Lebeau v. Dyerville Mfg. Co.

• Citation: 26 R.I. 34,57 A. 1092
• Parties: LEBEAU v. DYERVILLE MFG. CO.
• Decision Date: 14 March 1904
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island

57 A. 1092

26 R.I. 34

LEBEAU

v. DYERVILLE MFG. CO.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

March 14, 1904.

Case for negligence by Henry Lebeau, pro-chein ami, against the Dyerville Manufacturing Company. On petition of defendant for new trial. Petition denied.

Argued before STINESS, C. J., and TILLINGHAST and DOUGLAS, JJ.

Thomas Curray, for plaintiff.

Walter B. Vincent, for defendant.

TILLINGHAST, J. The plaintiff was seriously injured, while in the act of cleaning out waste and dirt from beneath a carding machine in defendant's mill, by having his hand caught in the "licker-in," so called, in said machine. He was directed by the second hand, at the instance of the overseer of the carding room, to sweep out under the carding machines—to clean out everything?and, if he saw any waste hanging down underneath the machines, to pull it out; and the second hand testified that, to do the work properly, it was necessary to pull the dirt and waste out, over the sill of the machine, with one's hand. The plaintiff was 18 years of age at the time of the accident, and had been in defendant's employ since January, 1902. His first work was that of running drawings in the carding room, which he followed for two weeks, when his work was changed to that of roping boy, which work he continued to do up to the day of the accident, February 14, 1902. He testifies—and his testimony is corroborated by that of the second hand—that he had never cleaned out under the cards before, and that he had never seen under the cards, where the "licker-in" was situated; and the evidence shows that, owing to the collection of waste and dirt under the carding machines, it was impossible for any one who was cleaning it out to see the "licker-in," which was situated in the neighborhood of 18 or 20 inches back from the opening. The reason for taking the plaintiff from his regular employment and setting him to do the work in question was that the person who had been operating the carding machines, and cleaning out under them, being about to terminate his employment, had neglected his work, and on the day of the accident bad absolutely refused to clean out under the machines, so that they became choked up with dirt and waste. The evidence shows that the plaintiff was not instructed as to the danger connected with the doing of said work. At the trial of the case to the jury the plaintiff recovered a verdict in the sum of $3,075, and the case is now before us on the defendant's petition for a new trial on the ground that the verdict was against the evidence.

The only argument adduced in support of the petition is that the evidence shows contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff in putting his hand into the machine in manner aforesaid. It has been many times decided by this court—and such is the law everywhere—that the question of contributory negligence is one of fact for the jury, except in those cases where it is clear that reasonable minds could draw no other inference or conclusion, from the facts presented, than that the plaintiff was at fault. And as "said by Mr. Beach, in his valuable work on Contributory Negligence (see 3d Revised Ed. § 448): "It will, it is plain, in point of fact, very rarely occur that the case which the evidence discloses, either for or against the plaintiff, is so clear and incontestable as to leave no room for difference of opinion as to the merits. In almost every case something will appear upon which there may be contrariety of judgment, so that in the majority of instances the question of the plaintiff's negligence will be one of fact to be ultimately determined by the jury." In cases where the standard of ordinary care is fixed, then a failure to attain that standard is negligence in law; and, if it appears that such negligence was the proximate cause of the injury, a verdict rendered in disregard of such standard should be promptly set aside. But where, as in most cases, there is no fixed standard, and the jury are called upon to assume a standard, and then to measure the plaintiff's conduct thereby; or, in other words, when they are called upon to say, under given circumstances, whether the plaintiff was in the exercise of ordinary care —their finding must be clearly and palpably wrong in order to warrant the court in disregarding it. Clarke v. Lighting Co., 16 R. I. 463, 17 Atl. 59; Elliott v. Ry. Co., 18 R. I. 707, 28 Atl. 338, 31 Atl. 694, 23 L. R. A. 208; Sauthof v. Granger, 19 R. I. 606, 35 Atl. 300, at page 608, 19 R. I., 35 Atl. 300; Le Febvre v. Spinning Co., 24 R. I. 215, 52 Atl. 1025; Crandall v. Stafford Mfg. Co., 24 R. I. 555, 54 Atl. 52. Again, in order to hold an employé guilty of...