LeClair v. Raymond

• Docket Number: 1:19-cv-28 (BKS/DJS)
• Decision Date: 25 January 2022
• Parties: NICHOLAS J. LECLAIR, Plaintiff, v. SARAH RAYMOND, in her individual capacity, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York

1

NICHOLAS J. LECLAIR, Plaintiff, v. SARAH RAYMOND, in her individual capacity, Defendant.

No. 1:19-cv-28 (BKS/DJS)

United States District Court, N.D. New York

January 25, 2022

For Plaintiff:

Nicholas J. LeClair, pro se

For Defendant:

Stephen M. Groudine

Murphy Burns LLP

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER

Brenda K. Sannes, United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

The sole claim remaining in this Section 1983 action is Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim for unlawful entry against Defendant Sarah Raymond. (See Dkt. No. 171 (summary judgment order)). Presently before the Court are: (1) Plaintiff's “request for an answer on the [Fourth] Amendment Monell claim” (Dkt. No. 181); (2) Plaintiff's motions in limine (Dkt. Nos. 186, 190); (3) Plaintiff's requests for subpoenas (see Dkt. Nos. 208, 216); and (4) Defendant's motion in limine (Dkt. No. 203). The Court heard oral argument on the motions at the final pretrial conference on January 21, 2022.

II. FOURTH AMENDMENT MONELL CLAIM

On September 17, 2021, Plaintiff filed a letter motion requesting that the Court issue an order on a Fourth Amendment Monell claim that was not addressed by the Court's Memorandum-Decision and Order on the parties' motions for summary judgment. (Dkt. No. 181). Plaintiff argues that his Second Amended Complaint states a Fourth Amendment Monell claim against Warren County, pointing to three specific allegations that the County:

• acted with “deliberate indifference in implementing a policy of inadequate training and/or supervision, and/or by failing to train and/or supervise its officers, agents, employees and state actors, in providing the constitutional protections guaranteed, including those under 14th Amendment, when performing actions related to child abuse reports and dependency proceedings, ” (Dkt. No. 75, at ¶ 73(e));

• had a “policy and/or practice of accusing parents of child abuse or neglect in order to intimidate parents to providing ‘consent' to search homes or unlawfully coerce testimony, ” (id. ¶ 73(f)); and

• had a “policy targeting poor and uneducated families with desirable children to frame them through physical searches, coerced interviews, concealing exculpatory evidence, and falsified local government records and conspire with private attorneys and use them to facilitate unjust custody transfers, ” (id. ¶ 77).

(Dkt. No. 181, at 1-2). Defendant argues that Plaintiff's request is best characterized as a motion to reconsider under Local Rule 60.1, and that such a motion is untimely. (Dkt. No. 211, at 1-2). Defendant further argues that (1) Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint did not allege a Fourth Amendment Monell claim against Warren County and (2) the allegations Plaintiff points to are not implicated by the remaining claim against Defendant Raymond. (Id. at 2).

To the extent that Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint contains a Fourth Amendment Monell claim, such claim did not survive the Court's August 25, 2020 Memorandum-Decision and Order granting in part Plaintiff's motion to amend and granting in part the Moving Defendants' motion to dismiss. (See Dkt. No. 73). Prior to this decision, Plaintiff had two surviving claims: (1) a substantive due process claim against the Moving Defendants and (2) a Fourth Amendment claim against Defendant Raymond. (Id. at 2). In relevant part, the Court granted Plaintiff's motion to amend his complaint to add a Fourteenth Amendment Monell claim against Warren County. (Id. at 27-28 (noting that Plaintiff's proposed Second Amended Complaint asserts a “Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim” against Warren County and allowing it to proceed where Fourteenth Amendment claim survived against certain individual defendants); see also Id. at 43 (granting Plaintiff's motion to amend “as to his Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claims against [individual defendants], and the related Monell claim against Warren County, and as to Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim against Raymond”)). The Court subsequently granted summary judgment to Defendants on and dismissed Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claims, including the Monell claim against Warren County. (Dkt. No. 171, at 36-39). To the extent Plaintiff's letter motion could be considered a motion for reconsideration of either ruling, the fourteen-day period for such a motion has long passed, and the Court denies it as untimely. N.D.N.Y. L.R. 60.1.

Moreover, the Court found at the summary judgment stage that:

Plaintiff has presented no evidence that Warren County (1) has a widespread policy or custom of allowing case workers to present intentionally misleading information, or ignore exculpatory evidence, to substantiate abuse allegations, or (2) systematically fails to train case workers on their roles and responsibilities relative to investigating abuse allegations.

