LeDeatte v. Horizon Media
| Decision Date | 23 November 2021 |
| Docket Number | 20 Civ. 10752 (ER) (GWG) |
| Parties | Raven LEDEATTE Plaintiff, v. HORIZON MEDIA, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Raven LeDeatte, Bronx, NY, Pro Se.
Todd H. Girshon, Jackson Lewis P.C., New York, NY, for Defendants.
Pro se plaintiff Raven LeDeatte brings this employment discrimination action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. ("Title VII"), the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. ("ADA"), and the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law § 290, et seq. ("NYSHRL"), alleging her former employer, Horizon Media, Inc. ("Horizon"), discriminated against her because of her race, color, and disability. See Complaint, filed Dec. 16, 2020 (Docket # 1) ("Comp."), at 3-5. Before the Court is defendants’ motion to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1, et seq. ("FAA").1 For the following reasons, defendants’ motion is granted.2
The following facts have not been controverted by LeDeatte:
Horizon "is a full-service media agency." Winkel Aff. ¶ 2. LeDeatte began working at Horizon in August 2019, following her graduation from college. See id. ¶¶ 4-8; Exhibit 1 to Comp., filed Dec. 16, 2020 (Docket # 1-1), at 1. During the onboarding process, LeDeatte signed Horizon's "Employment Understanding form," which stated that LeDeatte was "bound by Horizon Media's Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate Disputes unless [she] opt[ed]-out within 30 days of receiving the agreement." Winkel Aff. ¶¶ 5-7; Exhibit A to Winkel Aff., filed Sept. 14, 2021 (Docket # 19-1), at 3 ("Employment Understanding Form"). LeDeatte was separately provided a copy of the Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate Disputes, see Exhibit B to Winkel Aff., filed Sept. 14, 2021 (Docket # 19-2) ("Agreement"), and informed that the Agreement "would be effective immediately unless within 30 days of her receipt of it she choose to opt-out of [the Agreement] by executing [Horizon's] Arbitration Opt-Out Request Form ... and returned it to Human Resources." Winkel Aff. ¶¶ 12-15. LeDeatte did not opt out of the Agreement. Id. ¶¶ 16-17.
Id. The Agreement states that it "shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act," and "is the exclusive means of resolving any dispute between [LeDeatte] and [Horizon] covered by [the] Agreement." Id. at 1-2.
LeDeatte worked for Horizon until February 2020. See Comp. at 3, 5. LeDeatte asserts that during her employment she was subject to discrimination because of her race, color, and disability. See id. On February 14, 2020, LeDeatte went on medical leave for "emotional distress at work," which continued until February 25, 2020, when LeDeatte "was terminated while [she] was still out on medical leave." Id.
LeDeatte filed a charge of discrimination with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") on March 18, 2020, and she received an EEOC Notice of Right to Sue on September 16, 2020. Id. at 6. LeDeatte filed her complaint in this case three months later, on December 16, 2020. See id. The instant motion followed. See Def. Mot. LeDeatte's opposition to the motion consists of a two-sentence letter which states in relevant part that she "oppose[s]" Horizon's motion and "would prefer to be in the court of law." Nov. 9 Letter.
The FAA reflects "a strong federal policy favoring arbitration as an alternative means of dispute resolution."
Ross v. Am. Express Co., 547 F.3d 137, 142 (2d Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted). Section 2 of the FAA provides in pertinent part:
A written provision in any ... contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, ... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
9 U.S.C. § 2. Section 4 of the FAA permits a party to obtain from a federal district court "an order directing that [an] arbitration proceed in the manner provided for" in an arbitration agreement. 9 U.S.C. § 4. As the Second Circuit has held, the FAA "requires the federal courts to enforce arbitration agreements, reflecting Congress’ recognition that arbitration is to be encouraged as a means of reducing the costs and delays associated with litigation." Vera v. Saks & Co., 335 F.3d 109, 116 (2d Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted).
