Lebus v. Harris, Civ. No. C-80-1315 SW.

• Decision Date: 09 September 1981
• Docket Number: Civ. No. C-80-1315 SW.
• Citation: 526 F. Supp. 56
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of California
• Parties: Donald LEBUS, Plaintiff, v. Patricia Roberts HARRIS, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant.

526 F. Supp. 56

Donald LEBUS, Plaintiff, v. Patricia Roberts HARRIS, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant.

Civ. No. C-80-1315 SW.

United States District Court, N. D. California.

September 9, 1981.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

John MacMorris, San Francisco, Cal., for plaintiff.

G. William Hunter, U. S. Atty., William T. McGivern, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty., Chief, Civil Division, San Francisco, Cal., for defendant.

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND REMANDING CASE TO SECRETARY.

SPENCER WILLIAMS, District Judge.

Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to obtain judicial review of a final decision of the Secretary of Health and Human Services denying his application for disability insurance benefits. Both parties have filed motions for summary judgment. Having concluded that the administrative law judge (ALJ) used improper legal standards in weighing the evidence, this court remands, directing the Secretary to act in accordance with this opinion.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a thirty-three year old man with twelve years of formal education. His work history consists of sporadic periods of employment as a self-employed portrait artist, dishwasher, and street musician. In one six week period in 1967, plaintiff earned $1500 painting portraits. He continued to work intermittently as an artist until 1976 (TR 46), and his last job was as a dishwasher in October, 1978.

On August 23, 1978, plaintiff filed an application for supplemental security income, alleging manic-depressive illness as the cause of his inability to work. The Social Security Administration denied plaintiff's application. On January 21, 1980, after considering the case de novo, the ALJ found the plaintiff not to be disabled under the Social Security Act. The ALJ's decision became the final decision of the Secretary when it was approved by the Appeals Council on March 20, 1980.

GENERAL LEGAL STANDARD

Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the jurisdiction of the court is limited to the question of whether the findings of the Secretary are supported by substantial evidence. Hall v. Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, 602 F.2d 1372, 1374 (9th Cir. 1979). Applying this test, the court must uphold the Secretary's determination that plaintiff is not disabled for the purpose of receiving benefits if the findings are supported by "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971). The court's review is directed to the record as a whole and not merely to the evidence tending to support a finding. Cox v. Califano, 587 F.2d 988, 990 (9th Cir. 1978); Walker v. Mathews, 546 F.2d 814, 818 (9th Cir. 1976).

Where the proper legal standard, however, is not applied by the ALJ in weighing the evidence and reaching a decision, the decision should be set aside, even though the findings are supported by substantial evidence. Benitez v. Califano, 573 F.2d 653, 655 (9th Cir. 1978); Flake v. Gardner, 399 F.2d 532, 540 (9th Cir. 1968).

A claimant is entitled to disability benefits under the Social Security program if he is unable to "engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months." 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i)(1), 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). A physical or mental impairment "results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques." 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3), 1382c(a)(3)(C).

The initial burden of proving disability is on the claimant. Rhinehart v. Finch, 438 F.2d 920, 921 (9th Cir. 1971); Seitz v. Secretary of Social Security Administration, 317 F.2d 743, 744 (9th Cir. 1963). This burden is met once he establishes that a physical or mental impairment prevents him from engaging in his previous occupation. Hall, 602 F.2d at 1375; Cox, 587 F.2d at 990. The Secretary must then assume the burden of showing that alternative substantial gainful employment which claimant can perform exists in the national economy. Id.

SUBSTANTIALITY OF THE EVIDENCE

In finding the plaintiff not to be disabled, the ALJ based her decision on two key factors: (1) that the report by Dr. T. H. Brzozowski, staff psychiatrist with the San Francisco Department of Public Health, was not supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory data, and (2) that plaintiff, although found to suffer from manic-depressive illness, had sporadic periods of remission which precluded him from meeting the durational requirement of twelve continuous months of disability. The legal standards applied by the ALJ in reaching this decision are in error. In discussing the proper standards, the court will consider two issues: (1) whether psychiatric evidence can be disregarded by the ALJ because it is not accompanied by objective clinical or laboratory findings, and (2) whether the existence of symptom-free intervals during the course of mental illness necessarily prevents a claimant from meeting the statutory requirement that a disability last for at least twelve continuous months. In addition, the court will consider whether new evidence submitted by plaintiff should be considered on remand.

