Leclair v. Wells Fargo Bank Iowa, N.A., CIV.4:02-CV-10051.
Citation | 291 F.Supp.2d 873 |
Decision Date | 09 July 2003 |
Docket Number | No. CIV.4:02-CV-10051.,CIV.4:02-CV-10051. |
Parties | Ann LECLAIR, Plaintiff, v. WELLS FARGO BANK IOWA, N.A., Defendant, |
Court | United States District Courts. 8th Circuit. United States State District Court of Southern District of Iowa |
Darrell G. Meyer, Marshalltown, IA, for Plaintiff.
Deborah M. Tharnish, Jo Ellen Whitney, Davis, Brown, Koehn, Shors & Roberts PC, Des Moines, IA, for Defendant.
The Court has before it defendant Wells Fargo Bank Iowa, N.A.'s ("Wells Fargo") motion for summary judgment, filed May 1, 2003. Plaintiff resisted the motion June 5, 2003, and defendant filed a reply memorandum on June 19, 2003. The motion is now considered fully submitted.
The following relevant facts either are not in dispute or are viewed in a light most favorable to plaintiff. Plaintiff Ann LeClair has a history of dysthymia and major depression dating back prior to 1993. Medical records indicate plaintiff has been hospitalized more than ten times for mental health conditions, including attempted suicide and substance abuse. On September 7, 1993, plaintiff was declared "seriously mentally impaired" by an associate judge of the Iowa District Court for Marshall County, and ordered committed for impatient counseling and treatment at the University of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics. In March 1994, the Social Security Administration determined that plaintiff was disabled under the meaning of the Social Security Act on the basis of a mental health condition, specifically dysthymia with major depression. Beginning in August 1997, plaintiff enrolled in and subsequently completed a rehabilitation program for training at Marshalltown Community College.
Plaintiff began working for the predecessor of defendant Well Fargo [hereinafter "Wells Fargo"] on or about May 17, 1998. Plaintiff initially worked in Clive, Iowa, but then transferred to the banking store in Ames, Iowa.
On several occasions during 1999 and early 2000, plaintiff was nominated for service excellence awards by her supervisors at Wells Fargo. She won the award in the summer of 2000. Several Wells Fargo employees also wrote personal thank-you notes praising plaintiff for exceptional customer service.
During the same time period, however, plaintiff also received warnings for cash security violations in 1999. These warnings included a verbal warning on June 25, 1999, and a written warning on August 31, 1999.
On September 11, 1999, plaintiff and all other Ames branch tellers were given a written warning reiterating the importance of following standard operating procedures ("SOPs"). In addition, tellers were regularly reminded of the importance of complying with bank standards and procedures, the need for careful balancing and avoiding over/short situations and ticket errors, and the need to reduce errors. The requirement of processing all transactions according to SOPs is an important part of the annual performance evaluation, which considers each teller's errors and offsets.
In August 2000, plaintiff began to experience a relapse of her previous depression, and informed her supervisor of the problem at least once prior to mid-September 2000. Plaintiff contends in her administrative complaint that she began to receive increased pressure from her supervisor shortly thereafter, and that co-workers did not receive the same pressure. Plaintiff's annual employee evaluation for the period between August 1999 and August 2000 was largely positive, although her error and offset rate was deemed "not acceptable."
On September 7, 2000, plaintiff received a written warning for failing to follow SOPs with respect to a commercial deposit. Plaintiff contacted defendant's employee assistance program after receiving this warning, but was not helped by the program. On October 2, 2000, plaintiff was placed on a final written warning for unsatisfactory work performance.
The final written warning given to plaintiff stated that her performance was unsatisfactory in the following areas: consistently complying with Wells Fargo standards and procedures, projecting a professional manner at all times, maintaining error tolerance levels and maintaining over/short tolerance levels. In a meeting held to discuss the warning, Wells Fargo supervisors told plaintiff that she was expected to bring her performance to a satisfactory level, beginning immediately, and that she would be terminated if she made any additional errors. Plaintiff started crying, and was told to put her arms down and to stop crying. She also was told to take a few paid days off, and that she should "be better" when she returned to work.
