LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher
| Decision Date | 21 September 1995 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 779,BLANC-STERNBER,C,780 and 1018,D,s. 779 |
| Citation | 67 F.3d 412 |
| Parties | Rabbi Yitzchok Lehanie Leblanc-Sternberg, Fred Walfish, Lewis Kamman, Park Avenue Synagogue, Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross-Appellees, v. Robert FLETCHER, Marianne Cucolo, John C. Layne, and Nicholas Vertullo, Individually and in their capacity as Trustees of the Village of Airmont, Maureen Kendrick, Individually and in her capacity as Mayor of the Village of Airmont, Raymond Kane, Paul Berliner, The Airmont Civic Association, The Village of Airmont, The Town of Ramapo, and Herbert Reisman, Individually and in his capacity as Ramapo Town Supervisor, Defendants, Robert Fletcher, John C. Layne, Nicholas Vertullo, Maureen Kendrick, and Raymond Kane, Individually, and in their capacity as Trustees of the Village of Airmont, and The Village of Airmont, Defendants-Appellees, Robert Fletcher and Nicholas Vertullo, Defendants-Appellees-Cross-Appellants. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The VILLAGE OF AIRMONT, Airmont Civic Association, Ralph Bracco, in his capacity as Mayor of the Village of Airmont, John C. Layne, Raymond Kane, Charles Calotta and Ronald Sabo, in their capacities as trustees of the Village of Airmont, Defendants-Appellees. ocket 94-7103, 94-6048 and 94-6125. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
Craig L. Parshall, Fredericksburg, Virginia (Renee Wright, The Rutherford Institute, Charlottesville, Virginia, Reuben Koolyk, Randy Shaheen, Arnold & Porter, New York City, on the brief), for plaintiffs-appellants-cross-appellees Rabbi Yitzchok LeBlanc-Sternberg, Chanie LeBlanc-Sternberg, Fred Walfish, Lewis Kamman, Park Avenue Synagogue, Inc.
Sara L. Shudofsky, Assistant United States Attorney, New York City, (Mary Jo White, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, James L. Cott, Steven M. Haber, Assistant United States Attorneys, New York City, on the brief), for plaintiff-appellant United States of America.
Dennis E.A. Lynch, Nyack, New York (Dorfman, Lynch & Knoebel, Nyack, New York, on the brief), for defendants-appellees Village of Airmont, Raymond Kane, Maureen Kendrick, and John C. Layne.
Edmund C. Grainger, III, White Plains, New York (McCullough, Goldberger & Staudt, White Plains, New York, on the brief), for defendants-appellees-cross-appellants Robert Fletcher & Nicholas Vertullo.
G. Oliver Koppell, Attorney General of the State of New York, New York City (Sanford M. Cohen, Assistant Attorney General, New York, New York, of counsel), filed a brief for Amicus Curiae the State of New York in support of Appellants.
Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson, New York City (Howard W. Goldstein, Stephen E. Raynes, New York City, Steven M. Freeman, The Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, New York City, of counsel), filed a brief for amicus curiae Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith in support of Appellants.
David Zwiebel, Morton M. Avigdor, New York City, filed a brief for Amicus Curiae Agudath Israel of America in support of Appellants.
Barbara J. Samel, Albany, New York, filed a brief for Amicus Curiae The New York State Conference of Mayors & Municipal Officials in support of Appellees.
Before: KEARSE, McLAUGHLIN and CABRANES, Circuit Judges.
These appeals from judgments entered in actions consolidated for trial in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Gerard L. Goettel, Judge, involve claims that defendant Village of Airmont, New York ("Airmont" or the "Village"), along with individual defendants who incorporated the Village and/or served as its officers, discriminated against Orthodox Jews on the basis of their religion through the adoption of zoning policies limiting the use of Orthodox rabbis' homes for prayer services. In the action brought by the United States, the district court, as trier of fact, dismissed the government's claims under Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (the "Fair Housing Act," "FHA," or "the Act"), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 3601 et seq. (1988), finding that the government did not establish that the Village or its officers had engaged in unlawful discrimination On appeal, the government contends principally that the district court failed to apply Fair Housing Act principles and that it abused its discretion in refusing to enjoin the Village from engaging in conduct that would violate the Act. The private plaintiffs contend principally (a) that the court improperly entered judgment against them as a matter of law on their First Amendment and FHA claims against the Village in light of the jury's verdict in their favor on those claims, and (b) that because of errors in the court's instructions and evidentiary rulings, they are entitled to a new trial on their claims against the individual defendants. Robert Fletcher and Nicholas Vertullo, who were among the defendants in the private suit who received a jury verdict in their favor, cross-appeal, arguing principally that they should have been granted judgment as a matter of law at the close of the private plaintiffs' case.
