LeBlanc v. Mathena

Decision Date07 November 2016
Docket NumberNo. 15-7151,15-7151
Citation841 F.3d 256
Parties Dennis LeBlanc, Petitioner–Appellee, v. Randall Mathena, Chief Warden, Red Onion State Prison, Pound, Virginia; Commonwealth Of Virginia, Respondents–Appellants.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

ARGUED: Stuart Alan Raphael, Office of the Attorney General of Virginia, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellants. Bryan A. Stevenson, Equal Justice Initiative, Montgomery, Alabama, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Mark R. Herring, Attorney General of Virginia, Linda L. Bryant, Deputy Attorney General, Criminal Justice & Public Safety Division, Donald E. Jeffrey, III, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Eugene P. Murphy, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Katherine Quinlan Adelfio, Assistant Attorney General, Trevor S. Cox, Deputy Solicitor General, Office of the Attorney General of Virginia, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellants. Jennifer T. Stanton, J.T. Stanton, P.C., Norfolk, Virginia; Randall S. Susskind, Jennae R. Swiergula, Stephen Chu, Equal Justice Initiative, Montgomery, Alabama, for Appellee.

Before NIEMEYER and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and Thomas E. JOHNSTON, United States District Judge for the Southern District of West Virginia, sitting by designation.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Wynn

wrote the opinion, in which Judge Johnston joined. Judge Niemeyer wrote a dissenting opinion.

WYNN

, Circuit Judge:

Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010)

, held that “the Eighth Amendment forbids the sentence of life without parole” for juvenile offenders convicted of nonhomicide offenses. Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that States must provide juvenile nonhomicide offenders sentenced to life imprisonment with “some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” Id. at 75, 130 S.Ct. 2011.

Nearly a decade before the Supreme Court decided Graham

, Respondent, the Commonwealth of Virginia, sentenced Petitioner Dennis LeBlanc to life imprisonment without parole for a nonhomicide offense he committed at the age of sixteen. In light of Graham, Petitioner sought postconviction relief from his sentence in Virginia state courts. The state courts denied Petitioner relief, holding that Virginia's geriatric release program—which was adopted more than fifteen years before the Supreme Court decided Graham and will allow Petitioner to seek release beginning at the age of sixty—provides the “meaningful opportunity” for release that Graham requires.

Mindful of the deference we must accord to state court decisions denying state prisoners postconviction relief, we nonetheless conclude that Petitioner's state court adjudication constituted an unreasonable application of Graham

. Most significantly, Virginia courts unreasonably ignored the plain language of the procedures governing review of petitions for geriatric release, which authorize the State Parole Board to deny geriatric release for any reason, without considering a juvenile offender's maturity and rehabilitation. In light of the lack of governing standards, it was objectively unreasonable for the state courts to conclude that geriatric release affords Petitioner with the “meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation” Graham demands. Id. Accordingly, Petitioner is entitled to relief from his unconstitutional sentence.

I.

On July 15, 2002, a Virginia state trial court found Petitioner guilty of rape and abduction. Petitioner committed the offenses on July 6, 1999, when he was sixteen years old. The court sentenced Petitioner to two terms of life imprisonment. Petitioner was ineligible for parole pursuant to Va. Code Ann. § 53.1–165.1

, which abolished parole for individuals convicted of a felony committed after January 1, 1995. Petitioner did not appeal his conviction or sentence.

In 2011, Petitioner filed a motion to vacate his sentence in state trial court. The motion argued that Graham

rendered Petitioner's life sentence invalid. In opposition, Respondents asserted that, notwithstanding Virginia's abolition of parole, Petitioner's life sentence did not violate Graham because Virginia allows for conditional release of “geriatric prisoners,” Va. Code Ann. § 53.1–40.01 (“Geriatric Release”).

At a hearing on August 9, 2011, the state trial court orally denied Petitioner's motion to vacate. In rendering its decision, the trial court relied on the Supreme Court of Virginia's decision in Angel v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 248, 704 S.E.2d 386 (2011)

, which held that Geriatric Release provides juveniles sentenced to life in prison a “meaningful opportunity for release” and therefore complies with Graham's parole requirement. J.A. 157. Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the Supreme Court of Virginia, which summarily denied his petition for appeal.

