Leaty v. US

• Decision Date: 11 October 1990
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 90-1207.
• Citation: 748 F. Supp. 268
• Parties: Ricardo LEATY, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES of America, United States Postal Service, John Doe, a fictitious name, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

748 F. Supp. 268

Ricardo LEATY, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES of America, United States Postal Service, John Doe, a fictitious name, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 90-1207.

United States District Court, D. New Jersey.

October 11, 1990.

Michael Chertoff, U.S. Atty. by Susan Handler-Menahem, Asst. U.S. Atty., Newark, N.J., for defendants U.S., U.S. Postal Service and John Doe.

Jeremy Doppelt, Pros. Atty., East Orange, N.J., for plaintiff.

OPINION

DEBEVOISE, District Judge.

Plaintiff Ricardo Leaty brought this action on March 27, 1990 to recover for personal injuries incurred when the car in which he was a passenger and driven by his mother, Justa Leaty, collided with a vehicle owned and operated by the United States Postal Service. Complaint, Count I, ¶¶ 1, 3-5. Actions were filed against Justa Leaty, the United States of America, and the United States Postal Service for negligence. Plaintiff brings this suit against the defendant United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80. As this cause of action arises under the statutes of the United States, jurisdiction is proper in this court. 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

The United States as defendant in this action moves for dismissal on the ground that plaintiff never properly filed an administrative claim with the United States Postal Service as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) before this court can take jurisdiction over the matter.

Plaintiff initiated his claim against the defendant by filing an administrative tort claim form, a Standard Form 95, with the United States Postal Service. A Standard Form 95 naming plaintiff as a claimant was first sent to the Postal Service in September, 1988. A second, amended form was sent to defendant and stamped "received" by the Post Office on November 8, 1989.¹ This form named plaintiff, his mother Justa Leaty and his father Ernesto Leaty as claimants but was signed by Justa Leaty alone. The form also provided one sum for the amount claimed by both Justa Leaty and Ricardo Leaty for personal injuries.

On November 3, 1988, the attorney then retained by plaintiff sent a letter of representation to the Postal Service, indicating the amount of plaintiff's medical bills to date, the attorney's status as Ricardo Leaty's legal representative, and a willingness to enter into settlement negotiations. This letter named plaintiff Ricardo Leaty as the attorney's sole client in this matter. The record before the court reveals no reply by defendant to this communication. The Postal Service did not inform plaintiff that his claim was defective because a separate claim form was not filed and/or signed by him or by someone acting as his legal representative.² Nor does the record reflect any request or attempt to enter into settlement negotiations with plaintiff's attorney.

As a consequence of this administrative indifference and neglect, plaintiff filed suit in this court after six months of inaction by the Postal Service. At plaintiff's option, this inaction constituted a constructive final denial of the claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). See Miller v. United States, 741 F.2d 148, 150 (7th Cir.1984). Subsequent to the filing of this action, defendant did not raise any objection to the sufficiency of plaintiff's administrative claim until the filing of the instant motion.

DISCUSSION

Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), plaintiff's complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim if defendant demonstrates "beyond a doubt that plaintiffs can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); Johnsrud v. Carter, 620 F.2d 29, 33 (3d Cir.1980). All allegations set forth in the complaint must be accepted as true, see Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322, 92 S.Ct. 1079, 1081, 31 L.Ed.2d 263 (1972), and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in plaintiff's favor, see McKnight v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 583 F.2d 1229, 1235-36 (3d Cir.1978). To withstand the motion, it "is not necessary to plead facts upon which the claim is based." Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 446 (3d Cir.1977).

Defendant moves pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) for dismissal of plaintiff's action. The basis for this motion is defendant's claim that under 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a), the court is without jurisdiction to hear this case because plaintiff failed to file an administrative claim with the Postal Service before filing an action in federal court. The statutory provision provides in pertinent part:

An action shall not be instituted upon a claim against the United States, for money damages ... for personal injury ... caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the federal government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, unless the claimant shall have first presented the claim to the appropriate Federal agency and his claim shall have been finally denied by the agency in writing and sent by certified or registered mail. The failure of an agency to make final disposition of a claim within six months after it is filed shall, at the option of the claimant any time thereafter, be deemed a final denial of the claim for purposes of this section.

