Lecat's Ventriloscope v. MT Tool & Mfg.
| Decision Date | 20 November 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 16 C 5298,16 C 5298 |
| Citation | 351 F.Supp.3d 1100 |
| Parties | LECAT'S VENTRILOSCOPE, Plaintiff, v. MT TOOL AND MANUFACTURING, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Ronald B. Kowalczyk, Kowalczyk Law Offices, PC, St. Charles, IL, Andrew S. Curfman, Roger D. Emerson, Sergey V. Vernyuk, Emerson Thomson Bennett, LLC, Akron, OH, for Plaintiff.
John F. Rollins, Law Office of John F. Rollins, Wheaton, IL, Charles Thomas Riggs, Jr., River Forest, IL, for Defendant.
Lecat's Ventriloscope ("Plaintiff") filed this suit against MT Tool and Manufacturing ("Defendant") for alleged infringement of U.S. Patent No. 7,645,141 (the "'141 Patent"). (R. 1, Compl.) The trial previously set for August 2018 was recently vacated. (R. 77, Min. Entry; R. 140, Min. Entry.) Both parties have moved for partial summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. (R. 130, PL's Mot.; R. 132, Def.'s Mot.) For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff's motion is granted in part and denied in part, and Defendant's motion is granted in part and denied in part.
For brevity, the Court presumes familiarity with this case, the '141 Patent, the prosecution history of the '141 Patent, and the Court's claim construction ruling, as thoroughly set forth in several prior opinions. See Lecat's Ventriloscope v. MT Tool & Mfg. , No. 16 C 5298, 2018 WL 3651592 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 1, 2018) (); Lecat's Ventriloscope v. MT Tool & Mfg. , 283 F.Supp.3d 702 (N.D. Ill. 2018)( disputed claim terms); Lecat's Ventriloscope v. MT Tool & Mfg. , No. 16 C 5298, 2017 WL 489416 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 6, 2017) (); Lecat's Ventriloscope v. MT Tool & Mfg. , No. 16 C 5298, 2017 WL 1362036 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 6, 2017) (). In brief, the '141 Patent discloses and claims an "arrangement for auscultation training"—auscultation being "the act of listening to sounds within the body as a method of diagnosis." .) A stethoscope is an example of an auscultation device. .) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant indirectly infringes the '141 Patent by marketing and selling a stethoscope-like training device, the MT S-Scope ("S-Scope"). (R. 54, Am. Compl. ¶ 9.) Plaintiff alleges both forms of indirect infringement: induced infringement in violation of 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) and contributory infringement in violation of Section 271(c). (Id. ¶¶ 6-34; R. 82-2, Pl.'s Am. Infringement Contentions at 3.)
The parties disagreed over the proper construction of various claim terms. Lecat's Ventriloscope , 283 F.Supp.3d at 704. The Court issued claim constructions for the disputed terms on January 11, 2018. (R. 75, Mem. Op.) The Court ordered that the parties complete discovery by June 29, 2018, and set a trial date of August 13, 2018. (Id. at 5; R. 77, Min. Entry.) The Court subsequently vacated that trial date. (R. 140, Min. Entry.) On July 30, 2018, the parties filed their present motions for summary judgment.1 (R. 130, Pl.'s Mot.; R. 132, Def.'s Mot.) The Court addresses each of the parties' arguments in turn below.
Rule 56 provides that "[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (citation omitted). "A genuine dispute as to any material fact exists if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Kvapil v. Chippewa Cty., 752 F.3d 708, 712 (7th Cir. 2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In deciding whether a dispute exists, the Court must "construe all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Nat'l Am. Ins. Co. v. Artisan & Truckers Cas. Co. , 796 F.3d 717, 723 (7th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted).
Under Rule 56, the movant has the initial burden of establishing that a trial is not necessary. Sterk v. Redbox Automated Retail, LLC , 770 F.3d 618, 627 (7th Cir. 2014). "That burden may be discharged by showing ... that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). If the movant carries this burden, the nonmovant "must make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The nonmovant "must go beyond the pleadings (e.g. , produce affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or admissions on file) to demonstrate that there is evidence upon which a jury could properly proceed to find a verdict in [its] favor." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "The existence of a mere scintilla of evidence, however, is insufficient to fulfill this requirement." Wheeler v. Lawson , 539 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2008). "[S]peculation and conjecture" also cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment. Cooney v. Casady , 735 F.3d 514, 519 (7th Cir. 2013). In addition, not all factual disputes will preclude the entry of summary judgment, only those that "could affect the outcome of the suit under governing law." Outlaw v. Newkirk , 259 F.3d 833, 837 (7th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).
In deciding a summary judgment motion, the Court cannot weigh conflicting evidence, assess the credibility of the witnesses, or determine the ultimate truth of the matter, as these are functions of the jury. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ; Omnicare, Inc. v. UnitedHealth Grp., Inc. , 629 F.3d 697, 704-05 (7th Cir. 2011). Instead, the Court's sole function is "to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Tolan v. Cotton , 572 U.S. 650, 657, 134 S.Ct. 1861, 188 L.Ed.2d 895 (2014) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ).
As a preliminary matter, the Court must dispel Plaintiff's misconception of its burden on summary judgment. Plaintiff asserts that, because U.S. patents are presumed valid, "a patentee who moves for summary judgment that its patent is not invalid need not introduce any evidence in order to prevail." (R. 130, Pl.'s Mot. at 5.) Without any argument about the merits of Defendant's invalidity defenses, Plaintiff then declares that it "has met its burden" as the party moving for summary judgment, and that the "burden now shifts to Defendant to produce evidence from which a jury may find the '141 Patent invalid." (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff appears to believe that the presumption of validity alone is sufficient to discharge its burden on summary judgment, but Plaintiff misunderstands its initial burden as the moving party.
It is true that the claims of a U.S. patent are presumed valid and that the party contesting validity bears the ultimate burden of proving invalidity by clear and convincing evidence. 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) ; Microsoft Corp. v. I4I Limited P'ship , 564 U.S. 91, 95, 131 S.Ct. 2238, 180 L.Ed.2d 131 (2011). Consistent with these principles, a patentee moving for summary judgment on an accused infringer's invalidity defenses need not present any "factual evidence" to prevail. Massey v. Del Labs., Inc. , 118 F.3d 1568, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ; see also Modrowski v. Pigatto , 712 F.3d 1166, 1168 (7th Cir. 2013) (). But it does not follow that the presumption of validity alone discharges Plaintiff's initial burden on summary judgment. Instead, "a party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact."
Celotex Corp. , 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (emphasis added); see also Outlaw , 259 F.3d at 837 . That means, in this context, that a patentee moving for summary judgment of no invalidity "must show that the [defendant] ... failed to produce clear and convincing evidence on an essential element of a defense upon which a reasonable jury could invalidate the patent." Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc. , 251 F.3d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ; see also Freedman Seating Co. v. Am. Seating Co. , 420 F.3d 1350, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (). A patentee moving...
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