LeBron v. Naylor
| Decision Date | 17 December 2012 |
| Docket Number | CA 12-688-ML |
| Parties | HECTOR LEBRON, Plaintiff, v. MICHAEL S. NAYLOR, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island |
Before the Court is a Complaint (Doc. #1) filed by Plaintiff Hector Lebron, pro se, an inmate at the Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn, New York, pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d (1971), and the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA). Plaintiff has also filed an Application to Proceed in District Court without Prepaying Fees or Costs (Doc. #2) ("Application"), Hector Lebron Motion for This Honorable Court to Order the United States Marshal Service, to Serve All Defendants His Civil Complaint Pursuant to Rule 4(c)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Doc. #3) ("Motion for Service"), and Hector Lebron Motion to Show the Court That His Complaint Is within the Statute of Limitation of Three Years (Doc. #4) ("Motion to Show Timely").
Plaintiff filed the instant Complaint on September 28, 2012. (See Docket.) The Complaint names as Defendants Michael S. Naylor, Agents Smith, Schiffer, and Jacobson, all employees of the Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA") (collectively "DEA Defendants");1 Russell Henry and Raymond Angell III, both employees of the Cranston Police Department (collectively "CranstonPolice Defendants"); and the United States. (Complaint ¶ 4.) The DEA Defendants and Cranston Police Defendants are sued in their individual capacities. (Id.)
Plaintiff states that his Complaint "is based on an illegal arrest and illegal search of his apartment and car which purported [sic] to 10 years of illegal incarceration in violation of the Fourth Amendment and the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution." (Complaint ¶ 2.) He makes a similar allegation against each of the DEA Defendants and Cranston Police Defendants. (See id. 28-35.) Plaintiff further alleges that the United States is responsible for the violation of his Fourth and Eighth Amendment rights. (Id. ¶ 36.) Plaintiff seeks $ 5 million in punitive damages and $5 million for "illegal incarceration" from each Defendant, including the United States. (See id. ¶¶ 28-36.)
In connection with proceedings in forma pauperis, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) directs a court to dismiss a case at any time if the court determines that the action, inter alia, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).2 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Courtis required to screen complaints filed by prisoners against a governmental entity, officer, or employee of such entity and dismiss the complaint, or any portion thereof, for reasons identical to those set forth in § 1915(e)(2). See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.3
The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A is identical to that used when ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Chase v. Chafee, No. CA 11-586ML, 2011 WL 6826504, at *2 (D.R.I. Dec. 9, 2011). To state a claim on which relief may be granted, " a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). In making this determination, the Court must accept Plaintiff's well-pled allegations as true, construe them in the light most favorable to him, and give him the benefit of all reasonable inferences. See Greater Providence MRI Ltd. P'Ship v. Med. Imaging Network of S. New England, Inc., 32 F.Supp.2d 491, 493 (D.R.I. 1988). Although the Court must view the pleadings of a pro se plaintiff liberally, see Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976)(citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30L.Ed.2d 652 (1972)), the Court need not credit bald assertions or unsupported conclusions, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
A Bivens claim is the federal analog to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Davis v. United States, No. 98-557 T, 2000 WL 246277, at *7 (D.R.I. Feb. 15, 2000); see also Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 255 n.2, 126 S.Ct. 1695, 164 L.Ed.2d 441 (2006)("[A] Bivens action is the federal analog to suits brought against state officials under ... § 1983."). "The Bivens doctrine allows constitutional claims against federal officials, in their individual capacities for actions taken under color of federal law." Barrett v. United States, 462 F.3d 28, 31 n.1 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting McCloskey v. Mueller, 446 F.3d 262, 271 (1st Cir. 2006)); see also Davis, 2000 WL 246277, at * 7 (). Section 1983 creates a remedy for violations of federal rights committed by persons acting under color of state law. Sanchez v. Pereira-Castillo, 590 F.3d 31, 40 (1st Cir. 2009). Both Bivens and § 1983 actions are subject to a three year statute of limitations.4
It is clear from Plaintiff's Complaint that he is challenging the fact or duration of hisconfinement, not the conditions of his confinement. (See Complaint ¶¶ 2, 28-35.) In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), the United States Supreme Court stated that "habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement ...." id. at 481 (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 488-90, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973)); see also Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 80, 125 S.Ct. 1242, 161 L.Ed.2d 253 ()(quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 486); Figueroa v. Rivera, 147 F.3d 77, 81 (1st Cir. 1998)("The exclusive method of challenging an allegedly unconstitutional state conviction in the lower federal courts is by means of a habeas corpus action."); Lopes v. Mayor of Pawtucket, C.A. No. 09-263 ML, 2011 WL 321795, at *4 (D.R.I. Jan. 7, 2011)( that plaintiff "may not use this civil rights action as a collateral attack on his state conviction"), as opposed to the conditions of his confinement, Figueroa, 147 F.3d at 82. The Supreme Court in Heck held that:
[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 19836 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.
Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87 (footnotes omitted); see also Thore v. Howe, 466 F.3d 173, 179 (1st Cir. 2006)("In Heck v. Humphrey, the Supreme Court held that where a § 1983 suit for damages would 'necessarily imply' the invalidity of an inmate's conviction, or 'necessarily imply' the invalidity ofthe length of any inmate's sentence, such a claim is not cognizable under § 1983 unless and until the inmate obtains favorable resolution of a challenge to his conviction.")(quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 487). That is the case here.
It is plain that Plaintiff is attacking the legality of the search warrant and resulting arrest and incarceration, not the conditions of his confinement. (See Complaint ¶ 2.)( that his Complaint "is based on an illegal arrest and illegal search of his apartment and car which purported to 10 years of illegal incarceration ..."). Plaintiff has provided no information that his conviction has been favorably challenged and overturned. See Lopes, 2011 WL 321795, at *4 (); see also Figueroa, 147 F.3d at 81 ()(quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 487). To grant Plaintiff the relief he seeks, punitive and compensatory damages, would "necessarily imply" the illegality of the search, arrest, and ultimate incarceration. Thus, his claims are not cognizable under Bivens or § 1983. See Hughes, 350 F.3d at 1160; see also Baccus v. Florian, C/A No. 9:12-2440-DCN-BM, 2012 WL 4985243, at *2 (D.S.C. Sept. 21, 2012)( ).
Moreover, Plaintiff's Complaint is time-barred. As noted previously, a three year statute of limitations applies to Plaintiff's claims in this case. Girard v. Donald Wyatt Det. Facility, No. 00-194 T, 2001 WL 210473, at *2 (D.R.I. Feb. 5, 2001). The events about which Plaintiffcomplains occurred in 2005.7 Therefore, the statute of limitations would have run in early 2008.
Plaintiff states that his claim against the United States is "covered under the FTCA Title 28 U.S.C. 2671 to 2680." (Complaint ¶ 4.)
To continue reading
Request your trial