Lebron v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd.
| Decision Date | 26 July 2018 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 16-24687-CIV-WILLIAMS/SIMONTON |
| Parties | EDGARDO LEBRON, Plaintiff, v. ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES, LTD., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
This matter came before the Court upon Defendant's Motion to Strike/Daubert Motion Regarding Plaintiff's Expert Terry MacLaughlin, ECF No. [127]. The Motion is fully briefed, ECF Nos. [160] [162]. Also pending before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Exclude the Proposed Testimony of Dr. Ying Lu, Pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 403, 702, Daubert, ECF No. [126]. That Motion has also been fully briefed, ECF Nos. [161] [163]. The Honorable Kathleen M. Williams, United States District Judge, has referred the Motions to the undersigned Magistrate Judge, ECF No. [154]. For the following reasons, the Motion to Strike Terry MacLaughlin is granted in part, and denied in part, and the Motion to Exclude Dr. Lu's testimony is denied.
This personal injury action was initiated when Plaintiff Edgardo Lebron ("Lebron") filed a Complaint against Defendant Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., ("RCL") alleging various causes of action sounding in negligence related to injuries sustained by Plaintiff when he fell and broke his ankle while ice skating aboard the Adventure of the Seas, a cruise ship operated by Defendant RCL, ECF No. [1].
In its Answer, the Defendant has generally denied the substantive allegations in the Complaint and has raised several affirmative defenses including, comparative negligence and waiver of liability by the Plaintiff, ECF No. [67].
The Defendant has filed the instant Motions seeking to exclude the Plaintiff's two experts in this action, Terry MacLaughlin and Dr. Ying Lu, generally contending that the experts are unqualified to offer their opinions on certain subjects, did not utilize reliable methodology in forming their opinions, and have offered opinions that are not helpful to the trier of fact. In addition, as to Terry MacLaughlin, the Defendant contends that several of his opinions were belatedly disclosed and should be stricken on that basis. Defendant further argues that Dr. Ying Lu's testimony would be unfairly prejudicial pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 403 because it will likely mislead the jury.
For the following reasons, the Defendant's Motion to Strike Terry MacLaughlin is granted in part, as set forth below, and denied as to his remaining opinions; and the Defendant's Motion to Exclude Dr. Lu's testimony is denied in its entirety.1
Federal Evidence Rule 702 governs the admission of expert testimony in federal court, and provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) thetestimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
District courts have a duty under Rule 702 to "ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable." Wilson v. Taser Int'l, Inc., 303 F. App'x 708, 714 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)). Thus, a Court performs a "gatekeeping role" regarding admissibility of expert testimony, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
The Eleventh Circuit has set out three requirements that an expert must meet before his opinions may be admitted. Hughes v. Kia Motors Corp., 766 F.3d 1317, 1328 (11th Cir. 2014). First, the expert must be qualified on the matter about which he intends to testify. Id., citing City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chemicals, Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 562 (11th Cir. 1998). Second, the expert must employ reliable methodology. Id.2 Third, the expert's testimony must be able to assist the trier of fact through the application of expertise to understand the evidence or fact in issue. Id.
The burden of laying the proper foundation for the admission of the expert testimony is on the party offering the expert, and admissibility must be shown by a preponderance of the evidence. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592 n. 10, (citing Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175-76, (1987)).
As to the first of the these requirements, determining an expert's qualifications isnot a stringent inquiry "and so long as the expert is minimally qualified, objections to the level of the expert's expertise [go] to credibility and weight, not admissibility." Vision I Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Aspen Specialty Ins. Co., 674 F. Supp. 2d 1321, 1325 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (citations omitted); see also Johnson v. Big Lots Stores, Inc., 2008 WL 1930681, *14 (E. D. La. Apr. 29, 2008) (); Martinez v. Altec Indus., Inc., 2005 WL 1862677, *3 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 3, 2005) (). After a review of the relevant issues and an expert's qualifications, "the determination regarding qualification to testify rests within the district court's discretion." Clena Investments, Inc., 280 F.R.D. 653, 661 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (citing Berdeaux v. Gamble Alden Life Ins. Co., 528 F.2d 987, 990 (5th Cir. 1976).
Proposed expert testimony must be supported by appropriate validation, what the Supreme Court has characterized as "good grounds based on what is known." United States v. Frazier, 387 F. 3d 1244, 1261 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, (1993)). A court cannot admit an expert who simply states that he used the "scientific method" to reach his conclusions; more is required. See Hughes v. Kia Motors Corp., 766 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2014) ().
To determine the reliability of an expert's testimony, the Supreme Court identified four factors that district courts should consider: 1) whether the expert's methodology has been tested or is capable of being tested; 2) whether the theory or technique used bythe expert has been subjected to peer review and publication; 3) whether there is a known or potential error rate of the methodology; and 4) whether the technique has been generally accepted in the relevant scientific community. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 593-94,(1993). Such factors, however, are not exhaustive and are intended to be applied in a "flexible" manner. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999). Courts within the Eleventh Circuit have recognized that in cases with non-scientific expert opinions, the Daubert factors may not be helpful in determining the reliability of an expert's methodology. See Regions Bank v. Kaplan, 8:12-cv-1837-T-17MAP, 2017 WL 1148322, at * 3 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 24, 2017) (); Clena Invs., Inc., 280 F.R.D. at 663 (). Thus, a "district court has considerable leeway in deciding in a particular case how to go about determining whether particular expert testimony is reliable." McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1299 (11th Cir. 2004) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Further, the proponent of expert testimony need not show that the opinion proffered is scientifically correct, but only, based upon a preponderance of the evidence, that the opinion is reliable. Allison v. McGhan Medical Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1312 (11th Cir. 1999). Although, an expert must know "facts which enable him to express a reasonably accurate conclusion instead of mere conjecture or speculation," absolute certainty is not required. Jones v. Otis Elevator Co., 861 F.2d 655, 662 (11th Cir. 1988). Whether this logical basis has been established is within the discretion of the trial judge and the weaknesses in the underpinnings of the expert's opinion go to its weight rather than its admissibility. Id. Daubert requires that the proposed expert testimony be relevantand advance a material aspect of the case. McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289-1290 (11th Cir. 2004).
Finally, in assessing the validity of the expert's methodology, the district court may not "make ultimate conclusions as to the persuasiveness of the proffered evidence." Quiet Tech. DC-8, Inc. v. Hurel-Dubois UK Ltd., 326 F.3d 1333, 1341 (11th Cir. 2003). "The gatekeeper role ... is not intended to supplant the adversary system or the role of the jury." Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1311 (11th Cir. 1999) (alteration added). Instead, "[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence." Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596 (alteration added). The court's role is limited to analyzing if the...
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