Lebeau v. State

• Decision Date: 19 September 2014
• Docket Number: No. 20120829.,20120829.
• Citation: 337 P.3d 254
• Court: Utah Supreme Court
• Parties: Andrew LeBEAU, Petitioner, v. STATE of Utah, Respondent.

337 P.3d 254

Andrew LeBEAU, Petitioner,

v.STATE of Utah, Respondent.

No. 20120829.

Supreme Court of Utah.

Sept. 19, 2014.

Reversed and remanded.

Lee, J., filed a dissenting opinion. Joan C. Watt, Brittany D. Enniss, Salt Lake City, for petitioner.

Sean D. Reyes, Att'y Gen., Jeanne B. Inouye, Asst. Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, for respondent.

Justice PARRISH authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice DURRANT, Associate Chief Justice NEHRING, and Justice DURHAM joined.Justice LEE filed a dissenting opinion.Justice PARRISH, opinion of the court:

INTRODUCTION

¶ 1 On certiorari, petitioner Andrew LeBeau asks us to consider whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the district court's imposition of a sentence of life without the possibility of parole following Mr. LeBeau's conviction for aggravated kidnapping pursuant to Utah Code section 76–5–302. Mr. LeBeau's conviction stems from a domestic dispute triggered by Mr. LeBeau's suspicion that his then-girlfriend, Stephanie, was engaged in an affair with another man. At trial, Mr. LeBeau was convicted of aggravated kidnapping, aggravated assault, and cruelty to an animal.¹ The district court imposed a sentence of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for the aggravated kidnapping conviction, which was to run consecutively to Mr. LeBeau's lesser sentences for the other convictions.

¶ 2 Mr. LeBeau unsuccessfully challenged his sentence of LWOP before the court of appeals. He now argues that the court of appeals erred when it affirmed the district court's imposition of LWOP because the district court failed to properly consider whether the interests of justice warranted a lesser sentence as allowed for in Utah's aggravated kidnapping statute. Because we conclude that the district court improperly applied the sentencing provisions of section 76–5–302 of the Utah Code, we reverse Mr. LeBeau's sentence of LWOP and remand for new sentencing.

¶ 12 After weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the district court found that the aggravating circumstances were “substantial” and the mitigating circumstances “almost non-existent.” It then imposed LWOP for the aggravated kidnapping conviction, the most severe sentence allowed under Utah Code section 76–5–302. The court also sentenced Mr. LeBeau to zero to five years for both the aggravated assault and failure-to-respond convictions. Finally, the court imposed a suspended sentence of 180 days for the cruelty-to-an-animal conviction and ordered Mr. LeBeau's lesser sentences to run consecutively with his LWOP sentence.

¶ 13 Mr. LeBeau timely appealed, arguing that the district court abused its discretion in imposing a sentence of LWOP for his aggravated kidnapping conviction. State v. Lebeau, 2012 UT App 235, ¶ 16, 286 P.3d 1. Specifically, Mr. LeBeau argued that the district court failed to adequately consider the interests of justice, as required by Utah Code section 76–5–302(4). See infra ¶ 24. According to Mr. LeBeau, the district court abused its discretion by (1) failing to consider as a mitigating factor that Mr. LeBeau acted under provocation, (2) failing to give adequate weight to Mr. LeBeau's family support and employment history, (3) failing to credit Mr. LeBeau with his relatively minor prior criminal history, and (4) imposing LWOP without consideration of the proper role of the Board of Pardons and Parole in evaluating the rehabilitative prospects of offenders. Lebeau, 2012 UT App 235 ¶¶ 13, 28, 30, 286 P.3d 1.

¶ 14 The court of appeals rejected Mr. LeBeau's arguments and upheld his LWOP sentence. Id. ¶ 37. The appeals court found that the district court “expressly considered all of [Mr. LeBeau's] mitigating evidence” and that Mr. LeBeau had “demonstrated no more than his disagreement with how the court weighed the mitigating factors.” Id. ¶ 29. Additionally, the appeals court reasoned that Mr. LeBeau's LWOP sentence was the presumptive sentence prescribed by the Legislature and was, therefore, appropriate. Id. ¶¶ 34–36.

