Leatherwood v. State, No. 32A05-0710-PC-573.

Docket NºNo. 32A05-0710-PC-573.
Citation880 N.E.2d 315
Case DateFebruary 07, 2008
CourtCourt of Appeals of Indiana
880 N.E.2d 315
Terry LEATHERWOOD, Appellant-Petitioner,
v.
STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Respondent.
No. 32A05-0710-PC-573.
Court of Appeals of Indiana.
February 7, 2008.

[880 N.E.2d 317]

Susan K. Carpenter, Public Defender of. Indiana, Jonathan O. Chenoweth, Deputy Public Defender, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.

Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Joby D. Jerrells, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

OPINION

BRADFORD, Judge.


Appellant-Petitioner. Terry Leatherwood appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief ("PCR"). Leatherwood contends that the post-conviction court erred in refusing to apply the holding of Fajardo v. State, 859 N.E.2d 1201 (Ind.2007), that an amendment of substance to a charging information will be allowed no later than thirty days prior to the omnibus date. In this case of first impression, we affirm.

FACTS

The facts underlying Leatherwood's convictions were found by this court in his direct appeal:

The evidence most favorable to the convictions reveals that Leatherwood had an ongoing sexual relationship with his daughter, D.M., who was thirteen years old in October 2001. On October 22, 2001, the State charged Leatherwood with one count of child molesting, alleging that Leatherwood had intercourse with D.M. "on or about October 2001," another count of child molesting alleging that he performed deviate sexual conduct with D.M. "on or about October 2001," and one count of incest occurring "on or about October 2001." The omnibus date was set for December 21, 2001, which was later reset to January 18, 2002, on Leatherwood's motion, After some continuances, a trial date of June 10, 2002, was set.

On May 15, 2002, the State attempted to amend the information by filing additional counts. four through nine, which alleged child molesting via intercourse "on or between September-October 19, 2001," child molesting via intercourse "on or between June 1999-September 2001," child molesting via intercourse "on or between June 1999-September 2001," child molesting via deviate sexual conduct "on or between June 1999-September 2001," child molesting via sexual

880 N.E.2d 318

intercourse "on or between March 1998-June 1999," and child molesting via deviate sexual conduct "on or between March 1998-June 1999." Pursuant to Leatherwood's motion, the trial court dismissed these new counts on May 17, 2002. On May 20, 2002, the State amended the original three counts to specify that the alleged events occurred "On or between October 19-20, 2001." It also petitioned the trial court to reconsider its dismissal of counts four through seven. The trial court allowed the State to file an amended count four alleging child molesting via intercourse "on or between September 2001-October 18, 2001," count five alleging child molesting via intercourse "on or between June 1999-September 2001," and count seven (later renumbered count six) alleging child molesting via deviate sexual conduct "on or between June 1999-September 2001."

Following these amendments, the jury trial was rescheduled for July 8, 2002. Leatherwood later moved for a continuance, resulting in a final trial date of September 21, 2002. At trial, D.M. testified as to her sexual relationship with Leatherwood, including that he regularly had sexual intercourse with her and would frequently ejaculate in her mouth, but never in her vagina, When asked to describe the specific incident that occurred on the night of October 19-20, 2001, as alleged in counts one through three, D.M. testified that Leatherwood had sexual intercourse with her, but was "not completely sure" whether they engaged in oral sex that night. The State also introduced Leatherwood's videotaped confession to police into evidence. In the tape, Leatherwood admits to having been in a sexual relationship with his daughter over the past one or two years. He also specifically confesses to having had intercourse with D.M. on the night of October 19-20, 2001, to performing oral sex on D.M. that might, and to ejaculating in her mouth "the way it normally was." ... The jury found Leatherwood guilty of all counts.

Appellant's App. pp. 72-74. The trial court sentenced Leatherwood to an aggregate sentence of 120 years of incarceration.

On June 5, 2003, on direct appeal, this court concluded, inter alia, that allowing the State to file amended charges four through six approximately four months after the omnibus date, even though contrary to the provisions of Indiana Code section 35-34-1-5(b), did not prejudice Leatherwood and was therefore proper. On February 23, 2004, Leatherwood filed a PCR petition. On January 16, 2007, the Indiana Supreme Court issued Fajardo, 859 N.E.2d at 1201, in which it concluded that amendments of substance to a charging information could not be made after thirty days prior to the omnibus date, regardless of a lack of prejudice. Id. at 1208; Ind.Code § 35-34-1-5(b) (2006). On May 18, 2007, Leatherwood amended his PCR petition to include his claim that the trial court erred in allowing the untimely amendment to his charging information. On August 20, 2007, the postconviction court denied Leatherwood's PCR petition.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

