Leavy v. Congregation Beth Shalom

• Citation: 490 F.Supp.2d 1011
• Decision Date: 24 May 2007
• Docket Number: No. 5:05-cv-04086.,5:05-cv-04086.
• Parties: Rabbi Bonnie LEAVY, Plaintiff, v. CONGREGATION BETH SHALOM and Sioux City Jewish Community Board f/k/a Jewish Federation of Sioux City, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa

Page 1011

490 F.Supp.2d 1011

Rabbi Bonnie LEAVY, Plaintiff, v. CONGREGATION BETH SHALOM and Sioux City Jewish Community Board f/k/a Jewish Federation of Sioux City, Defendants.

No. 5:05-cv-04086.

United States District Court, N.D. Iowa, Western Division.

May 24, 2007.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Daniel B. Shuck, Jeana L. Goosmann, Sioux City, IA, for Plaintiff.

Paul D. Lundberg, Lundberg Law Firm, Sioux City, IA, for Defendants.

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

GRITZNER, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on the motion of Defendants Congregation Beth Shalom (the Congregation) and the Sioux City Jewish Community Board for summary judgment. Plaintiff Rabbi Bonnie Leavy is represented by Daniel Shuck and Jeana Goosmann. Defendants are represented by Paul Lundberg. The Court has determined no hearing is necessary; therefore, the case is fully submitted and ready for ruling.

SUMMARY OF MATERIAL FACTS¹

Rabbi Leavy currently resides in Bethel Park, Pennsylvania. Congregation Beth Shalom and the Sioux City Jewish Community Board are religious organizations operating in Sioux City, Iowa. Rabbi Leavy served as the Congregation's religious leader or rabbi pursuant to two employment contracts. The first was signed July 3, 2002, for a term of two years. In May 2004, the parties entered into a second contract, at issue in the present case. The Board of Congregation Beth Shalom supervised Rabbi Leavy. The chairman of the board was Brent Rosenthal.²

The May 2004 contract provided that Rabbi Leavy would serve as rabbi to Congregation Beth Shalom for a period of three years ending August 14, 2007.³ Paragraph 11 provides that the agreement may be terminated by the Congregation for gross misconduct or an ongoing inability to perform the duties described in the agreement. According to the agreement, Rabbi Leavy's duties included the following: leading religious services, serving as principal and teacher in the Hebrew school, Bar/Bat Mitzvah training, visiting ill or confined congregants, satisfying pastoral needs of members, maintaining regular office hours, writing newsletter articles, and representing the Jewish community in a positive light.

Rabbi Leavy claims she suffered a physical disability related to a broken foot, which limited her ability to stand, walk, and move. She contends she outlined a set of accommodations that would permit her to work, and, despite her disability, she continued to perform her job duties in a manner that met Defendants' expectations.

Michael Potash, president of the Congregation, authored a memo outlining areas of the Congregation's dissatisfaction with Rabbi Leavy's performance, including communication with congregants, office hours, pastoral care, religious services, and secular community activities. Congregants were specifically concerned about Rabbi Leavy's participation in Minyan (communal prayer), her lack of visits to ill or infirm congregants, and her lack of availability to congregants. In December 2004, the Congregation gave Rabbi Leavy a written memorandum of concerns regarding her job performance and provided specific instructions for the timeliness of returning phone calls and number of visits to ill or confined congregants. Rabbi Leavy responded with a written memorandum, stating she had posted her office hours and made every reasonable effort to return congregants' phone calls and messages. She also stated that the visitation requirements outlined in the memo were not reasonable, given her foot injury. She requested that Al Shilling take her in a wheelchair to visit nursing homes and hospitals each Wednesday morning, Defendants claim Rabbi Leavy took advantage of alternate transportation once and then refused to continue with the accommodation.

In February 2005, the Defendants' board of directors determined that Rabbi Leavy's performance had not improved since the December 2004 memo, and the board voted to terminate her employment. Defendants contend the board of directors so acted after determining that Rabbi Leavy failed to provide pastoral leadership for the Congregation consistent with the rabbinic nature of her employment. They claim Rabbi Leavy failed to maintain reasonable and predictable office hours and was not accessible by phone for congregants needing her pastoral services. Defendants further assert she refused to properly respond to family needs regarding funerals, failed to provide pastoral care of congregants in nursing homes and hospitals, complained about the Congregation to non-members, and complained about individual congregants to other congregants. In sum, Defendants claim Rabbi Leavy failed to conform to the duties expected of her as pastoral leader of the Congregation.

Defendants point to the Guidelines for Rabbinical-Congregational Relationships, published by the Union of American Hebrew Congregations and the Central Conference of American Rabbis, which states, "Sacred Jewish values underlie the partnership between Rabbi and congregation,". "[a] congregation is best served when its lay and rabbinic leadership consider themselves partners in carrying on the scared functions of the Synagogue," and "the Rabbi is the congregation's chosen spiritual leader, called to minister to the religious, educational, pastoral, and communal needs of the membership."

Rabbi Leavy contends she performed her job adequately at all times, despite her foot injury disability. She brought this suit claiming she was discharged because of her disability and in violation of her employment agreement.

Rabbi Leavy alleges claims of disability discrimination under state and federal law and breach of contract. Jurisdiction is proper as Rabbi Leavy's discrimination claim arises under federal law, the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. Jurisdiction for claims under Iowa Code § 216.6(1)(a) and breach of contract is premised on the Court's supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Defendants admit Rabbi Leavy has exhausted her administrative remedies. Defendants assert that Rabbi Leavy was not disabled within the meaning of the ADA, and she refused reasonable accommodations for her alleged physical impairment. Defendants further assert that personnel decisions affecting clergy are protected religious activity under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.⁴

APPLICABLE LAW AND DISCUSSION

I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 permits parties against whom claims are brought to move for summary judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(b). That rule provides that summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. R. 56(c). The United States Supreme Court has explained that "`[w]hen the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.'" Scott v. Harris, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 1776, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (footnote omitted and alteration by the Scott Court)). In other words, "the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat'" a properly supported motion for summary judgment; instead, there must be "`no genuine issue of material fact.'" Id. (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (emphases by the Anderson Court)).

However, even where there are competing narratives, "one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment." Id. Two or more sides of a factual dispute each supported by evidence identified by the parties metamorphose a generic factual dispute into a genuine one. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (to reject a motion for summary judgment, "the evidence [must be] such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party"), 249 ("[T]here is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party." (citing First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 20 L.Ed.2d 569 (1968)); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348 ("Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no `genuine issue for trial.'")). That is, the demonstration "that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts" is not sufficient. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348.

Of course, locating a genuine factual dispute that can be resolved in favor of the nonmoving party does not automatically render the entry of summary judgment inappropriate: the dispute must also be about a fact that is material. A genuine dispute about a fact is material if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Conversely, genuine disputes about "irrelevant or unnecessary" facts are not sufficient. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. As a result, if the evidence supporting a claim "is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Id. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (citing Cities Serv., 391 U.S. at 290, 88 S.Ct. 1575; Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 87 S.Ct. 1425, 18 L.Ed.2d 577 (1967) (per curiam)); see also Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 600, 118 S.Ct. 1584, 140 L.Ed.2d 759 (1998) (in the face of a properly supported motion, requiring a nonmoving party to "identify...