¶ 15 We granted certiorari on the question of “[w]hether the court of appeals erred in affirming the district court's imposition of a sentence of life without parole pursuant to section 76–5–302(3) of the Utah Code.” We have jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78A–3–102(3)(a).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 16 “On certiorari, we review the decision of the court of appeals and not that of the district court.” State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, ¶ 11, 103 P.3d 699. We review the decision of the court of appeals for correctness, granting “no deference to its conclusions of law.” State v. Baker, 2010 UT 18, ¶ 7, 229 P.3d 650. To determine whether the court of appeals erred in affirming Mr. LeBeau's sentence requires that we consider the standard of review applicable to the court of appeals' review of the sentence. When reviewing a district court's sentencing decision, appellate courts “traditionally afford [ ] the [district] court wide latitude and discretion.” State v. Moa, 2012 UT 28, ¶ 34, 282 P.3d 985 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). An appellate court will, therefore, only set aside a sentence if the sentence represents an abuse of discretion, if the district court “fails to consider all legally relevant factors, or if the sentence imposed is clearly excessive.” State v. McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Utah 1990) (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, a district court's sentencing determination constitutes an abuse of discretion if such determination is based on an erroneous interpretation of law. See State v. Barrett, 2005 UT 88, ¶¶ 14–17, 127 P.3d 682.

ANALYSIS

I. UTAH'S AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING STATUTE

¶ 17 Mr. LeBeau was convicted of aggravated kidnapping pursuant to section 76–5–302 of the Utah Code. Section 76–5–302 defines aggravated kidnapping as a first degree felony and establishes a complex sentencing scheme that contemplates a range of possible sentences based on the seriousness of the offender's conduct. Mr. LeBeau was sentenced pursuant to subsection (3)(b), which establishes that aggravated kidnapping resulting in “serious bodily injury to another” is punishable by LWOP, “except as provided in Subsection ... (4).” Utah Code § 76–5–302(3)(b) (2008). Subsection (4), in turn, allows a sentencing court to impose an indefinite term of six, ten, or fifteen years to life if it finds that doing so would be “in the interests of justice.” ³ Id. § 76–5–302(4).

¶ 18 The heart of Mr. LeBeau's challenge concerns the proper interpretation of subsections (3)(b) and (4). Mr. LeBeau argues that the district court failed to adequately consider the “interests of justice” when sentencing him to LWOP. Though the court did consider whether Mr. LeBeau's sentence should be reduced, it did so by starting with a presumptive sentence of LWOP and then considering “the aggravating and mitigating circumstances” of the crime to determine if Mr. LeBeau's sentence should be reduced to one of the lesser terms allowed for in subsection (4). Though the district court did not expressly state its reasoning, it appears to have interpreted the Legislature's use of the phrase “interests of justice” as equivalent to the “aggravating and mitigating circumstances” recognized by the Utah Sentencing Commission as part of its sentencing guidelines. Mr. LeBeau asserts that this was in error because the Legislature's use of the phrase “interests of justice” requires consideration of factors beyond the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of his particular crime. Specifically, Mr. LeBeau argues that the district court was required to consider (1) the severity of an LWOP sentence, (2) whether a sentence of LWOP was proportionate to the seriousness of Mr. LeBeau's crime, and (3) Mr. LeBeau's rehabilitative potential. Further, Mr. LeBeau argues that the district court erred when it rejected several of Mr. LeBeau's proposed mitigating factors by employing incorrect legal standards in its analysis.

¶ 19 Our task of reviewing Mr. LeBeau's sentence requires that we interpret section 76–5–302 of the Utah Code, which calls for the imposition of a sentence of LWOP unless the interests of justice dictate a lesser sentence. We note, first, that any error on the part of the district court in its interpretation of subsection (4)'s interests-of-justice language would be harmless if the district court were free to sentence Mr. LeBeau to LWOP without considering the interests of justice in the first instance. Thus, the threshold question is whether the district court was required to engage in an interests-of-justice analysis prior to sentencing Mr. LeBeau to LWOP under subsection (3)(b). Because we conclude that the court was so required, we then turn our attention to the proper meaning of “interests of justice” as used in subsection (4). Finally, we consider Mr. LeBeau's claim that the district court erred when it rejected several of his proposed mitigating factors.

II. THE DISTRICT COURT WAS REQUIRED TO CONDUCT AN INTERESTS–OF–JUSTICE ANALYSIS PRIOR TO SENTENCING MR. LEBEAU TO LWOP

¶ 20 As with any question of statutory interpretation, our primary goal is to effectuate the intent of the Legislature. State v. Watkins, 2013 UT 28, ¶ 18, 309 P.3d 209. The best evidence of the Legislature's intent is the statute's plain language. Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P'ship, 2011 UT 50, ¶ 14, 267 P.3d 863. “We presume that the [L]egislature used each word advisedly and give effect to each term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning.” C.T. ex rel. Taylor v. Johnson, 1999 UT 35, ¶ 9, 977 P.2d 479 (internal quotation marks omitted). Further, “we interpret[ ] statutes to give meaning to all parts, and avoid [ ] rendering portions of the statute superfluous.” Watkins, 2013 UT 28, ¶ 23, 309 P.3d 209 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). To do so, “we read the plain language of the statute as a whole, and interpret...