JLM Indus., Inc. v. Stolt-Nielsen SA, 387 F.3d 163, 169 (2d Cir. 2004) (quotation omitted). "[U]nder the FAA, ‘any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.’ " Id. at 171 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983) ).
When a motion to compel arbitration is brought, a "court applies a standard similar to that applicable for a motion for summary judgment." Bensadoun v. Jobe-Riat, 316 F.3d 171, 175 (2d Cir. 2003). "If undisputed facts in the record require[ ] the issue of arbitrability to be resolved against the Plaintiff as a matter of law," the motion to compel arbitration must be granted. Id. If, however, the party opposing arbitration can show "there is an issue of fact as to the making of the agreement for arbitration, then a trial is necessary." Id. (citing 9 U.S.C. § 4 ).
Applying the JLM Industries four-part test, see 387 F.3d at 169, we conclude that LeDeatte's claims are subject to arbitration.
First, we must consider whether LeDeatte and Horizon mutually assented to arbitrate LeDeatte's claims. See id. To do so, "we look to ‘state contract law principles.’ " Abdullayeva v. Attending Homecare Servs. LLC, 928 F.3d 218, 222 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220, 229 (2d Cir. 2016) ). Under New York law, contract formation requires a "manifestation of mutual assent [that is] sufficiently definite to assure that the parties are truly in agreement with respect to all material terms." Starke v. SquareTrade, Inc., 913 F.3d 279, 289 (2d Cir. 2019) (citing Joseph Martin, Jr., Delicatessen, Inc. v. Schumacher, 52 N.Y.2d 105, 109, 436 N.Y.S.2d 247, 417 N.E.2d 541 (1981) ). Here, LeDeatte signed the Employment Understanding Form and expressly agreed "to be bound by [the Agreement] unless [she] opt[ed]-out within 30 days of receiving the agreement." Employment Understanding Form. Despite receiving a copy of the Agreement and information on the opt-out process, LeDeatte did not opt-out. See Winkel Aff. ¶¶ 4-17. By signing the Employment Understanding Form and declining to opt out of the Agreement, LeDeatte manifested a clear and definite intention to be bound by the Agreement's terms. See Manigault v. Macy's East, LLC, 318 F. App'x 6, 8 (2d Cir. 2009) (summary order) (even without signed acknowledgement of arbitration program, employee's failure to opt out of mandatory arbitration program of which employee is on notice, combined with continued employment thereafter, "is sufficient to manifest assent" to arbitration).
Next, on the issue of scope, the Second Circuit has held:
To determine whether a particular dispute falls within the scope of an agreement's arbitration clause, a court should undertake a three-part inquiry. First, recognizing there is some range in the breadth of arbitration clauses, a court should classify the particular clause as either broad or narrow. See Mehler v. Terminix Int'l Co., 205 F.3d 44, 49 (2d Cir. 2000) ; Peerless Imps., Inc. v. Wine, Liquor & Distillery Workers Union Local One, 903 F.2d 924, 927 (2d Cir. 1990) ; McDonnell Douglas Fin. Corp. v. Pa. Power & Light Co., 858 F.2d 825, 832 (2d Cir. 1988). Next, if reviewing a narrow clause, the court must determine whether the dispute is over an issue that "is on its face within the purview of the clause," or over a collateral issue that is somehow connected to the main agreement that contains the arbitration clause. Rochdale Vill., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Emps. Union, 605 F.2d 1290, 1295 (2d Cir. 1979) ; see also Prudential Lines, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 704 F.2d 59, 64 (2d Cir. 1983). Where the arbitration clause is narrow, a collateral matter will generally be ruled beyond its purview. See Cornell Univ. v. UAW Local 2300, 942 F.2d 138, 140 (2d Cir. 1991). Where the arbitration clause is broad, "there arises a presumption of arbitrability" and arbitration of even a collateral matter will be ordered if the claim alleged "implicates issues of contract construction or the parties’ rights and obligations under it." Collins & Aikman Prods. Co. v. Bldg. Sys., Inc., 58 F.3d 16, 23 (2d Cir. 1995).
To continue reading
Request your trial