Lecrone v. Leckrone
Decision Date | 19 September 1991 |
Docket Number | No. 1-89-1458,1-89-1458 |
Parties | , 162 Ill.Dec. 814 Thomas LECRONE, Connie Lecrone Loper, Scott H. Lecrone, and Dale E. Lecrone, Plaintiffs, v. Harriet LECKRONE, individually, and Harriet Leckrone and William J. Flotow as co-executors of the Will of Gordon L. Leckrone, Deceased, Defendants (Harriet Leckrone, Individually, Defendant and Petitioner-Appellee; Thomas W. Murphy and Johnson, Cusack & Bell, Ltd., Respondents-Appellants). |
Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Joseph R. Marconi, Johnson, Cusack & Bell, Ltd., Chicago, for respondents-appellants.
Irving Lewis, Des Plaines, for defendant and petitioner-appellee.
Respondents, Thomas W. Murphy and Johnson, Cusack & Bell, Ltd., appeal from an order of the circuit court granting petitioner, Harriet Leckrone, sanctions in the amount of $7,000 pursuant to section 2-611 of the Code of Civil Procedure. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 110, par. 2-611.) Harriet Leckrone was also one of the defendants in the underlying suit in this appeal. On appeal, respondents raise the following issues: (1) Whether the trial court erred in imposing sanctions against them for their filing of the underlying complaint against defendants, Harriet Leckrone and William J. Flotow; and (2) whether the amount of the sanctions imposed was excessive.
We reverse.
The facts, as we can discern from the record, reveal that on August 9, 1974, Anthony J. Lecrone and his wife, Hattie Lecrone, each executed a will. Anthony and Hattie are the parents of Charles Lecrone and Gordon L. Leckrone and the grandparents of the plaintiffs in the underlying suit. The plaintiffs in that suit are Thomas C. Lecrone, Connie Lecrone Loper, Scott H. Lecrone, and Dale E. Lecrone. Plaintiffs' father, Charles Lecrone, predeceased his parents.
Pursuant to the terms of Anthony's will, all of his property was bequeathed to his wife, Hattie. In the event she predeceased him, one-half of his estate was bequeathed to his son, Gordon. The other one-half of Anthony's estate was to be divided, in equal shares, among plaintiffs.
The distribution of the assets in Hattie's will differed from the distribution in Anthony's will. Hattie provided that $1,000 was to be left to each of the four plaintiffs. Plaintiffs' $4,000 was to be paid out of her savings account at York Federal Savings and Loan Association. The balance of the savings account was bequeathed to Gordon. The remainder of her estate was bequeathed to her husband. In the event Anthony predeceased her, the remainder of her estate was left to Gordon. If Gordon did not survive her, plaintiffs were to receive, in equal shares, the remainder of the estate.
When Anthony and Hattie became infirm, they moved in with Gordon and his wife, Harriet Leckrone. Gordon and Harriet then purchased another house, in joint tenancy, from the proceeds of the sale of the Lecrones' home. The Lecrones resided with Gordon and his wife for approximately 6 months. The Lecrones were then placed in a nursing home where they subsequently died.
Prior to the deaths of Anthony and Hattie Lecrone, Gordon allegedly contacted Thomas Lecrone regarding the terms of his parents' wills. Gordon expressed a concern that his wife, Harriet, and his children would not be provided for in the event he and Anthony predeceased Hattie. According to Gordon, his parents' entire estate would eventually pass on to plaintiffs to the exclusion of Harriet and his children. Gordon then allegedly entered into an oral agreement in which he agreed to distribute one-half of the property that he would inherit from his parents to plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs alleged that Gordon felt obligated to make such a promise because of the familial ties between himself and plaintiffs. This promised distribution was in spite of the fact that Hattie only bequeathed $1,000 to each of the plaintiffs. In exchange for the promised distribution, plaintiffs alleged that Gordon extracted a promise from them that they would forgo half of their grandparents' estate to provide for Gordon's wife and children if Anthony died first and Gordon predeceased Hattie.
