Lechman v. Hooper
| Decision Date | 20 February 1890 |
| Citation | 52 N.J.L. 253,19 A. 215 |
| Parties | LECHMAN v. HOOPER. |
| Court | New Jersey Supreme Court |
(Syllabus by the Court.)
Error to circuit court, Mercer county; before BEASLEY, Chief Justice. Motion for a new trial.
The plaintiff was an apprentice to one Duncan MacKenzie in the iron business. The firm of Furman & Kite, being contractors to put up an engine-house, engaged MacKenzie to supply and erect the lintels of the door, consisting of iron uprights and cross-pieces. The plaintiff and two of his fellow-apprentices were sent by their employer, MacKenzie, to put these lintels in place; and, in raising a derrick for that purpose in the engine-house, one of the walls fell upon and injured the plaintiff. The wall in question had been erected by the defendant under contract with Furman "& Kite, and there was evidence tending to show that it had been left in a dangerous condition for want of shoring up. The complementary facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.
R. S. Woodruff, for plaintiff in error. H. N. Barton, for defendant in error.
BEASLEY, C. J., (after stating the facts as above.) The wall that fell and injured the plaintiff had been built by the defendant, and, as the jury has found, had been left by him in a dangerous condition. Being conscious of that fact, he had directed one of his men to prop it up in the usual manner; an order that had not been adequately obeyed, and hence the accident. The verdict acquits the plaintiff of all negligence on his part. The only connection between the plaintiff and defendant was that they were engaged in doing work on the same structure, by force of independent contracts with the builder; the defendant having undertaken to do the mason work, and the master of the plaintiff to do the iron work. The plaintiff had been sent by his employer to put in the lintels to the door of the building in question, and, while assisting in raising a derrick for that purpose, had been hurt by the falling of the wall already mentioned.
A single question of law was stated at the trial. It was insisted that there was some evidence from which the jury could have properly inferred that one Bechtel, who was a co-employe with the plaintiff, and who had been directed to oversee that particular job, had received an intimation from one of the employes of the defendant that should have put him on his guard with respect to the dangerous condition of the building. It will be assumed, for the present, that this intimation was such that by its force Bechtel was chargeable with knowledge of the danger, and that, without apprising the plaintiff of the fact, he led him into the peril that so disastrously resulted. At the trial the presiding judge charged the jury that, even if the apprentice was the overseer of the job, his knowledge of the lurking danger was not to be imputed to the plaintiff, and that, to disentitle the plaintiff to a recovery, it should appear that he himself knew, or from the circumstances should have known, of the impending peril. This statement of the law is now challenged in this court. But it is conceived that the rule thus declared at the trial was correct. The legal situation was this: The defendant had erected this wall, and therefore the law imposed on him the duty to put it in a safe condition, or to give warning of its unsafe condition; and this was a duty he owed to each individual person who should lawfully come upon the premises. Being aware of such responsibility, hedirected one of his men to make the wall safe; but, instead of doing this, the latter, as it is claimed, warned Bechtel, the co-employe of the plaintiff, and the foreman of the work for the time being, of the danger. But how is it that the plaintiff is to be affected by such a notice, which it is not pretended was communicated to him? There seems no ground, not even the least, for asserting that Bechtel was his agent for the purpose of receiving such a notice in his behalf. An agency cannot be created without the consent of the principal, express or implied. In this instance there is no suggestion of an actual appointment by the plaintiff of this foreman as his agent, and it is not perceived that there is any circumstance from which it can be inferred. The defendant, as has been said, owed the plaintiff...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Wright v. K.C. Structural Steel Co.
...139; Flanagan v. Wells Bros. Co., 237 Ill. 82, 86 N.E. 609; Penn Steel Co. v. Elmore & Hamilton Const. Co., 175 Fed. 176; Lechman v. Hooper, 52 N.J.L. 253, 19 Atl. 215; Bill v. New York Expanding Metal Co., 69 N.Y.S. 989; Lisle v. Anderson (Okla.), 159 Pac. 278. (c) There is substantial pro......
-
Wright v. Kansas City Structural Steel Co.
... ... 139; Flanagan v. Wells Bros ... Co., 237 Ill. 82, 86 N.E. 609; Penn Steel Co. v ... Elmore & Hamilton Const. Co., 175 F. 176; Lechman v ... Hooper, 52 N.J. L. 253, 19 A. 215; Bill v. New York ... Expanding Metal Co., 69 N.Y.S. 989; Lisle v ... Anderson (Okla.), 159 P. 278 ... ...
-
Bergquist v. Penterman
...possibly use a torch while down in the cellar, such knowledge cannot as a matter of law be imputed to decedent. Lechman v. Hooper, 52 N.J.L. 253, 19 A. 215 (Sup.Ct.1890); Farrell v. Diamond Alkali Co., 16 N.J.Super. 163, 83 A.2d 900 (App.Div.1951). There is absolutely no proof to show deced......
-
Lane v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.
...is not imputable to his employees, who are invitees." Id. In harmony with those cases that share the minority view is Lechman v. Hooper, 52 N.J.L. 253, 19 A. 215 (1890). The Court had before it the question of notice, from the employee of the subcontractor that had built a wall, to the fore......