(Dkt. No. 171, at 37-38). The Court therefore already found no evidence supporting the allegations Plaintiff now asserts support a Fourth Amendment Monell claim. Moreover, the remaining claim against Defendant Raymond for unlawful entry does not rest on any allegations of intimidation to obtain consent to enter the home. Finally, there is no evidence that Warren County had a policy, practice, or custom with respect to entering homes in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

Accordingly, the Court denies Plaintiff's request for an “answer on the 4th Amendment Monell claim.”

III. PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS IN LIMINE

A. Defenses

Plaintiff argues that the Court should bar Defendant from offering a “good motives” defense, a de minimis defense, or a qualified immunity defense. (Dkt. No. 186, at 10-18). Defendant generally responds that Plaintiff's request is not a proper use of a motion in limine because it seeks substantive, rather than evidentiary, relief. (See Dkt. No. 212, at 5-10).

First, Plaintiff argues that the Court should reject “[a]ny attempt to inject a necessity, resident's approval, exigent motive, some new ‘hot tip' that was never disclosed in discovery, or similar ‘good motive' defense” because Defendant has never alleged consent, exigent circumstances, or other “good motive” defense to enter the home. (Dkt. No. 186, at 10-12). The Court denies this portion of Plaintiff's motion in limine without prejudice to raising objections to specific testimony at trial. Defendant has not asserted any defense based on consent, exigent circumstances, or good motives; rather, she denies entering Plaintiff's home at all. In any event, the Court “is unwilling to speculate, pretrial, as to what statements any witness will or will not make during trial.” Picciano v. McLoughlin, No. 07-cv-0781, 2010 WL 4366999, at *5, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114704, at *15 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2010).^[1]

The Court also denies Plaintiff's request to bar Defendant from arguing that her entry into Plaintiff's home was “de minimis.” The trial will center around Defendant's conduct and whether it was reasonable. Defendant may testify regarding her actions on the day in question, the nature and extent of which are relevant to the reasonableness of her actions as well as to any damages Plaintiff may have suffered as a result of any Fourth Amendment violation.

Finally, the Court denies Plaintiff's request to bar Defendant from asserting a qualified immunity defense. (See Dkt. No. 186, at 14-18).^[2] While Defendant does not “anticipate” seeking qualified immunity for a Fourth Amendment claim premised on her alleged unlawful entry into the home, Defendant notes that if Plaintiff asserts a Fourth Amendment violation based on a violation of the curtilage of his home, she will request special interrogatories for a qualified immunity defense. (E.g., Dkt. No. 212, at 10).^[3] Because Defendant properly raised a qualified immunity defense in her answer to Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, the Court denies Plaintiff's request to bar such a defense. To the extent that particular findings of fact are necessary for the Court to determine whether Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, it is Defendant's responsibility to request specific factual interrogatories for the jury. See Thomas v. Kelly, 903 F.Supp.2d 237, 254 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).

B. Exclusions

Plaintiff generally requests that the Court rule as inadmissible “any hearsay statements or scandalous matters” and evidence regarding matters that “pertain to any action or allegation in another state or jurisdiction” which are irrelevant to Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim. (See Dkt. No. 186, at 18-28). Defendant responds that (1) she “does not anticipate offering into evidence” the documents from New Hampshire authorities Plaintiff references “in her case-in-chief, ” and (2) Plaintiff's request is essentially one that all admitted evidence “be in compliance with the Federal Rules of Evidence” and not a “legitimate evidentiary issue[] that require[s] an advanced ruling.” (Dkt. No. 212, at 10-11).

Plaintiff does identify specific documents he contends are “legally flawed” under the Federal Rules of Evidence: Exhibits E, F, G, and I to Defendants' motion for summary judgment. (See Dkt. No. 186, at 22-27 (citing Dkt. Nos. 139-6, 139-7, 139-8, 139-10)). However, none of these documents appears on Defendant's exhibit list. (See Dkt. No. 194). In addition, Defendant has represented that she “does not anticipate offering” these documents in her case-in-chief. (Dkt. No. 212, at 11). Accordingly, the Court denies Plaintiff's request to exclude these documents as moot.

The Court also denies Plaintiff's more general request to exclude hearsay statements and scandalous or otherwise irrelevant matters, without prejudice to raising objections at trial. The Court will not issue general admissibility or evidentiary rulings without consideration of...