Leccese v. McDonough

• Citation: 361 Mass. 64,279 N.E.2d 339
• Parties: Arthur C. LECCESE, administrator and individually, et al. v. James F. McDONOUGH et al.
• Decision Date: 07 February 1972
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

Page 339

279 N.E.2d 339

361 Mass. 64

Arthur C. LECCESE, administrator and individually, et al. v. James F. McDONOUGH et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex.

Argued Dec. 8, 1971.

Decided Feb. 7, 1972.

George R. Halsey, Boston (Robert I. Deutsch, Boston, with him), for plaintiffs.

David W. Kelley, Boston, for defendants.

Before TAURO, C.J., and CUTTER, QUIRICO, BRAUCHER and HENNESSEY, JJ.

CUTTER, Justice.

A Superior Court judge sustained the demurrer of each of the defendants, two doctors, in an action of tort for negligence in giving prenatal care to the plaintiff administrator's intestate (the Leccese foetus). The declaration alleges that in October, 1969, the Lecccese foetus 'was a viable child in the womb' and that, 'in consequence of' each defendant's negligence in treating it over seven months, it 'suffered great pain of body and mind, and subsequently died.' The action is 'for the benefit and use of the next of kin' under G.L. c. 229 (see fn. 1). The plaintiffs admit 'for purposes of this appeal that . . . (the Leccese foetus) died in her mother's womb and was thereafter delivered stillborn from her mother.' We treat the matter as if the declaration appropriately alleged this fact.

The controlling statute is G.L. c. 229, § 2 (as amended through St.1967, c. 666, § 1). ¹ With respect to prenatal injuries, recovery for wrongful death under the predecessor of c. 229 was originally denied in an opinion by Mr. Justice Holmes in Dietrich v. Northampton, 138 Mass. 14. In that case there was some slight evidence that the foetus (about four to five months advanced in pregnancy) did live for ten or fifteen minutes. The court (p. 17) decided, after reviewing the then existing authorities, 'that, as the unborn child was a part of the mother at the time of the injury, any damage to it which was not too remote to be recovered for at all was recoverable by her.' The opinion proceeded, 'we think it clear that the statute sued upon does not embrace the . . . intestate within its meaning.' This rule, in effect, was reaffirmed in Bliss v. Passanesi, 326 Mass. 461, 95 N.E.2d 206, and in Cavanaugh v. First Natl. Stores, Inc., 329 Mass. 179, 107 N.E.2d 307.

In Keyes v. Construction Serv. Inc., 340 Mass. 633, 634--637, 165 N.E.2d 912, we took note of, and reviewed, the constantly developing trend of the decisions elsewhere to depart from the doctrine of the Dietrich case, 138 Mass. 14. We also discussed conflicting considerations which bore upon whether recovery should be allowed. We summarized our conclusions in the Keyes case, at p. 637, 165 N.E.2d at p. 915: 'The . . . declaration alleges receipt of a bodily injury by . . . (the) intestate when a viable child in his mother's womb. We interpret the term viable child to mean a foetus so far formed and developed that if then born it would be capable of living. The declaration does not allege with sufficient certainty the fact, if true, that the child was born alive. If the child was stillborn the plaintiff would have no right of action. We think that the plaintiff should have an opportunity to amend her declaration. If she does so and states a cause of action in accordance with this opinion, the case is to stand for further proceedings, otherwise the order sustaining the demurrer is affirmed' (emphasis supplied).

In Torigian v. Watertown News Co. Inc., 352 Mass. 446, 225 N.E.2d 926, we considered an accident which occurred on January 2, 1964, when the mother had been pregnant (p. 447, 225 N.E.2d p. 926) for three and one-half months. The foetus 'was not then viable.' On March 13, 1964, the child was born and lived about two and one-half hours. In these circumstances, we held that the child 'was a 'person' within the meaning of G.L. c. 229, § 2, as amended.'

A 1969 case applying Massachusetts law, Henry v. Jones, 306 F.Supp. 726, 727 (D. Mass.), correctly concluded that the Massachusetts 'courts would hold that the distinction between infants born alive and those stillborn is of such significance that recovery under' c. 229, § 2, as amended 'will be denied to the latter.' Special reliance was placed on our decisions in the Keyes case, 340 Mass. 633, 636, 637, 165 N.E.2d 912, and the Torigian case, 352 Mass. 446, 447--448, ² 225 N.E.2d 926.

The requirement that the foetus be born alive, stated expressly in the Keyes case, 340 Mass. 633, 636, lays down a sensible and easily administered rule under our statute. In recognizing the possibility of recovery under c. 229, § 2 (as amended), for a viable foetus born alive in the Keyes case, and for a foetus nonviable at the date of injury but later born alive (see the Torigian case, 352 Mass. 446, 225 N.E.2d 926), we went as far in revising the rule in the Dietrich case, 138 Mass. 14, as the statutory language reasonably permits. If a foetus is born alive, it becomes a 'person' with at least the theoretical possibility of survival and of enduring the consequences of prenatal injury throughout its life. A foetus not born alive seems to us to incur no such risk of continuing injury and also not to be a 'person' within our interpretation of the legislative intention. ³ If there are to be changes in the bases for recovery in this type of statutory action, we think that they are for legislative rather than judicial determination.

The plaintiff invites our attention to authorities elsewhere. These authorities are somewhat split. Many of them rest upon the interpretation of particular wrongful death statutes, some unlike our own in various respects. The principal decisions are collected in a reporter's note to Restatement 2d: Torts, § 869 ⁴ (Tent. Draft No. 16, April 24, 1970, pp. 174--182). See Harper & James, Torts, § 18.3, p. 1031; Prosser, Torts (4th ed.) § 55, pp. 337--338. See also annotation, 15 A.L.R.3d 992. We adhere to the view taken in the Massachusetts decisions already mentioned.

Orders sustaining demurrers affirmed.

1 Chapter 229, § 2, as amended, reads in part (emphasis supplied): 'A person who (1) by his negligence causes the death of a person in the exercise of due care, or (2) by wilful, wanton or reckless act causes the death of a person under such circumstances that the deceased could have recovered damages for personal injuries if his death had not resulted . . . shall be liable in damages in the sum of not less than five...