Lebron v. United States, 12317

• Decision Date: 13 October 1955
• Docket Number: No. 12317,12319,12320.,12318,12317
• Citation: 229 F.2d 16,97 US App. DC 133
• Parties: Lolita LEBRON, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee. Rafael Cancel MIRANDA, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee. Andres Figueroa CORDERO, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee. Irving Flores RODRIGUEZ, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

97 US App. DC 133, 229 F.2d 16 (1955)

Lolita LEBRON, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.

Rafael Cancel MIRANDA, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.

Andres Figueroa CORDERO, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.

Irving Flores RODRIGUEZ, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.

Nos. 12317, 12318, 12319, 12320.

United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued June 27, 1955.

Decided October 13, 1955.

Petition for Rehearing Denied February 24, 1956.

Messrs. Ben Paul Noble and James C. Toomey, Washington, D. C., with whom Mr. H. Hugo Perez, Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellants.

Mr. John C. Conliff, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Messrs. Leo A. Rover, U. S. Atty., and Lewis Carroll and John D. Lane, Asst. U. S. Attys., were on the brief, for appellee.

Before WILBUR K. MILLER, WASHINGTON and DANAHER, Circuit Judges.

WILBUR K. MILLER, Circuit Judge.

The four appellants, who are Puerto Ricans and fanatical members of an anti-American political party on that island, had a meeting February 28, 1954, in New York, where they were then residing. They planned to go to Washington the next day for the purpose of visiting the Capitol and demonstrating for Puerto Rican independence by shooting at members of Congress. They arrived in the District of Columbia shortly after noon March 1 and after lunch proceeded to a gallery of the House of Representatives. Each was armed with a .38 calibre German pistol and together they had 90 rounds of ammunition. About 2:30 p. m., when 243 Congressmen were engaged in voting on the floor of the House, appellant Lolita Lebron arose, waved a Puerto Rican flag, shouted the imperative demand, "Free Puerto Rico," and began shooting. Her companions then stood and shot their pistols toward the floor of the House. Some 16 shots were fired and five Congressmen were wounded before the appellants were overpowered and disarmed.

They were indicted March 3 in ten counts, the first five of which charged them with assault with intent to kill (a separate count being devoted to the assault upon each victim) and the second five accused them of assault with a dangerous weapon. Upon arraignment the defendants pleaded not guilty and four able and experienced attorneys were appointed to represent them.

Trial began June 3 and was concluded June 17. Under the five counts charging assault with intent to kill, Lolita Lebron was acquitted, but her three male companions were found guilty and five consecutive sentences of from 5 to 15 years were imposed upon them. Under the five counts which charged assault with a dangerous weapon, all four appellants were found guilty and received five consecutive sentences of from 40 months to 10 years; those imposed upon the men to run concurrently with the longer terms they received on the other five counts.

On these appeals, diligent appointed counsel advance many reasons for reversal. Among them are the contentions that the trial court erred in refusing to order a psychiatric examination to determine defendants' mental competency to stand trial, and in refusing to submit to the jury the question whether the defendants were sane when they fired their pistols into the crowded well of the House of Representatives. These contentions are of course not identical and require separate consideration.

1. Concerning alleged mental incapacity to stand trial, the applicable statute is 18 U.S.C. § 4244, which in pertinent part is as follows:

"Whenever after arrest and prior to the imposition of sentence * * the United States Attorney has reasonable cause to believe that a person charged with an offense against the United States may be presently insane or otherwise so mentally incompetent as to be unable to understand the proceedings against him or properly to assist in his own defense, he shall file a motion for a judicial determination of such mental competency of the accused, setting forth the ground for such belief with the trial court in which proceedings are pending. Upon such a motion or upon a similar motion in behalf of the accused, or upon its own motion, the court shall cause the accused * * * to be examined as to his mental condition by at least one qualified psychiatrist, who shall report to the court. * * *"

An attempt to invoke this statutory provision was made at the close of defendants' evidence, when one of associate defense counsel made this statement:

"If your Honor please, at this time it has occurred to us as counsel for these people, for these defendants, there is probably something mentally wrong with them.

"We are asking the Court at this time to have these people examined by psychiatrists other than those who Mr. Rover the United States Attorney had examine them. Because of the conversation, the testimony on the witness stand, and what the testimony was, their lack of remorse, their peculiar attitude towards this entire situation, that I am firmly convinced there is a strong probability that these people are mentally unstable."

Such a motion will not be granted if it is not made in good faith or if it is based upon a frivolous ground. Wear v. United States, 1954, 94 U.S.App. D.C. 325, 218 F.2d 24. The motion in this case, quoted above, fell short of meeting the statutory requirements as to the belief of the movant concerning the mental condition of the accused. Counsel did not say he had reason to believe and did believe that the defendants "may be presently insane" or otherwise so mentally incompetent as to be unable to understand the proceedings against them or to assist in their own defense. He merely said, "It has occurred to us * * * there is probably something mentally wrong with them," and "I am firmly convinced there is a strong probability that these people are mentally unstable."

There may be something mentally wrong with an accused person or he may be emotionally unstable, and yet he may not be insane within the meaning of the statute and may be mentally competent to stand trial. We do not mean to say a motion under § 4244 must be couched in the exact language of the statute; but it is insufficient unless its recital approximates the meaning of the statutory language. Cf. Perry v. United States, 1952, 90 U.S.App.D.C. 186, 195 F.2d 37.

Even more importantly, the ground for the motion stated by the movant here was slight indeed, and of little weight or importance, and so was frivolous. It set forth no particulars and can be characterized as a statement of vague impressions. Moreover, the chief counsel for the defense had already told the court he had talked with the defendants many times and had no doubt as to their sanity. It should be noted too that soon after the shooting, the Government had the defendants examined by three psychiatrists who found them sane. They were not called upon to testify, but copies of their reports were furnished to defense counsel well in advance of trial. We hold the District Court did not err in denying the motion for a psychiatric examination.

2. In support of their contention that the District Court erred in refusing to submit to the jury the question of the defendants' sanity at the time of the shooting, it is pointed out that this court has twice said¹ that whenever there is some evidence of insanity, a factual issue for the jury is formed, and the Government must prove sanity in order to convict, just as it must prove every ingredient of the...