Leatherwood v. United States
| Decision Date | 21 January 2014 |
| Docket Number | 2:10-cv-8054-LSC-JHE,2:08-cr-0064-LSC-JHE |
| Parties | RICKY GUY LEATHERWOOD, Movant, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama |
This is a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct a sentence, brought by a federal prisoner, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
The movant, Ricky Guy Leatherwood, was convicted in this court on July 2, 2008, on his plea of guilty1 to one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of cocaine base, five kilograms or more of cocaine hydrochloride, and marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), and (b)(1)(A)(Count 1s); one count of possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(Count 8s); one count of criminal forfeiture, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(1) and (2)(Count 34s); and two counts of use of a communication device to facilitate a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b)(Counts 49s and 52s).He was sentenced on October 23, 2008, to a term of imprisonment for 120 months on each count, to be served concurrently, and to be followed by a 60-month supervised release term.
On appeal, Leatherwood's court-appointed attorney Thomas Wolsoncroft filed a motion to withdraw, supported by an Anders brief. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Leatherwood's conviction and sentences on September 17, 2009, noting that its "independent examination of the entire record revealed no arguable issues of merit."
In support of his motion to vacate, Leatherwood claims that he received constitutionally ineffective counsel because counsel:
In response to the court's order to show cause, the respondent has filed an answer in which it maintains that the motion to vacate is due to be denied. In response, Leatherwood has filed a traverse.
The United States Supreme Court has established a national standard for judging the effectiveness of criminal defense counsel under the Sixth Amendment. "The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as havingproduced a just result." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The Court elaborated:
A convicted defendant's claim that counsel's assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction or death sentence has two components. First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. "Because the [petitioner] must prove both deficiency and prejudice, a [petitioner's] failure to prove either will be fatal to his claim." Johnson v. Scott, 68 F.3d 106, 109 (5th Cir. 1995).
Under the Strickland test, the petitioner must initially show that counsel's representation fell below an "objective standard of reasonableness." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. "While it need not be errorless, counsel's advice 'must be within the realm of competence demanded of attorneys representing criminal defendants.'" Jones v. White, 992 F.2d 1548, 1557 (11th Cir. 1993)(quoting Stano v. Dugger, 921 F.2d 1125, 1151 (11th Cir.)(en banc), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 835 (1991)). In making such an evaluation, "the court should recognize that counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. The effectiveness or ineffectiveness of counsel must be evaluated by consideration of the totality of the circumstances. Stanley v. Zant, 697 F.2d 955, 962 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1219 (1984).
The second requisite element in a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is a showing of prejudice. Even if counsel made an error so egregious as to be outside the broad scope of competence expected of attorneys, a movant can obtain relief only if the error caused actual prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691-92. In order to establish actual prejudice, a petitioner must show that "there is a reasonable probability that but for the attorney's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Armstead v. Scott, 37 F.3d 202, 207 (5th Cir. 1994). A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceedings. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Furthermore, in addition to showing that the outcome would have been different, a petitioner must prove that "counsel's deficient performance caused the outcome to be unreliable or the proceeding to be fundamentally unfair." Armstead v. Scott, 37 F.3d 202, 207 (5th Cir. 1994)(citing Lockhart v. Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. 838, 844 (1993)). "In other words, a 'counsel's unprofessional errors [must] so upset the adversarial balance between the defense and prosecution that the trial was rendered unfair and the verdict suspect.'" Weekley v. Jones, 56 F.3d 889, 897 (8th Cir. 1995)(quoting Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. at 842). "Unreliability or unfairness does not result if the ineffectiveness of counsel does not deprive the defendant of any substantive or procedural right to which the law entitles him." Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. at 844.
The Strickland two-part test applies to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel. United States v. Pease, 240 F.3d 938, 941 (11th Cir. 2001); Hill v.Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 60 (1985). In a guilty plea context, a defendant must show "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Gordon v. United States, 518 F.3d 1291, 1297 (11th Cir. 2008)(quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)).
Leatherwood first claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to inform him that he could be sentenced below the mandatory minimum 120-month sentence pursuant to the "safety-valve." A district court may impose a sentence of imprisonment below the statutory minimum if the defendant meets the "safety-valve" criteria set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). Title 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) provides:
Leatherwood alleges that he met all the requirements for application of the "safety-valve" and, but for counsel's failure to discuss the "safety-valve" provision with him or argue in court for a "safety-valve" reduction, he would have been eligible for a sentence reduction.
To meet the requirements of the "tell-all" provision of the "safety-valve," a defendant has an "affirmative responsibility to 'truthfully disclose to the government all information and evidence that he has about the offense and all relevant conduct.'" United States v. Johnson, 375 F.3d 1300, 1302 (11th Cir. 2004)(citing United States v. Yate, 176 F.3d 1309, 1310 (11th Cir. 1999)). The offense for which the defendant is convicted determines the scope of information a defendant must disclose. Id. (citing United States v. Figueroa, 199 F.3d 1281, 1283 (11th Cir. 2000).
In response to the allegations against him, Leatherwood's court-appointed attorney, Thomas Wolsoncroft, has submitted an affidavit. Doc. 6-3. In his affidavit, Mr. Wolsoncroftstates that on several occasions he discussed possible sentence reductions with Leatherwood, but Leatherwood affirmed on more than one occasion that he "would not give evidence or cooperate with the Government." Id. at 2. Additionally, the government states in its...
To continue reading
Request your trial