Leaton v. Flik Int'l Corp.
| Decision Date | 11 August 2021 |
| Docket Number | 2:19-cv-425-JLB-MRM |
| Parties | RICHARD LEATON and KAREN LEATON, Plaintiffs, v. FLIK INTERNATIONAL CORP., d/b/a FLIK HOSPITALITY GROUP AT HERTZ, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Defendant Flik International Corp., d/b/a Flik Hospitality Group at Hertz (“Flik”), moves for summary judgment. (Doc 46.) After careful review of the record, the parties' briefs, and viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs Richard and Karen Leaton, Flik's motion for summary judgment is granted.
This lawsuit arises from a slip-and-fall accident at the corporate headquarters of the Hertz Corporation (“Hertz”) in Estero, Florida. On April 3, 2016, Plaintiff Richard Leaton-a Hertz employee-exited a conference room and was heading down the corridor toward the elevators when he passed a food station on his left. (Doc. 46-4 at 102:7-12.) He did not stop at the food station but instead walked directly by it. (Id. at 102:13-16.)[1] Mr. Leaton testified that he slipped and fell in front of the food station after he had walked about five to seven steps out of the conference room. (Id. at 102:25-103:3.)
Mr Leaton did not notice any liquid on the floor prior to his fall, but he noticed a wet spot on the back of his pants afterwards. (Id. at 99:24-100:6, 104:13- 24.) He does not know what the liquid was or how it got there, and he does not know how long the liquid was on the ground. He believes, however, that he slipped on water that came from a drink dispenser, which was sitting on the edge of the food service table at the time. (Doc. 46-4 at 106:14-22.) In a Hertz incident report, Robert Leverenz-Hertz's Corporate Security manager-states that he inspected the scene of the accident and did “not notice any contributing factors or items on the ground area where Mr. Leaton fell.” (Doc. 46-6 at 2.) Mr. Leverenz also states that a short time after Mr. Leaton's fall, cleaning personnel “responded to the scene with a mop and did not witness any liquid spillage on the ground as no corrective action was taken.” Id. However, a photograph of the scene shows that a yellow floor sign with the warning “caution-wet floor” had been placed in front of the food station after Mr. Leaton fell. (Doc. 46-4 at 99:16-19; Doc. 46-7.)
Mr Leverenz states that upon arriving at the scene, he observed Mr. Leaton lying on the floor with his head propped up on a backpack. (Doc. 46-6 at 2.) Mr. Leaton was conscious, and he told Mr. Leverenz that “one leg went one way and his other leg went the other way and he ended up on the floor.” Id. Emergency personnel were called and Mr. Leaton was transported to the hospital.
Mr. Leaton brought this lawsuit in May 2019, alleging a single count of negligence.[2] Mr. Leaton has not sued Hertz, which is both his employer and the owner of the premises where the accident occurred. Instead, he has sued Flik, the operator of the self-service food station located in the hallway of Hertz's headquarters. Under its Food Services Agreement with Hertz, Flik provides certain food and beverage services and sales at Hertz's Estero headquarters. Included in those services is a food catering station that Flik employee Prescilia “Lia” Fnu sets up five days a week in the hallway where Mr. Leaton fell. (Doc. 46-1; Doc. 46-3 at 8.) Ms. Fnu testified that she sets up the catering station and then leaves; she returns between one and four hours later to clean up the station. (Doc. 46-3 at 26- 27.) The food catering station includes a water dispenser with a pull spout, along with other drinks, such as self-service coffee and iced tea dispensers.
