Leatherwood v. State
| Decision Date | 31 July 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 53914,53914 |
| Citation | 473 So.2d 964 |
| Parties | Michael Dale LEATHERWOOD v. STATE of Mississippi. |
| Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
Michael Sandler, Michael Miller, Felice Busto, Washington, D.C., Samuel Walters, Jackson, for appellant.
Edwin Lloyd Pittman, Atty. Gen. by William S. Boyd, III and Marvin L. White, Jr., Spec. Asst. Attys. Gen., Jackson, for appellee.
En Banc.
ON MOTION TO VACATE, OR TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE
Michael Dale Leatherwood, pursuant to the "Mississippi Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act", Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-39-1 et seq., has filed in this Court a motion to vacate his conviction 1 for capital murder and the sentence of death now pending against him.
This Court has previously considered the conviction and sentence in Leatherwood v. State, 435 So.2d 645 (Miss.1983), and affirmed the decision of the trial court. As noted by Leatherwood in his motion to vacate, the majority of his present claims were raised on direct appeal, not appealed, or not raised at the trial level. These claims are procedurally barred or res adjudicata and not subject to further review by this Court. Only Leatherwood's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel remains to be considered by this Court.
Leatherwood contends he was deprived of his right under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution to effective assistance of counsel; that his counsel failed to investigate the law or supporting facts minimally necessary to represent him at trial and sentencing; and that his defense counsel ignored or failed to investigate potential defenses and then undertook no meaningful preparation for the sentencing phase.
Leatherwood specifically states several claims as to his defense counsel's ineffectiveness. These specific claims will be discussed in the order presented.
Leatherwood contends that if his defense counsel had investigated he would have uncovered at least fifteen substantial witnesses who could and would have provided favorable character evidence concerning Leatherwood. Leatherwood provided affidavits from these potential witnesses. The substance of these statements was that Leatherwood (1) was an excellent student with above average grades; (2) had a good reputation in school and was involved in high school activities; (3) was a reliable honest and conscientious employee who worked diligently at his after-school job; (4) participated in church and youth activities; (5) was never involved in any trouble in or out of school except for traffic tickets; (6) had a strong desire for approval and was easily influenced; and (7) was not viewed as violent or temperamental or as the type who would inflict harm. According to Leatherwood, these mitigation witnesses all live in Leatherwood's hometown of DeRidder, Louisiana and were willing to testify and could have been easily located by defense counsel.
Leatherwood contends that his counsel made no effort to explain to him or his parents the importance of having character witnesses at the sentencing hearing and his counsel's advice to plead guilty made Leatherwood's life dependent on the evidence presented at the sentencing trial.
Leatherwood also contends that his counsel made no effort to obtain his school, medical, or army records despite the fact that he had been in high school just five months prior to the killing and that the record would have been useful in mitigation against the death penalty.
Leatherwood's second claim is that defense counsel failed to investigate and present available psychological evidence.
During the sentencing trial it was apparent that defense counsel sought to demonstrate that Leatherwood was an inherently good person who had fallen under the domination of George David Tokman. Yet, Leatherwood contends, psychological evidence relevant to his chosen defense had been developed in Leatherwood's trial in Louisiana but his counsel made no effort to use this evidence or any other evidence to support this defense.
Leatherwood was tried in Louisiana for armed robbery and underwent a psychological evaluation performed by Dr. David Post, a clinical psychologist in DeRidder, Louisiana. Leatherwood contends that his Mississippi counsel knew of this evaluation and generally about the results of the evaluation through conversations with Leatherwood's parents. Leatherwood's Louisiana counsel had also informed defense counsel of Dr. Post and the substance of his testimony in the Louisiana court cases.
The psychological profile for Leatherwood was as follows: He was emotionally immature and dependent on the acceptance of others. Though intelligent, he could only succeed in a highly structured situation where goals are clearly defined. He is not creative enough to define his own goals and depends on others for direction. He is a follower who in stressful situations becomes overwhelmed and immobolized by emotional distress. His reaction to stress prevents him from using his intelligence to exhibit rational behavior in keeping with his usual standards and further exacerbates his tendency to follow others. Dr. Post found that the characteristics associated with antisocial and psychopathic personality types were not found in Leatherwood.
Next Leatherwood contends that counsel erred by failing to consult an independent pathologist concerning the circumstances of the victim's death. The purpose of such evidence or testimony would have been to support Leatherwood's version of the crime and discredit the testimony of Jerry Fuson, another participant in the crime. Fuson testified that Leatherwood, after putting the rope around the victim's neck, jerked him from the driver's seat into the backseat. Leatherwood testified that the driver climbed into the backseat. Leatherwood contends that the pathologist would demonstrate that he did not apply such excessive force to the victim that would have caused his death.
Leatherwood next argues that his guilty plea was induced by his counsel's ineffectiveness and was constitutionally invalid for the reasons which follow.
Counsel was retained in the fall of 1980. According to Leatherwood's argument, counsel's strategy was to seek a plea bargain arrangement. The first in-depth interview of Leatherwood was conducted less than one month before trial by a new associate in counsel's firm who was fresh out of law school. Less than three weeks before trial counsel told Leatherwood's parents that plea bargaining efforts had failed.
Leatherwood contends that by relying on a false hope that a plea bargain would materialize counsel failed to undertake the factual investigation and legal research necessary to defend the capital murder charges or to investigate mitigation evidence for the sentencing hearing.
It is Leatherwood's contention that his defense counsel erroneously advised him to plead guilty due to a failure to research the law. According to Leatherwood, counsel advised him that if he pled guilty the state would be limited in the evidence it could present concerning the details of the murder during the sentencing phase. This, of course, is not the law. A plea of guilty does not restrict the state from offering evidence of the details of the commission of the crime that would have otherwise been admissible during the guilt phase.
The legal test as to effective assistance of counsel was recently established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), where the United States Supreme Court held that on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel the benchmark is "whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." 466 U.S. at ----, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d at 692-93. This is because counsel plays a critical role in assuring that the adversarial system does produce a just result.
The burden of proving ineffective assistance of counsel is on the defendant to show that the counsel's performance was (1) deficient, and that (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. If the defendant fails to prove either component then reversal of a conviction or sentence is not warranted. 466 U.S. at ----, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693.
The defendant is required to specify the acts or omissions that are alleged to be the result of unreasonable legal assistance.
In assessing whether or not a defendant received a fair trial or whether a fair trial was undermined by counsel's errors: "The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different." 466 U.S. at ----, 104 S.Ct. at 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d at 698.
In assessing whether counsel's performance was deficient the standard of performance is that of "reasonably effective assistance." 466 U.S. at ----, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693. This continues to be reasonableness under prevailing professional norms and reasonableness considering all the circumstances.
There is a strong presumption that counsel's conduct is within the wide range of reasonable professional conduct. There are however certain basic duties required of an attorney when representing a criminal defendant. These duties include the following: to assist the defendant, to advocate the defendant's cause, to consult the defendant on important decisions and to keep the defendant informed of important developments. However, there is no exhaustive list and no set of detailed rules which can take into account all the circumstances counsel faces or all the legitimate decisions on how to represent a defendant. There is no single, particular way to defend a client or to provide effective assistance.
To fairly assess the attorney performance "every effort [must] be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight." 466 U.S. at...
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