Leblanc and Ossen v. Cleveland, Grant, et al
| Decision Date | 01 August 1998 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 97-9389 |
| Parties | (2nd Cir. 1999) ETOILE LEBLANC, STEPHEN OSSEN, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. TERRY CLEVELAND, ROBERT GRANT, JR., Defendants-Third-Party-Plaintiffs, J.R.D. RETAILERS LTD., d/b/a Syd and Dusty's Outfitters, Third-Party-Defendants-Appellees |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (Lawrence E. Kahn, Judge), entered October 1, 1997, dismissing appellants' complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Affirmed.
Paul S. Edelman, Kreindler & Kreindler, New York, NY, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
E. David Duncan, Law Office of David Duncan, Albany, NY, for Third-Party-Defendants-Appellees.
Before: VAN GRAAFEILAND and PARKER, Circuit Judges, and MISHLER, District Judge.*.
Etoile LeBlanc and Stephen Ossen appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (Lawrence E. Kahn, Judge), entered October 1, 1997, dismissing their claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court based the dismissal on its conclusion that the portion of the Hudson River in which the accident giving rise to appellants' claims took place was not a navigable waterway for purposes of establishing federal admiralty jurisdiction.
We affirm.
On July 4, 1994, Etoile LeBlanc and Stephen Ossen suffered personal injuries when the kayak they were paddling on the Hudson River was struck by a recreational motor boat operated by Terry Cleveland and owned by Robert Grant. LeBlanc and Ossen had rented their kayak from JRD Retailers, Ltd., d/b/a Syd & Dusty's Outfitters ("JRD"). The collision occurred approximately 29 miles upstream of Fort Edward, near Lake Luzerne.
On March 29, 1995, LeBlanc and Ossen sued Grant and Cleveland in the Southern District of New York, invoking federal admiralty jurisdiction. They alleged that Grant and Cleveland negligently caused the collision and their resulting injuries. On September 22, 1995, the action was transferred to the Northern District of New York. Cleveland and Grant then brought third-party complaints against JRD. Pursuant to Rule 14(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, these third-party complaints allowed the case to proceed as if LeBlanc and Ossen had sued JRD as well as Cleveland and Grant. Fed. R. Civ. P. 14(c).
On July 22, 1997, JRD moved to dismiss the complaint filed by LeBlanc and Ossen for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). On October 1, 1997, the district court granted the motion, finding that the Hudson River is not "navigable in fact" at the location at which the accident took place and that, consequently, the court lacked admiralty jurisdiction over the lawsuit. The court acknowledged that the Hudson River below Fort Edward is a navigable waterway because it permits passage to the open sea. Nonetheless, the court found that the "part of the Hudson [where the accident took place] cannot . . . be accessed from Fort Edward due to the presence of numerous areas of rapids, . . . [nine] dams, and at least three major waterfalls of 30 feet or more in height." As a result, the court concluded that "[n]othing in the records suggests that the Hudson north of Fort Edward is now, or has ever been, an artery of maritime commerce" sufficient to support a finding of navigability necessary to the exercise of federal admiralty jurisdiction. LeBlanc and Ossen timely appealed.
On appeal, LeBlanc and Ossen argue that the district court erred in finding that the Hudson River is unnavigable north of Fort Edward for purposes of establishing federal admiralty jurisdiction. In support of this argument, they contend, first, that the district court applied an incorrect standard when it found that navigability was precluded in part due to the existence of artificial dams. Appellants urge this Court to adopt a standard that focuses on the historic navigability of the river in its natural, unimproved state, rather than its present, improved state. Second, they assert that, whether the test focuses on historic or contemporary navigability, the Hudson is sufficiently navigable at the site of the accident to support federal admiralty jurisdiction over their claims. After setting forth the applicable standard of review, we address each argument in turn.
Where the relevant facts are not in dispute, a district court considering a motion to dismiss for lack of admiralty jurisdiction must take as true all of the material factual allegations contained in the complaint. See Shipping Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Drakos, 140 F.3d 129, 131 (2d Cir. 1998). However, where jurisdictional facts are placed in dispute, the court has the power and obligation to decide issues of fact by reference to evidence outside the pleadings, such as affidavits. See Filetech S.A. v. France Telecom S.A., 157 F.3d 922, 932 (2d Cir. 1998). We review the district court's factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. See id. at 930.
Appellants first contend that the district court applied an incorrect legal standard in finding admiralty jurisdiction lacking. Specifically, they argue for a jurisdictional test that focuses on the historic navigability of the waterway in question, without reference to present-day artificial obstructions, rather than on its contemporary navigability, including artificial dams. Under an historic navigability test, the argument continues, the district court erred in refusing to take into account the fact that, prior to 1951 and before the construction of several impassible dams, the logging industry regularly used the Hudson River upstream of Fort Edward to float logs to timber mills. For the reasons discussed below, appellants' argument fails.
The Constitution extends federal judicial power "to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction." U.S. Const. art. III, 2. Congress has codified that power at 28 U.S.C. 1333(1), which gives federal district courts "original jurisdiction . . . of . . . [a]ny civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction . . . ." Id.; see also Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 531-32 (1995). The primary purpose of federal admiralty jurisdiction is to "protect[] commercial shipping" with "uniform rules of conduct." Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 362 (1990)(internal quotations omitted).
In light of this stated purpose, the Supreme Court has enunciated a two-part test for determining whether a tort action falls within the federal courts' admiralty jurisdiction. First, the alleged tort must have occurred on or over "navigable waters." Grubart, 513 U.S. at 534. Second, the activity giving rise to the incident must have had a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity such that the incident had a potentially disruptive influence on maritime commerce. Id. The Supreme Court has held that although pleasure boating is not itself maritime commerce, pleasure boat accidents have a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity because of "[t]he potential disruptive impact [upon maritime commerce] of a collision between boats on navigable waters." Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 675 (1982). In light of Foremost, the parties do not dispute that if the first part of the jurisdictional test is satisfied, the second is as well. Thus, appellants assign error only to the definition of "navigable waters" employed by the district court.
The district court, like virtually every other court to consider the question of navigability for admiralty jurisdiction purposes, applied the definition of navigable waters first articulated in The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557 (1870):
Those rivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers in law which are navigable in fact. And they are navigable in fact when they are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water. And they constitute navigable waters of the United States within the meaning of the acts of Congress, in contradistinction from the navigable waters of the States, when they form in their ordinary condition by themselves, or by uniting with other waters, a continued highway over which commerce is or may be carried on with other States or foreign countries in the customary modes in which such commerce is conducted by water.
Id. at 563; see also Grubart, 513 U.S. at 529-30 (); In re Petition of Boyer, 109 U.S. 629, 631-32 (1884) (same). The district court found, and the parties did not dispute, that the Hudson River downstream of Fort Edward can be and is used as a continuous highway for interstate commerce because it permits passage beyond New York both to the south, where it empties into the Atlantic, and to the north, via the Champlain Canal (which begins near Fort Edward) and the St. Lawrence. However, the court found that the accident site is separated from Fort Edward, and therefore from any interstate or international waterway, by numerous impassible rapids, falls, and artificial dams.
Appellants do not dispute that The Daniel Ball sets forth the basic navigability test for purposes of admiralty jurisdiction. Instead, they first contend that by focusing on whether rivers are navigable "in their ordinary condition," the Daniel Ball test required the district court to measure navigability by reference to the river's historic, unimproved state, rather than its present, improved state.
This argument is foreclosed by subsequent Supreme Court caselaw. In United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 407 (1940),...
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