28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (as amended July 18, 1966, Pub.L. 89-506, § 2, 80 Stat. 306.).

Defendant contends that plaintiff's failure to submit an individual claim form signed personally by plaintiff or by plaintiff's attorney with adequate evidence of representation rendered plaintiff's claim fatally defective. Due to this alleged fatal deficiency, defendant argues, no cognizable administrative claim was ever made as a matter of law. Consequently, defendant argues that plaintiff never filed an administrative claim and is thus barred from pursuing an action in this forum.³

The central issue in the disposition of defendant's motion to dismiss is the determination of whether the Standard Form 95 submitted on plaintiff's behalf by his mother when taken together with a letter of representation from plaintiff's attorney can be considered sufficient to constitute an administrative claim and an adequate basis to initiate a court action under the Tort Claims Act. Defendant correctly notes that § 2675(a) is jurisdictional in nature and cannot be waived. See, e.g., Burns v. United States, 764 F.2d 722 (9th Cir.1985); Melo v. United States, 505 F.2d 1026 (8th Cir.1974). Defendant is fortunate in this respect; for if the sufficiency of an administrative claim for purposes of jurisdiction could be waived, defendant's inexcusably belated objection to the form of plaintiff's claim would undoubtedly constitute waiver and the court would need to proceed no further.⁴ Unfortunately, the issue is more complex than this and requires the court to determine how the Federal Tort Claims Act defines the jurisdiction of the court and how those legal standards apply to the facts of this case.

Any construction of § 2675(a), the jurisdictional provision of the Federal Tort Claims Act, must be undertaken in light of the section's underlying policy goals. The section

is designed ... to provide a procedure under which the government may investigate, evaluate and consider settlement of a claim. This purpose requires that the Notice of Claim provide sufficient information both to permit an investigation and to estimate the claim's worth. Keene Corp. v. United States, 700 F.2d 836, 842 (2d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 864, 104 S.Ct. 195, 78 L.Ed.2d 171 (1984); see Shipek v. United States, 752 F.2d 1352, 1354 (9th Cir.1985); Bush v. United States, 703 F.2d 491, 493-94 (11th Cir.1983); Douglas v. United States, 658 F.2d 445, 447 (6th Cir.1981); Adams v. United States, 615 F.2d 284, 289 (5th Cir.), clarified, 622 F.2d 197 (1980).

Johnson by Johnson v. United States, 788 F.2d 845, 848 (2d Cir.1986). The policy goal the provision was enacted to accomplish was "to ease court congestion and avoid unnecessary litigation, while making it possible for the Government to expedite the fair settlement of tort claims asserted against the United States." Id. at 845, 848-849 (quoting S.Rep. No. 1327, 89th Congress, 2d Sess. 2 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 2515, 2516).

A review of the decisional law defining the requisite qualities of a sufficient administrative claim indicates that the legal determination rests on whether the claim filed enables the target agency to pursue avenues of negotiation and settlement. "The courts appear to decide on the facts and circumstances of each case and the equities involved. The key factor seems to be adequate notice of the claim to the government agency, so that settlement will not be impeded." Champagne v. United States, 573 F.Supp. 488, 494 (E.D.La.1983); and see Estate of Santos v. United States, 525 F.Supp. 982 (D.P.R.1981); Hunter v. United States, 417 F.Supp. 272 (N.D.Cal. 1976). Accordingly, the determination of whether plaintiff's administrative claim was sufficient to confer jurisdiction on this court once it was ignored by the Postal Service for six months is made with reference to the written claim's utility in effecting the policy goals of § 2675(a). See Surratt v. United States, 582 F.Supp. 692, 699-700 (N.D.Ill.1984); Champagne, 573 F.Supp. at 494.

In Champagne, 573 F.Supp. 488, the mother of an adult child filed an administrative claim on the child's behalf for the wrongful death of the child's father. The adult child-claimant did not sign the Standard Form 95 though she was named in both the form and a letter sent by her mother's attorney. Although the claim was technically defective, the court held that the administrative claim prerequisite of the Federal Tort Claims Act was satisfied where the government was clearly on notice that the non-signatory claimant's claim was pending and the agency had "never informed anyone involved of the need for a separate claim by claimant...