It was further alleged that reference is made to this oral agreement in a letter from Gordon dated December 19, 1980. Specifically, the letter states, in pertinent part:
On November 15, 1981, Anthony died and pursuant to the terms of his will he left all his property to Hattie. Approximately 4 months later, Hattie died leaving all of her property to Gordon. Plaintiffs did not receive the gifts provided for them in Hattie's will as her savings account had previously been closed.
In a letter dated July 27, 1982, Gordon informed Thomas Lecrone that Hattie's estate amounted to approximately $80,000. Pursuant to the parties' previous agreement, Gordon stated his intention to distribute half of the $80,000 estate to plaintiffs over a period of 3 years. Gordon's letter provides, in relevant part:
"The attorney is nearly ready to file the forms with the state and I think the $80,000 figure for the final estate will be very close. What I have in mind is the following: First, each of you will receive the $1,000 as set up in the will, then I plan to send each of you $3,000.
* * * If all goes well next year I plan to send each of you another $3,000 and the same the following year. * * *.
* * * Harriet is in complete accord with my plans but by putting it clearly in my will, it leaves no room for any problems."
In a subsequent letter, dated September 3, 1982, Gordon informed the plaintiffs that his mother's estate was worth approximately $79,127. He explained that although he was legally entitled to all of the estate, he would send each of the plaintiffs $1,000 after the estate closed. Gordon wrote:
Plaintiffs allege that this letter also conforms to the parties' previous agreement that plaintiffs would receive approximately one-half of Hattie's estate. Under this arrangement, each of the plaintiffs would still receive approximately $10,000. Although the funds were to be distributed prior to Gordon's death, the will ensured that the agreed upon distributions would be made.
On October 15, 1982, Gordon gave each of the plaintiffs a check in the amount of $1,000. On May 4, 1985, Gordon executed his will in which he provided that each of the plaintiffs would receive $7,500 upon the maturity of a 5- or 7-year security instrument.
On October 1, 1986, Gordon Leckrone died. On December 20, 1986, the co-executor of Gordon's will, William Flotow, sent a letter to plaintiffs informing them that the assets in Gordon's estate had been depleted to the point where there were no existing funds to make the promised distributions to plaintiffs.
On March 26, 1987, plaintiffs filed a complaint against Harriet Leckrone individually, and Harriet Leckrone and William Flotow as co-executors of the will of Gordon Leckrone. Plaintiffs, through their attorneys, the respondents, sought to impose a constructive trust upon the estate and its executors for the covert dissipation of the funds allegedly earmarked for plaintiffs. Plaintiffs also requested an accounting of Gordon's estate and injunctive relief to prevent further dissipation of the assets in the estate.
Prior to filing the suit, plaintiffs contacted respondents to determine whether they had a potential cause of action. In an opinion letter dated February 9, 1987, respondent Thomas W. Murphy on behalf of respondent law firm stated that a cause of action for a constructive trust could be maintained based on the case of Labarbera v. Labarbera (1983), 116 Ill.App.3d 959, 72 Ill.Dec. 431, 452 N.E.2d 684. Respondents were then retained by plaintiffs to file the action against defendants.
Defendants, in response, proceeded to file a motion to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint. Prior to the time defendants' motion to dismiss was heard, respondents withdrew from further representation of plaintiffs. Respondents allegedly withdrew because of plaintiffs' failure to pay their legal fees. On January 27, 1989, in an ex parte hearing, the trial court dismissed plaintiffs' complaint with prejudice. The trial court also retained jurisdiction of the case for purposes of hearing Harriet Leckrone's 2-611 petition filed against both plaintiffs and respondents.
On March 29, 1989, plaintiffs and respondents filed a motion to strike and dismiss the 2-611 petition. In an order dated May 23, 1989, the trial court awarded Harriet $7,000 in sanctions against respondents. Plaintiffs were not sanctioned by the court. The trial court found, inter alia, that the complaint was not well grounded in law or in fact. The court held that a reasonable inquiry into the matters alleged in the complaint would have enabled the respondents to ascertain "the invalidity and lack of merit" of their allegations. The amount of the sanctions was based upon Harriet's costs in defending against plaintiffs' suit. It is from this May 23 order that respondents appeal.
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