Ledford v. Klein

• Decision Date: 20 December 1957
• Docket Number: No. 7713,7713
• Citation: 87 N.W.2d 345
• Parties: Charles LEDFORD, a minor, by John A. Watson, his guardian ad litem, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Charles KLEIN, Defendant and Respondent.
• Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Page 345

87 N.W.2d 345

Charles LEDFORD, a minor, by John A. Watson, his guardian ad

litem, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Charles KLEIN, Defendant and Respondent.

No. 7713.

Supreme Court of North Dakota.

Dec. 20, 1957.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 17, 1958.

Syllabus by the Court

1. A guest is a person who accepts a ride in any vehicle without giving compensation therefor. Section 39-1501, NDRC 1943.

2. The guest law statute relieves the owner, driver, or person responsible for the operation of a motor vehicle from liability for injury to or death of a guest unless such injury or death of a guest proximately results from intoxication, willful misconduct, or gross negligence of such owner, driver or person responsible for the operation of such vehicle. Section 39-1503, NDRC 1943.

3. The question as to who is a guest within the contemplation of the statute is a question for determination in each individual case upon the peculiar facts thereof.

4. An important element in determining whether a person is a guest within the meaning and limitations of the guest statute is the identity of the person or persons advantaged by the carriage. If, in its direct operation, it confers a benefit only on the person to whom the ride is given, and no benefits other than such as are incidental to hospitality, companionship or the like upon the person extending the invitation, the beneficiary is a 'guest' within the statute.

5. Under ordinary circumstances the status of a guest is not changed by reason of the fact that he does a part of the driving. Such benefit is too trivial or inconsequential to change the relationship of the parties. The relationship which gives rise to the status of a passenger must confer something of a tangible nature upon the owner, driver, or the person responsible for the operation of a motor vehicle.

6. While compensation under the guest statute has been held not to be limited specifically to payment of money, it must confer some substantial benefit on the owner, driver or person responsible for the operation of a motor vehicle.

7. Gross negligence is generally a question of fact for the jury. Willful misconduct is also ordinarily a jury question.

8. Ordinarily the negligence or contributory negligence of a plaintiff, while riding as a guest is not available as a defense to a charge of willful misconduct, but may become so only where the act of the plaintiff is such that it is a part of, or the inducing cause of, defendant's misconduct.

9. It is held for reasons stated in the opinion that the facts and circumstances in the case at bar show that the defendant's misconduct, if any, was induced by the acts of the plaintiff, and are such a part thereof as to preclude plaintiff's recovery of damages.

Wattam, Vogel, Vogel, Bright & Peterson, Fargo, for appellant.

Nilles, Oehlert & Nilles, Fargo, for respondent.

JOHNSON, Judge.

This is an action brought on behalf of the plaintiff, Charles Ledford, a minor, by his guardian ad litem, John A. Watson, for damages resulting from an accident on Highway No. 10, about thirty-two miles west of Fargo at about 2:00 p. m. August 22, 1956. The plaintiff is a sailor, who at the time of the accident was 20 years of age. He was picked up and given a ride by the defendant, either at Mullan, Idaho, or Three Forks, Montana, on August 21, 1956.

Plaintiff bases his action on the defendant's alleged negligence, gross negligence, and the reckless manner in which the defendant handled his automobile at the time of the accident. In addition thereto, he charges the defendant with willful misconduct proximately causing the accident resulting in the injuries to the plaintiff, and maintains that such willful misconduct arises out of the fact that the defendant was without adequate sleep for over 30 hours prior to the accident.

The defendant answered denying the allegations of the plaintiff generally. He admits that the accident happened at the time alleged by the plaintiff, but specifically denies that he was negligent, careless, grossly negligent, or reckless in the operation of his automobile. He further alleges that the plaintiff was riding with him voluntarily as a guest without payment for transportation, and further that in the exercise of ordinary care, the plaintiff should have known that if the defendant was guilty of any acts of negligence, such acts of negligence were apparent to him and that he assumed the risk of any injury from such acts. The defendant also alleges that if the plaintiff suffered any damage or injury or injuries, the same were the proximate result of the plaintiff's own negligence.

This case was tried to a jury. The jury found for the defendant and dismissed the action. Judgment of dismissal was entered pursuant to the verdict on April 10, 1957. Plaintiff has appealed to this court from the judgment of dismissal.

