LeCronier v. United Parcel Serv.
| Decision Date | 03 November 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 02650, Sept. Term, 2008.,02650, Sept. Term, 2008. |
| Citation | 196 Md.App. 131,7 A.3d 1106 |
| Parties | Jeffrey LeCRONIER v. UNITED PARCEL SERVICE et al. |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
196 Md.App. 131
Jeffrey LeCRONIER
v.
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE et al.
No. 02650, Sept. Term, 2008.
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.
Nov. 3, 2010.
Frank E. Trock (Almark, Rotter, Staff & Trock, LLP, on the brief) Baltimore, MD, for appellant.
Jennifer L. Watkins (Law Office of Jonathan P. Stebenne, on the brief) Baltimore, MD, for appellee.
Panel: EYLER, DEBORAH S., KEHOE, JAMES A. KENNEY, III, (Retired Specially Assigned), JJ.
KEHOE, J.
May a claimant aggrieved by a decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission seek judicial review in the circuit court for the county in which he or she is employed, in addition to the circuit courts for the counties in which he or she resides and in which the accident occurred? The Circuit Court for Baltimore City construed § 9-738 of the Workers' Compensation Act (the "Act"), codified as Md.Code (1991, 2008 Repl.Vol.), Lab. & Empl.. § 9-101 et seq. , as providing that a worker cannot, and transferred the case to the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. We reach the opposite conclusion. Accordingly, we shall vacate the judgment entered against appellant, Jeffrey D. LeCronier, in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County and remand this case to that court with instructions for it to transfer this case to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City for a new trial.
This case arises from a workers' compensation claim filed by Mr. LeCronier against his employer, United Parcel Service, an
Did the Circuit Court for Baltimore City err in granting appellees' motion to transfer venue to the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County?
Facts and Procedural History
Appellant alleged that he was injured on December 4, 2006 while training a tractor trailer driver for UPS in Harrington, Delaware. The injury developed into a serious medical condition. Appellant filed an employee's claim for benefits with the Workers' Compensation Commission ("Commission"). The record does not indicate the date of the filing of appellant's claim or the specifics of the claim itself.
On August 16, 2007, the Commission held a hearing regarding appellant's claim. On September 5, 2007, the Commission denied the claim on the basis that "the claimant did not sustain an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of employment."
On September 14, 2007, appellant filed a petition for judicial review of the Commission's decision in the Circuit Court for
Appellee filed a motion to transfer venue to the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County pursuant to LE § 9-738,2
A hearing was held before the Circuit Court for Baltimore City on November 2, 2007. At the hearing, the parties argued substantively the same contentions presented in their motions, that is, appellee asserted that the provisions of LE 9-738 precluded Baltimore City as a venue and appellant argued that it did not because he was regularly employed and carried on business in the City. Appellee did not present an argument based upon forum non conveniens and the circuit court made it clear that it was not considering forum non conveniens as a ground for transferring the case.4
During the course of the hearing, the circuit court asked appellee's counsel if appellee disputed whether appellant regularly conducted business 5 in Baltimore City; appellee's counsel replied, "[n]ot vigorously." The court concluded:
The question is whether we have jurisdiction 6 over [appellant]. Yes, we have jurisdiction as to where he lives, but we also have jurisdiction over him as to where he regularly does business under the circumstances and the facts submitted. And it's properly in Baltimore City and the Motion to Transfer is denied.
On that same day, the circuit court issued an order denying the motion to transfer. On November 12, 2007, appellee filed a motion to reconsider judgment or, in the alternative, revise, alter or amend judgment arguing substantively the same arguments presented to the circuit court on November 2, 2007. While the motion for reconsideration again referred to Maryland Rule 2-327(c) and stated, in passing, that UPS conducted business in Anne Arundel County, none of the substantive arguments in the motion pertained to transferring the case on the basis of forum non conveniens. Appellant filed a response, presenting the same arguments raised at the hearing.
On December 6, 2007, the circuit court granted appellee's motion, without a hearing or explanation, and transferred the
The matter then proceeded to a jury trial conducted on January 6 and 7, 2009. The transcript of the trial is not included with the record. The jury found in favor of appellee. Appellant filed this timely appeal.8
Discussion
The issue in this case-whether the applicable statute permits Mr. LeCronier to pursue his petition for judicial review in the City of Baltimore-is purely legal. Therefore, we review the circuit court's decision de novo. Payton-Henderson v. Evans, 180 Md.App. 267, 276, 949 A.2d 654 (2008) ("The venue chosen by the plaintiff is either proper, as a matter of law, or it is not.")
The outcome of this case turns upon our construction of LE § 9-738. The statute reads, in pertinent part:
Venue. (a) Filing with circuit court.-To take an appeal, a person shall file an order of appeal with the circuit court:
(1) that has jurisdiction over that person; or
(2) for the county where the accidental personal injury, compensable hernia, or last injurious exposure to the hazards of the occupational disease occurred.
Appellant asserts that LE § 9-738 must be read in conjunction with Maryland's general venue statute, CJ § 6-201(a).9 He contends that, because he is regularly employed in Baltimore City, he can be sued in the City pursuant to CJ § 6-201(a). From that premise, he suggests that the City is a permissible venue for his petition for judicial review pursuant to LE § 9-738. Thus, the circuit court erred in transferring the case to Anne Arundel County.
Appellee contends that the circuit court did not err in transferring the case. It contends that the general venue provisions of CJ § 6-201 are explicitly subject to the proviso "unless otherwise provided by law." UPS posits that LE § 9-738 is such an exception. It argues that, as "the Court of Appeals has consistently found
As we will explain, application of principles of statutory construction leads to the conclusion that, when the General Assembly enacted the statutory predecessor to LE § 9-738, it intended that a person aggrieved by a decision of the Commission could file an appeal in the county in which that person was employed or resided as well as the county in which the
(A) Statutory Construction
We begin our analysis by considering the language of the Act itself. LE § 9-737 authorizes the filing of a petition for judicial review by an "employer, covered employee, dependent of a covered employee, or any other interested person aggrieved by a decision of the Commission...." Section 9-738 provides that the various persons authorized to seek judicial review of a decision of the Commission may do so by filing an appeal "with the circuit court: (1) that has jurisdiction over that person; or (2) for the county where the accidental personal injury ... occurred."
The language of LE § 9-738 is problematic. Did the General Assembly's use of the singular-"the circuit court"-indicate that it intended that only one venue would be available to a person intending to file a petition for judicial review? If so, in light of the other venues listed in CJ § 6-201, how can courts determine which should be considered "the" venue?
In construing a statute, our goal is to
ascertain and effectuate legislative intent. We first examine the primary source of legislative intent, the words of the statute, giving them their ordinary and natural meaning. If the meaning of the language is unclear or ambiguous, we must consider not only the literal or usual meaning of the words, but their meaning and effect in light of the setting, the objectives and purpose of the enactment, in our attempt to discern the construction that will best...
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