Our standard for reviewing the denial `of a PCR petition is well-settled:

In reviewing the judgment of a postconviction court, appellate courts consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences supporting its judgment. The post-conviction court is the sole judge of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. To prevail on appeal from denial of post-conviction relief, the petitioner must show that the evidence as a whole leads unerringly and unmistakably

880 N.E.2d 319

to a conclusion opposite to that reached by the post-conviction court.... Only where the evidence is without conflict and leads to but one conclusion, and the post-conviction court has reached the opposite conclusion, will its findings or conclusions be disturbed as being contrary to law.

Hall v. State, 849 N.E.2d 466, 468-69 (Ind. 2006) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Leatherwood argues that this court should revisit its earlier decision regarding the amended charges in light of Fajardo, which all agree would entitle him to relief were we to apply it. The State counters that our earlier decision on this question is now the "law of the case" and that we should not revisit it.

The law of the case doctrine mandates that an appellate court's determination of a legal issue binds both the trial court and the court on appeal in any subsequent appeal involving the same case and relevantly similar facts. The doctrine's admittedly important purpose is to minimize unnecessary relitigation of the legal issues once they have been resolved by an appellate court.

With due respect for the doctrine of res judicata...

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8 practice notes
  • Shaw v. Wilson, No. 12–1628.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)
    • August 28, 2013
    ...performance. The state also cites a case holding that Fajardo is not retroactive in a collateral attack, Leatherwood v. Indiana, 880 N.E.2d 315, 320 (Ind.Ct.App.2008), but that decision is irrelevant because the relief to which Shaw is entitled is a new direct appeal. Should Indiana choose ......
  • Singleton v. State, No. 45A03-0712-PC-551.
    • United States
    • Indiana Court of Appeals of Indiana
    • June 26, 2008
    ...recently determined that post-conviction petitioners are not entitled to the retroactive application of Fajardo. Leatherwood v. State, 880 N.E.2d 315, 321 (Ind.Ct.App.2008), reh'g denied, trans....
  • Shaw v. Wilson, No. 12-1628
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)
    • July 24, 2013
    ...performance. The state also cites a case holding that Fajardo is not retroactive in a collateral attack, Leatherwood v. Indiana, 880 N.E.2d 315, 320 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), but that decision is irrelevant because the relief to which Shaw is entitled is a new direct appeal. Should Indiana choo......
  • Vazquez v. State, No. 79A02–1207–PC–545.
    • United States
    • Indiana Court of Appeals of Indiana
    • September 19, 2013
    ...to the amendment of an information based on the reasoning later adopted in Fajardo ), trans. denied. See also Leatherwood v. State, 880 N.E.2d 315, 318 (Ind.Ct.App.2008) (holding that Fajardo did not apply retroactively to cases on post-conviction review), reh'g denied, trans. denied. Couns......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
8 cases
  • Shaw v. Wilson, No. 12–1628.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)
    • August 28, 2013
    ...performance. The state also cites a case holding that Fajardo is not retroactive in a collateral attack, Leatherwood v. Indiana, 880 N.E.2d 315, 320 (Ind.Ct.App.2008), but that decision is irrelevant because the relief to which Shaw is entitled is a new direct appeal. Should Indiana choose ......
  • Singleton v. State, No. 45A03-0712-PC-551.
    • United States
    • Indiana Court of Appeals of Indiana
    • June 26, 2008
    ...recently determined that post-conviction petitioners are not entitled to the retroactive application of Fajardo. Leatherwood v. State, 880 N.E.2d 315, 321 (Ind.Ct.App.2008), reh'g denied, trans....
  • Shaw v. Wilson, No. 12-1628
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)
    • July 24, 2013
    ...performance. The state also cites a case holding that Fajardo is not retroactive in a collateral attack, Leatherwood v. Indiana, 880 N.E.2d 315, 320 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), but that decision is irrelevant because the relief to which Shaw is entitled is a new direct appeal. Should Indiana choo......
  • Vazquez v. State, No. 79A02–1207–PC–545.
    • United States
    • Indiana Court of Appeals of Indiana
    • September 19, 2013
    ...to the amendment of an information based on the reasoning later adopted in Fajardo ), trans. denied. See also Leatherwood v. State, 880 N.E.2d 315, 318 (Ind.Ct.App.2008) (holding that Fajardo did not apply retroactively to cases on post-conviction review), reh'g denied, trans. denied. Couns......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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