The plaintiff's appeal is based on several alleged errors of law. The errors of which the appellant complains are set forth under four groups. The first relates to the question of whether, under the circumstances, the plaintiff was a guest in the defendant's car at the time of the accident. The second pertains to the trial court's determination that contributory negligence is a defense to willful misconduct. The third relates to the court's instructions to the jury, and the fourth asserts that the trial court erred in limiting proof of damages for medical expenses of the plaintiff to $55.

The trial court on motion made prior to the submission of the case to the jury ruled that the plaintiff, as a matter of law, was a guest of the defendant at the time of the accident and so instructed the jury. It said:

'In this case the court instructs the jury that the plaintiff was riding with the defendant as a guest at the time of the accident.'

We will now discuss the alleged errors on which the plaintiff bases his appeal in this action in the order stated.

The first question for determination is whether or not the plaintiff was a guest of the defendant at the time of the accident, so as to eliminate from consideration his liability to the plaintiff on the basis of ordinary negligence.

Our statute defines 'guest' as a person who accepts a ride in any vehicle without giving compensation therefor. Section 39-1501, NDRC 1943. Section 39-1503, NDRC 1943 of the 'guest law' statute relieves the owner, driver, or person responsible for the operation of a motor vehicle from liability for injury to or death of a guest unless such injury or death of a guest proximately results from intoxication, willful misconduct or gross negligence of such owner, driver, or person responsible for the operation of such vehicle. The statute does not define 'gross negligence' or 'willful misconduct.'

The question as to who is a guest within the contemplation of our statutes, fixing the liability of the owner or operator of the motor vehicle for injury to a guest, is largely a question for determination in each individual case upon the peculiar facts thereof. Jacobs v. Nelson, 67 N.D. 27, 268 N.W. 873.

'One important element in determining whether a person is a guest within the meaning and limitations of such statutes (guest statutes) is the identity of the person or persons advantaged by the carriage. If, in its direct operation, it confers a benefit only on the person to whom the ride is given, and no benefits, other than such as are incidental to hospitality, companionship, or the like, upon the person extending the invitation, the passenger is a guest within the statutes; but, if his carriage tends to the promotion of mutual interests of both himself and the driver and operates for their common benefit or if it is primarily for the attainment of some objective or purpose of the operator, he is not a guest within the meaning of such enactments.' 4 Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice, Part 1, Perm.Ed., Sec. 2292, pgs. 307-310 (Emphasis supplied).

The plaintiff, man 20 years old, a sailor in the United States Navy, obtained an 18 any leave on August 20, 1956. He wanted to see his parents and to do that within the time allowed him, had to reach Hialeah, Florida, and also stop at Chattanooga, Tennessee, and make his return within time of his leave. He tried to obtain commercial transportation, but while attempting to make arrangements therefor, obtained a ride with a motorist, an Air Force Sergeant, out of Seattle, Washington. The plaintiff claims that the Sergeant was going as far as Three Forks, Montana, and offered to give him a ride that far. The defendant, however, claims that he picked up the plaintiff at Mullan, Idaho, but whether he picked him up at Mullan, Idaho, or Three Forks, Montana, is immaterial to the issues in this action. When the plaintiff obtained a ride with the defendant, either from Mullan, Idaho, or Three Forks, Montana, he was standing near a corner on Highway No. 10 with his bag near him and a map in his hand. As the defendant drove his car around the corner he apparently saw the plaintiff standing there and stopped his car about ten feet ahead of where the plaintiff was standing. The plaintiff got into the defendant's car and rode with him.

At Big Timber, Montana, the defendant, a man 72 years old, wanted to stop and spend the night, unless the plaintiff would do some of the driving. The defendant was on his way home, a trip of some 2,500 miles. He had been visiting relatives and was going up to northern Michigan and from there into Canada. The plaintiff and the defendant reached Big Timber, Montana, about 6 o'clock p. m. on August 21, 1956. While at Big Timber, the defendant had new points put in his car. The plaintiff and the defendant left after the repairs had been made, probably about 9 o'clock that evening. Before leaving the defendant asserted that he was tried, and since he had stopped at Big Timber, Montana, four years previously at a good motel, he suggested to the plaintiff that they stop there. He also stated...