Psychiatric Evidence:

According to the ALJ's findings, plaintiff did not meet his initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of disability. In evaluating plaintiff's case, the ALJ assigned very little weight to the psychiatric evidence presented, particularly the opinion of Dr. T. H. Brzozowski, due to the absence of objective clinical and laboratory findings. Dr. Brzozowski's report of October 4, 1979, indicated that plaintiff suffers from severe manic-depressive psychosis, leads a "very marginal chaotic life style," and is and "will be unable to hold competitive employment in the near future." (TR 146) This evaluation by Dr. Brzozowski was based on nearly two months of psychiatric monitoring of plaintiff, immediately following plaintiff's confinement at Napa State Hospital from June 8 to July 24, 1979.

Courts have recognized that a psychiatric impairment is not as readily amenable to substantiation by objective laboratory testing as is a medical impairment and that consequently, the diagnostic techniques employed in the field of psychiatry may be somewhat less tangible than those in the field of medicine. See Lewis v. Weinberger, 541 F.2d 417, 420 (4th Cir. 1976); Wyatt v. Weinberger, 519 F.2d 1285, 1287 (4th Cir. 1975); Young v. Harris, 507 F.Supp. 907, 912 (D.S.C.1981); Reams v. Harris, 498 F.Supp. 802, 804 (D.N.C.1980); Alvarez v. Califano, 483 F.Supp. 1284, 1286 (E.D.Pa.1980); Taddeo v. Richardson, 351 F.Supp. 177, 180 (C.D.Cal.1972).¹ In general, mental disorders cannot be ascertained and verified as are most physical illnesses, for the mind cannot be probed by mechanical devises in order to obtain objective clinical manifestations of mental illness. A strict reading of the statutory requirement that an impairment to "demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques," 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3), 1382c(a)(3)(C), is inappropriate in the context of mental illness. Rather, when mental illness is the basis of a disability claim, clinical and laboratory data may consist of the diagnoses and observations of professionals trained in the field of psychopathology. The report of a psychiatrist should not be rejected simply because of the relative imprecision of the psychiatric methodology or the absence of substantial documentation, unless there are other reasons to question the diagnostic technique. Alvarez, 483 F.Supp. at 1286.²

This view is entirely consistent with the regulations, 20 C.F.R. Subparts P and I, Appendix 1, § 12.00 et seq. (1979), which describe the nature and clinical manifestations of certain mental disorders. Appendix 1 is incorporated in the sequential evaluation process for the adjudication of disability claims which is set forth in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1503, 416.903 et seq. These regulations establish a series of inquiries which the ALJ is to make in determining the validity of plaintiff's claim.³ This evaluation procedure allows plaintiff to prove disability in two ways. Appendix 1 of Subparts P and I lists medical criteria for various impairments that are of a level of severity justifying a finding of disability. If plaintiff introduces specific medical findings that are identified in the Appendix as essential in establishing a diagnosis or in confirming the existence of an impairment, his claim is approved. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1517, 416.917. Plaintiff is not, however, required to meet the standards of Appendix 1 in order to prove disability. Rather, plaintiff may rely on the traditional approach established by the case law which utilizes shifting burdens of proof.

The alternative standard for clinical and laboratory data in the context of mental disorders as discussed supra, parallels the regulatory scheme in Appendix 1, § 12.00 et seq. in that the observations and diagnoses of professionals trained in the field of psychopathology are the focal points of both systems. Specifically, under Section 12.00 et seq. of Appendix 1, clinical signs are "medically demonstrable phenomena ... which indicate specific abnormalities of behavior, affect, thought, memory, orientation or contact with reality." 20 C.F.R. Subparts P and I, Appendix 1, § 12.00(A). Laboratory findings include psychological tests and those findings "relevant to such issues as restriction of daily activities, constriction of interests, deterioration of personal habits (including personal hygiene), and impaired ability to relate to others." Id.

Though the regulations identify specific observational findings which must be...