or that its zoning code would be interpreted in a discriminatory manner. In the other action, brought against the Village and its officers by plaintiffs Rabbi Yitzchok LeBlanc-Sternberg, Park Avenue Synagogue, Inc., and three members of that congregation under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (1988), claiming violations of, inter alia, the Fair Housing Act, the First Amendment, and 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1985(3) (1988), a jury, while finding in favor of the individual defendants, had found that the Village had violated the private plaintiffs' rights under the Fair Housing Act and conspired to violate their First Amendment rights. Thereafter, the district court, incorporating the facts and reasoning set out in its own decision dismissing the government's action, denied the private plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief, set aside the jury's verdict in favor of the private plaintiffs against the Village, and entered judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b) dismissing their complaint as a matter of law.
For the reasons that follow, we reverse so much of the judgment entered in the private action, appealed in Nos. 94-7103 and -6125, as dismissed the private plaintiffs' claims against the Village, we affirm so much of that judgment as dismissed the private plaintiffs' claims against the individual defendants, and we dismiss the cross-appeal as moot. As to the judgment dismissing the government's action, appealed in No. 94-6048, we reverse. In both cases, we remand for further proceedings on issues as to relief.
Airmont is located within the Town of Ramapo, New York ("Ramapo" or the "Town"), a large area that comprises a number of incorporated villages and unincorporated sections. During the 1980s, the Town's Orthodox Jewish population, including Hasidic Jews, a subgroup of Orthodox Jewry, grew substantially. This growth was accommodated by the Town's adoption and interpretation of certain zoning ordinances that facilitated adherence to certain restrictive principles of Orthodox Judaism. Airmont was incorporated in a movement critical of the zoning measures adopted by the Town. The evidence at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the private plaintiffs as the parties challenging the entry of judgment against them as a matter of law, see, e.g., Binder v. Long Island Lighting Co., 57 F.3d 193, 198-99 (2d Cir.1995), included the following.
Strict observance of Orthodox Judaism necessitates a relatively high number of local houses of worship. Daily prayer is required, and the saying of certain prayers and the reading from the Torah on the Sabbath require the presence of a "minyan"--a quorum of ten males over the age of 13. Orthodox Jews are forbidden to use cars or other means of transportation during religious holidays and the weekly Sabbath; thus, adherents are required to walk to their houses of worship. The combination of these requirements makes it important for Orthodox Jews to be able to gather for worship in congregations large enough to ensure the presence of a minyan, and close enough to the congregants' homes to allow them to walk to services.
Ramapo has a zoning code ("Ramapo Code") that, in most residential areas, allows a place of worship to be built only on a lot that is at least two acres in size. Construction of a synagogue on such a lot would cost shall be incidental and secondary to the use of the residence for dwelling purpose, shall not change the character thereof and shall not have any evidence of such accessory use other than a permitted announcement sign. Said activity shall not occupy more than one-half ( 1/2) of the ground floor area of the residence or its equivalent elsewhere in the residence if so used. In said activity, no more than two (2) persons, including members of the family residing on the premises, shall be employed. Permissible "home professional office" uses include, but are not limited to, the following: clergymen, lawyers, physicians, dentists, architects, engineers or accountants.
as much as $750,000, an expenditure that would require the support of approximately 150 families, far beyond the number of Orthodox Jewish families living near each other in Airmont. However, the Ramapo Code also includes a provision for "home professional offices" ("HPO"), which permits members of the "learned professions," including clergy, to operate offices within their homes, subject to certain restrictions. It provides that HPO use
Ramapo Code Sec. 376-181, at 37678.
In recognition of the needs of Orthodox Jews for local houses of worship, the Town in the mid-1980s adopted an interpretation of its Code's HPO provision that permitted "home synagogues," by allowing rabbis to conduct worship services within their homes for groups not exceeding 49 individuals.
Until 1991, Airmont was an...
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