Either during the same meeting, or upon her return to work three days later, Wells Fargo supervisors told plaintiff that her teller position was being eliminated, and that she could choose between a receptionist position or a 30-hour-per week teller position, which was a decrease from the 40-hour position she previously held. She chose the latter position.
Between September 2000 and December 2000, plaintiff was excused from work on a few occasions under doctor's orders, and was on prescription medication for her mental health. Plaintiff contends that she was repeatedly reprimanded during this period for not smiling, and criticized for not socializing after work with co-workers.
Plaintiff contends that in October 2000, she was treated differently from co-workers who did not have mental health problems, by being the sole teller required to stay late to reconcile drawer balances, when others who had made similar errors were not forced to stay late. Plaintiff also contends that other workers were allowed to read or study on duty, while plaintiff was prohibited from both activities. Plaintiff states her supervisor continually changed plaintiff's work schedule to make things more difficult for plaintiff.
Meanwhile, on October 23, 2000, plaintiff left a roll of quarters in the cash drawer, in violation of Wells Fargo procedures. On November 20, 2000, she shorted a commercial customer by $150, and placed a $20 bill in the $50 strap.
During the Christmas holiday season, the bank was short-staffed. Plaintiff was placed in charge of the vault, despite telling her supervisor she could not manage the pressure. Plaintiff's supervisor told plaintiff she had no choice.
On December 29, 2000, a strap of money in the vault was short by $200, and a $180.74 error was found on a commercial deposit. Plaintiff was terminated on January 3, 2001.
Plaintiff subsequently filed a timely administrative charge of discrimination with the Iowa Civil Rights Commission ("ICRC"). The complaint was cross-filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). The ICRC issued an Administrative Release, or Letter of Right-To-Sue, on September 14, 2001. The EEOC in turn issued its Notice of Right to Sue on October 30, 2001.
On January 28, 2002, plaintiff presented to this Court her complaint, as well as an affidavit and request to proceed in Forma Pauperis, and directions for service by a United States Marshal.1 On February 6 2002, this Court issued an Order deferring ruling on plaintiff's request to proceed in Forma Pauperis, and granted plaintiff fifteen (15) days in which to submit addition information regarding her financial condition. This Court ultimately granted plaintiff's application on February 27, 2002, and the complaint was filed of record the same day.
Plaintiff alleges in her complaint that defendant discriminated against her based on her disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq., and the Iowa Civil Rights Act ("ICRA"), IOWA CODE §§ 216 et seq., respectively. Defendant now moves for summary judgment on both claims.
Summary judgment is properly granted when the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c); Walsh v. United States, 31 F.3d 696, 698 (8th Cir.1994). "When the evidence would support conflicting conclusions, summary judgment should be denied." Kells v. Sinclair Buick-GMC Truck, Inc., 210 F.3d 827, 830 (8th Cir. 2000). "[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). An issue is "genuine," if the evidence is sufficient to persuade a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Id.
"Summary judgment should seldom be used in employment discrimination cases." Crawford v. Runyon, 37 F.3d 1338, 1341 (8th Cir.1994). Summary judgment should be granted only on the rare occasion where no dispute of fact exists and there is only one conclusion. Id. (citations omitted) (quotations omitted). The Court should not grant defendants' summary judgment motion "unless the evidence could not support any reasonable inference for the nonmovant." Id. (citations omitted).
Before discussing the merits of plaintiff's claims, the Court must address defendant's contention that plaintiff's claims are untimely, due to the fact her complaint was not actually filed until February 27, 2002-outside the ninety-day window allowed under the applicable state and federal statutes. To comply with the limitations period under the ADA, a claimant generally must file a cause of action in district court within 90 days of receiving her "right-to-sue" letter from the EEOC. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (...
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