Leavy v. GFS Grp.

• Decision Date: 14 June 2022
• Docket Number: 21-CV-1913 JLS (WVG)
• Parties: ARNITRA LEAVY, an individual, Plaintiff, v. GFS GROUP, a corporate entity form unknown; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of California

ARNITRA LEAVY, an individual, Plaintiff,
v.
GFS GROUP, a corporate entity form unknown; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Defendants.

No. 21-CV-1913 JLS (WVG)

United States District Court, S.D. California

June 14, 2022

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS (ECF No. 4)

Hon. Janis L. Sammartino United States District Judge

Presently before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss (“Mot., ” ECF No. 4) filed by Defendant Global Food Services LLC (“Defendant” or “GFS”), erroneously named as GFS Group. Plaintiff Arnitra Leavy (“Plaintiff”) filled an Opposition to (“Opp'n, ” ECF No. 6), and Defendant filed a Reply in support of (“Reply, ” ECF No. 8), the Motion. The Court vacated the hearing on the Motion and took it under submission without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). See ECF No. 9. Having considered Plaintiff's Complaint (“Compl., ” ECF No. 1-2 at 10-33), the Parties' briefing, and the law, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendant's Motion for the reasons that follow.

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BACKGROUND^[1]

Defendant, who “operate[s] out of Oceanside, California, ” hired Plaintiff on or about September 18, 2007. Compl. ¶¶ 9-10. Plaintiff suffers from arthritis and, since 2007, has been designated as permanently disabled and requiring light duty. Id. ¶ 11. Plaintiff eventually became a shift lead supervisor earning an hourly wage of $14.51. Id. ¶ 10. “Plaintiff has always worked diligently, ” and “ha[s] even earned awards for her hard work and excellent customer service.” Id. ¶ 11.

Donna, the dining manager, had been arriving late for and leaving prior to the end of her shifts. Id. ¶ 12. “Defendant's agent was forcing Plaintiff to take over [Donna's] shifts, ” which was “more work than one person can cover” and “far more work than the position encompassed by a shift lead [supervisor], ” and “also verbally attack[ing] Plaintiff with foul and demeaning language.” Id. In or around October 2019, Plaintiff complained to Defendant's human resources department (“HR”) about Donna's actions, but Defendant failed to remedy the hostile work environment, instead permitting the situation to continue and escalate. Id. ¶ 13.

By in or around December 2019, the “constant harassment and work-related stress” was causing Plaintiff's health to suffer. Id. ¶ 14. On one occasion, Donna “unfairly wrote up Plaintiff five (5) times in one day just to harass and retaliate against her for her complaints to HR.” Id. This caused Plaintiff to shake and have difficulty breathing. Id. Plaintiff began to see stars and requested that a paramedic be called because of blood pressure concerns. Id. However, Defendant failed to call for paramedics or provide Plaintiff with workers' compensation documentation. Id. Plaintiff was suspended without pay for a week following the incident. Id. Thereafter, instead of reprimanding Donna,

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Defendant moved Plaintiff from zone to zone, “forcing her to work new jobs and with different staff.” Id. ¶ 16. “[Defendant] even placed [Plaintiff] on probation.” Id.

In or around January 2020, Defendant hired a new project manager, Dante. Id. “[Dante] constantly pressured Plaintiff to work harder and faster than was reasonable or safe.” Id. Plaintiff complained to Dante that he was supposed to assign her modified duties due to her disability. Id. Plaintiff also reported that she was experiencing pain and swelling in her right leg and requested workers' compensation paperwork. Id. However, Defendant denied Plaintiff's requests. Id. In fact, Dante removed personnel from Plaintiff's zones, thus forcing Plaintiff to do the work of multiple individuals herself. Id. ¶ 17. He would also stand near Plaintiff's work area to watch and intimidate Plaintiff. Id.

Dante instructed Plaintiff's supervisor, Tracy Williams, to find a reason to terminate Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 18. Defendant and its agents “w[ere] constantly looking for a reason to write [Plaintiff] up.” Id. ¶ 21. Whenever Plaintiff requested time off for illness, Defendant accused her of “faking it” and wrote her up. Id. No other employee was treated this way. Id. In May of 2020, Plaintiff's younger sister passed away, and Plaintiff asked for time off for the burial. Id. ¶ 22. Defendant refused to believe Plaintiff's request until Plaintiff texted a picture of her deceased sister. Id.

In August 2020, Plaintiff accepted a demotion because Defendant refused to accommodate Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 24. However, Plaintiff's health continued to deteriorate, and on or about September 16, 2020, “Plaintiff's doctor placed her off work for work-related stress and an arthritis flare up in her right shoulder.” Id. Plaintiff attempted to give HR her doctor's note, but Defendant refused to accept the document. Id. “[O]n or about May 3, 2021, Defendant wrongfully terminated Plaintiff.” Id. ¶ 25.

Plaintiff claims she filed at least four grievances concerning harassment and discrimination, but Defendant failed to remedy its hostile work environment. Id. ¶ 18. Plaintiff claims she was discriminated against on the basis of her age, id. ¶ 19, and her race, given that she was the only Black woman in her workplace, id. ¶ 20. Prior Black employees who have held Plaintiff's position have resigned as a result of the harassment and

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discrimination they have faced. Id. ¶ 23. Plaintiff further asserts she was discriminated against, retaliated against, and harassed due to her work-related injuries and her disability. Id. ¶ 26.

Plaintiff initiated this action on September 3, 2021, when she filed the Complaint in the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of San Diego. See generally Compl. The Complaint asserts nine claims for violations of California law: (1) discrimination in violation of California Government Code § 12940 et seq.; (2) failure to accommodate in violation of California Government Code § 12940(m); (3) failure to engage in interactive process in violation of California Government Code § 12940(n); (4) age discrimination in violation of California Government Code § 12940 et seq.; (5) race/national origin discrimination in violation of California Government Code § 12940 et seq.; (6) failure to prevent discrimination in violation of California Government Code § 12940(k); (7) retaliation in violation of California Government Code § 12940(h); (8) wrongful termination; and (9) violation of California Business & Professions Code § 17200 et seq. (the “UCL”). See generally id.

On November 10, 2021, Defendant removed to this District on the basis of diversity jurisdiction and federal enclave jurisdiction. See generally ECF No. 1 (“Notice of Removal”). The same day, Defendant filed the instant Motion.

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a party to raise by motion the defense that the complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, ” generally referred to as a motion to dismiss. The Court evaluates whether a complaint states a cognizable legal theory and sufficient facts in light of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), which requires a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Although Rule 8 “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,' . . . it [does] demand more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). In other words, “a plaintiff's obligation to

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provide the ‘grounds' of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). A complaint will not suffice “if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]' devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

To survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). A claim is facially plausible when the facts pled “allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). That is not to say that the claim must be probable, but there must be “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. Facts “‘merely consistent with' a defendant's liability” fall short of a plausible entitlement to relief. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). This review requires context-specific analysis involving the Court's “judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 675 (citation omitted). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]'-‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.'” Id.

“In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a district court must accept as true all facts alleged in the complaint, and draw all reasonable...