Ledergerber v. Stangler
Decision Date | 07 October 1997 |
Docket Number | No. 96-2395,96-2395 |
Citation | 122 F.3d 1142 |
Parties | 74 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1544, 71 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 44,974 Diane LEDERGERBER, Appellant, v. Gary STANGLER; Carmen Schultze, Appellees. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Michael G. Berry, argued, Jefferson City, MO, for Appellant.
Michael Eugene Cook Pritchett, Assistant Attorney General, argued, Jefferson City, MO (Barbara J. Wood, on the brief), for Appellees.
Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge, and ROSS and BEAM, Circuit Judges.
Diane Ledergerber (appellant), a Caucasian income maintenance supervisor with the Division of Family Services (DFS) of the Missouri Department of Social Services (DSS), filed this action on February 24, 1995. She alleged that Gary Stangler, director of DSS, and Carmen Schulze, director of DFS (appellees), discriminated against her on the basis of her race, in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2; 42 U.S.C. § 1981a, and that they retaliated against her for opposing their alleged policy of affording deference to African-American employees, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3-; 42 U.S.C. § 1981a. The district court 1 granted summary judgment in favor of the appellees. We affirm.
On March 25, 1993, sixteen African-American income maintenance caseworkers jointly filed a charge of racial discrimination against DFS regarding hiring and evaluation practices, probationary procedures, and general disparate treatment. Appellant's name did not appear in this charge of discrimination. On July 20, 1993, three of these caseworkers filed a new charge of discrimination, this time asserting that appellant had retaliated against them for filing the earlier discrimination charge by searching a complainant's desk in her absence, selectively enforcing office dress code against a complainant, and reprimanding complainants for abusing break-time privileges, while ignoring infractions of other employees.
After an investigation of the two discrimination charges, DSS director Stangler found that hiring practices at the DFS office were flawed, that caseworker case approval and probation were inconsistently applied, and that two of the six allegations of retaliation against appellant were substantiated, including appellant's decision to send one complainant home for improper office attire and her reprimand of another complainant for failing to adhere to break-time policies. Stangler recommended changes in hiring, probation, and case approval practices and mediation of disputes. Concluding that the atmosphere in appellant's section was "rife with tension and dissension," Stangler also recommended corrective action for appellant.
Following Stangler's recommendation, effective November 16, 1993, appellant's staff of four income maintenance supervisors and their caseworkers were replaced with a different staff of four income maintenance supervisors and their caseworkers. It is undisputed that appellant's position as an Income Maintenance Supervisor III remained unchanged, and that her basic responsibilities and staff size remained substantially the same.
Appellant subsequently filed suit, asserting that the replacement of her staff and the placement in her file of a statement that discriminatory practices would not be tolerated constituted discrimination on the basis of her race, as well as retaliation against her for opposing appellees' alleged policy of giving deference to African-American employees. The district court determined that appellant had established a prima facie case of discrimination, but ultimately concluded that appellant's claim must fail because appellant was unable to show that the appellees' actions were taken on the basis of race or retaliation.
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this court applies the same standard as the district court and views the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, giving that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from those facts. Harlston v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 37 F.3d 379, 382 (8th Cir.1994).
A Title VII plaintiff has the initial burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination. Only upon this prima facie showing does the burden of production shift to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action at issue. If the employer carries this burden of production, the burden shifts back to the employee to demonstrate that the proffered reason is mere pretext for discrimination. Thomas v. Runyon, 108 F.3d 957, 959 (8th Cir.1997).
In order to overcome her initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation, appellant was required to show, among other things, that she suffered an adverse employment action that affected the terms or conditions of her employment. Harlston, 37 F.3d at 382. The district court believed that appellant satisfied this burden by producing evidence that she suffered a loss of status and prestige with the reassignment of her staff. We conclude, however, that appellant failed to establish how such consequences effectuated a material change in the terms or conditions of her employment. While the action complained of may have had a tangential effect on her employment, it did not rise to the level of an ultimate employment decision intended to be actionable under Title VII. In Harlston, 37 F.3d at 382, we stated that "[c]hanges in duties or working conditions that cause no materially significant disadvantage ... are insufficient to establish the adverse conduct required to make a prima facie case." There, we held that a secretary's reassignment to a different position without any reduction in title, salary or benefits, even though the new position involved fewer secretarial duties and was more stressful, did not constitute an adverse employment action. We stated that "[t]his describes nothing 'more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities.' " Id. (quoting Crady v. Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 993 F.2d 132, 136 (7th Cir.1993)). See also Flaherty v. Gas Research Inst., 31 F.3d 451, 457 (7th Cir.1994) ( ); Spring v. Sheboygan Area Sch. Dist., 865 F.2d 883, 886 (7th Cir.1989) ( ).
The clear trend of authority is to hold that a "purely lateral transfer, that is, a transfer that does not involve a demotion in form or substance, cannot rise to the level of a materially adverse employment action." Williams v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 85 F.3d 270, 274 (7th Cir.1996) (emphasis in original). A transfer involving only minor changes in working conditions and no reduction in pay or benefits will not constitute an adverse employment action, "[o]therwise every trivial personnel action that an irritable ... employee did not like would form the basis of a discrimination suit." Id.
Appellant did not suffer the type of adverse employment action that is necessary to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII. Appellant offers no evidence to show that an exchange of her staff, while her salary, benefits, responsibilities, title and even office location remained the same, 2 somehow materially altered the terms or conditions of her employment. Further, the placement of the notice in appellant's file that discrimination is an unlawful employment practice did not constitute an adverse employment action. This notice, which fairly described the law, was given to the other employees at appellant's level and simply reiterated what was already part of DSS policy and performance appraisals, and was eventually deleted from the employees' files. Accordingly, we conclude that appellant has failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination and we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of appellees. 3
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