapsey, 566 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1977); United Handicapped Federation v. Andre, 558 F.2d 413 ... ...
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