On June 19, 2012, Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254

in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. A federal magistrate judge reviewed the petition and recommended that the district court deny it. LeBlanc v. Mathena, No. 2:12–cv–340, 2013 WL 10799406, at *1 (E.D. Va. July 24, 2013). Petitioner filed objections to the magistrate judge's report. Finding the objections well-taken, the district court granted Petitioner's habeas petition, holding that his state court adjudication was contrary to, and an unreasonable application of, Graham. LeBlanc v. Mathena, No. 2:12cv340, 2015 WL 4042175, at *9 (E.D. Va. July 1, 2015). In particular, the district court concluded that Geriatric Release does not offer juvenile offenders sentenced to life imprisonment, like Petitioner, the “meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation” required by Graham. Id. at *9, *11–18. The district court further concluded that Geriatric Release did not comply with Graham's dictate that state penal systems reflect the lesser culpability of juvenile offenders, explaining that Geriatric Release “treats children worse than adult offenders. Id. at *14 (emphasis in original). Accordingly, the district court remanded Petitioner's case to the state court for resentencing in accordance with Graham. Id. at *19.

Respondents filed a timely appeal, and the district court stayed its judgment pending resolution of that appeal.

II.
A.

The Virginia General Assembly established Geriatric Release in 1994—more than 15 years before the Supreme Court decided Graham

—as part of its “truth-in-sentencing” reform package. J.A. 169. The primary goal of truth-in-sentencing reform was to close the gap between prisoners' original sentences and the amount of time they actually served. Brian J. Ostrom et al., Truth–in–Sentencing in Virginia 17–20 (April 5, 2001), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/187677.pdf. The centerpiece of the reform package was the elimination of parole for all offenders who committed felonies on or after January 1, 1995. Id.

The statutory provision governing Geriatric Release, as amended,1 provides, in its entirety:

Any person serving a sentence imposed upon a conviction for a felony offense, other than a Class 1 felony, (i) who has reached the age of sixty-five or older and who has served at least five years of the sentence imposed or (ii) who has reached the age of sixty or older and who has served at least ten years of the sentence imposed may petition the Parole Board for conditional release. The Parole Board shall promulgate regulations to implement the provisions of this section.

Va. Code Ann. § 53.1–40.01

. Unlike with other components of the truth-in-sentencing reform package,2 we have identified no evidence in the contemporaneous legislative record speaking to the General Assembly's goal in enacting Geriatric Release or providing guidance regarding the implementation of Geriatric Release.

The Virginia Parole Board is responsible for deciding whether to grant petitions for Geriatric Release. Section 53.1–40.01

directs the Parole Board to promulgate regulations necessary to implement the statute. Pursuant to that authority, the Parole Board established administrative procedures governing implementation of the Geriatric Release provision (the “Geriatric Release Administrative Procedures”).

The Geriatric Release Administrative Procedures set forth a two-stage review process for Geriatric Release petitions. At the “Initial Review” stage, the Parole Board reviews a prisoner's petition—which must provide “compelling reasons for conditional release”—and the prisoner's “central file and any other pertinent information.” J.A. 287. The Parole Board may deny the petition at the Initial Review stage based on a majority vote. Neither the statute nor the Geriatric Release Administrative Procedures states what constitute “compelling reasons for conditional release,” nor does either document require the Parole Board to consider any particular factors in conducting the Initial Review, nor does either document set forth any criteria for granting or denying a prisoner's petition at the Initial Review stage.

If the Parole Board does not deny a petition at the Initial Review stage, the petition moves forward to the “Assessment Review” stage. As part of the Assessment Review, a Parole Board member or designated staff member interviews the prisoner. During that interview, the prisoner may present written and oral statements as well as any written material bearing on his case for parole. The interviewer then drafts a written assessment of the prisoner's “suitability for conditional release” and, based on that assessment, recommends whether the Parole Board should grant the petition. J.A. 288. In order to grant Geriatric Release to a prisoner sentenced to life imprisonment, at least four members of the five-member Parole Board must vote in favor of release.

In engaging in the Assessment Review, Parole Board members should consider [a]ll factors in the parole...

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