LeBlanc v. The Ohio Oil Company

• Decision Date: 03 February 1928
• Docket Number: 3058
• Citation: LeBlanc v. The Ohio Oil Company, 7 La.App. 721 (La. App. 1928)
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana
• Parties: LeBLANC v. THE OHIO OIL COMPANY

7 La.App. 721

LeBLANC v. THE OHIO OIL COMPANY

No. 3058

Court of Appeals of Louisiana, Second Circuit

February 3, 1928

Rehearing Refused March 14, 1928.

Certiorari Denied by Supreme CourtApril 9, 1928.

Appeal from the Eighth Judicial District Court of Louisiana, Parish of LaSalle.Hon. F. E. Jones, Judge.

Action by T. L. LeBlanc against the Ohio Oil Co.There was judgment for defendant and plaintiff appealed.

Judgment reversed.

Fern M Wood, A. D. Flowers, of Leesville, attorneys for plaintiffappellant.

R. L. Benoit, of Shreveport, attorney for defendant, appellee.

OPINION

WEBB, J.

The plaintiff, T. L. LeBlanc, an employee of the defendant, The Ohio Oil Company, brought this action to recover compensation under the Employers' Liability Statute for injuries alleged to have been sustained in an accident arising in the course and out of his employment, resulting in permanently disabling him to do work of a reasonable character.

The defendant denied liability, urging that the accident had not arisen in the course or out of the employment, or, if liable, that plaintiff had not been permanently totally disabled, and plaintiff appeals from a judgment rejecting his demands.

The evidence establishes that plaintiff was employed as a general workman on an oil lease operated by defendant at a daily wage of four and 50-100 dollars, and that plaintiff began work by reporting at 7 o'clock a. m. at a toolhouse situated on the leased premises.

The lease covered eighty acres, a part of which had been developed, which part was bisected by the public highway; on one side of which there were oil wells and on the other a treating plant and tool house, and in the course of plaintiff's work it was necessary for him to pass over the highway in going from one part of the premises to the other.

The plaintiff resided at a boarding-house with which defendant was not connected, situated on or near the highway about a mile from the lease, and plaintiff had been accustomed to using the highway in going to and from his work, sometimes walking and at other times riding, in vehicles belonging to third persons, and on the day of the accident plaintiff left his boarding-house at about half past six o'clock in the morning and had been allowed to ride in an automobile owned and driven by a third person to the lease, arriving there sometime between half past six and seven o'clock, that the automobile was stopped at a point on the highway opposite the tool house, where plaintiff alighted, and while passing over the roadway from the place where he alighted from the automobile towards the tool house, he was struck by an automobile which was being driven along the highway by some one who was not connected with defendant.

While plaintiff recognizes the general rule that an injury to an employee on the public highway in going to or returning from the place of his employment does not arise in the course or out of the employment, he urges that the facts bring this case within equally as well recognized exceptions to the general rule, citing Cudahy Packing Co. vs. Parramore,263 U.S. 418, 68 L.Ed. 366, 44 S.Ct. 153;Jones vs. Louisiana Central Lumber Co.,2 La.App. 260, andPrevost vs. Gheens,151 La. 508, 92 So. 38.

The cases cited, with the exception of Cudahy Packing Co. vs Parramore, did not deal with accidents which occurred on the public highway, but we think they are authority for the plaintiff's contention that the fact of plaintiff having arrived at the place of his employment a short time before he was to report for work would not affect his right to recover insofar as it relates to the question of whether or not he should be considered in the course of his employment, as the evidence showing that plaintiff resided about a mile from his place of employment, it cannot be said that his leaving his residence at half past six o'clock so as to report for work at seven o'clock as unreasonable, or that the interval between the time of his arrival and the time he was to report for work was an unreasonable time, but the question does not relate so much to the time of the accident...