Ms. Fnu testified that she always places the water dispenser against the back wall away from the edge of the counter when she sets up the catering station. (Id. at 14-15.) Flik's corporate representative, Krystine Russo, testified that Flik trained its employees to set water dispenser back from the edge of the food station, but not all the way back against the wall. (Doc. 48-1 at 12:10-21, 35:5-36:11.) Mr. Leaton testified, however, that the water dispenser was located close to the edge of the table at the time of his accident. (Doc. 46-4 at 98.)[3] A photograph taken of the scene approximately an hour after Mr. Leaton fell shows a water dispenser at the edge of the food station countertop. (Doc. 46-7.)[4]
A party may obtain summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The moving party bears the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Shiver v. Chertoff, 549 F.3d 1342, 1343 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). To meet that burden, the moving party must point to specific evidence in the record-including depositions, documents, affidavits, or declarations-to demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute regarding the material facts. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Once the moving party has met its burden, the non-moving party must demonstrate that a genuine dispute exists as to “each essential element of the case for which he has the burden of proof.” Ray v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 327 Fed.Appx. 819, 825 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). “[T]he nonmoving party ‘must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.'” Ray, 327 Fed.Appx. at 825 (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, (1986)). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [nonmoving party's] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which a jury could reasonably find for the [non-moving party].” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986).
In resolving issues under Rule 56(c), the court views the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draws all reasonable inferences in the nonmoving party's favor. See Davis v. Williams, 451 F.3d 759, 763 (11th Cir. 2006). “[T]he court may not weigh conflicting evidence to resolve disputed factual issues; if a genuine dispute is found, summary judgment must be denied.” Carlin Commc'n, Inc. v. So. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 802 F.2d 1352, 1356 (11th Cir. 1986) (citing Warrior Tombigbee Transp. Co. v. M/V Nan Fung, 695 F.2d 1294, 1299 (11th Cir. 1983)).
Flik argues it is entitled to summary judgment because there is no evidence that any water was spilled on the floor by a Flik employee. Flik asserts that Mr. Leaton's testimony that he slipped on water dripped from the drink dispenser on Flik's catering station is based on speculation rather than personal knowledge, and there is no record evidence to support either of those facts beyond Mr. Leaton's speculative testimony. In addition, Flik contends that it cannot be held liable based on the mere existence of water on the floor because it did not control the area in which Mr Leaton fell, and even if it did, there is no evidence it had either actual or constructive knowledge of the water spill that Mr. Leaton thinks caused his fall.
Mr. Leaton responds by asserting that he knows he slipped on water on the floor because he noticed a wet spot on his pants after the fall. Further, he argues that a jury could reasonably infer that the water came from Flik's nearby water dispenser. Mr. Leaton asserts that he does not need to show Flik's actual or constructive knowledge of the water spill because Flik is responsible for having created that dangerous condition. A reasonable jury could find Flik was responsible for that condition because Flik's employee, Ms. Fnu, placed a self-service water dispenser near the edge of the service counter without placing a mat on the floor underneath the waterspout to catch spills. Relying on the series of photographs taken of the food station in the months following the accident, all showing the water dispenser at the edge of the table, Mr. Leaton argues that Flik breached its general duty of care to others by conducting business in a manner that created a foreseeably dangerous situation for people walking by Flik's food catering station.
The Court addresses these arguments as follows: First, the Court will discuss the applicability of a premises-liability theory of negligence to Flik's conduct at issue in this case. Second, the Court will discuss Mr. Leaton's argument that Flik is liable under a general theory of negligence rather than a premises liability theory. And third, the Court will discuss whether the evidence is sufficient under either theory of liability to support a jury verdict in Mr. Leaton's favor on the issue of proximate causation.
A negligence claim under Florida law[5] has four elements: “(1) a duty by defendant to conform to a certain standard of conduct; (2) a breach by defendant of that duty; (3) a causal connection between the breach and injury to plaintiff; and (4) loss or damage to plaintiff.” Encarnacion v. Lifemark Hosps. of Fla., 211 So.3d 275, 277-78 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) (internal citation and quotation omitted).
As to the duty element, Florida law prescribes that “'[t]he duty of the landowner to a business invitee is to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition and to warn the invitee of latent perils which are known or should be known to the owner but which are not known to the invitee or which, by the exercise of due care could not be known to him.'” Wilson-Greene v. City of Miami, 208 So.3d 1271, 1274 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) (quoting Storr v. Proctor, 490 So.2d 135, 136 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)). The duty of, as here, a vendor contracted to provide services on another's business premises “turns on a...
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