Lee County Gin Co. v. Middlebrooks

• Decision Date: 19 October 1931
• Docket Number: 29491
• Citation: Lee County Gin Co. v. Middlebrooks, 161 Miss. 422, 137 So. 108 (Miss. 1931)
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: LEE COUNTY GIN CO. v. MIDDLEBROOKS

137 So. 108

161 Miss. 422

LEE COUNTY GIN CO. v. MIDDLEBROOKS

No. 29491

Supreme Court of Mississippi

October 19, 1931

(Division A. Suggestion of Error Overruled Nov. 16, 1931.)

1 TRIAL.

Everything must be considered as proved which evidence establishes directly or by reasonable inference, against party asking for peremptory instruction.

2. MASTER AND SERVANT.

Whether gin company's employees negligently loaded customer's wagon and whether injury to one struck by cotton falling off was natural consequence held for jury.

3. MASTER AND SERVANT. Where gin company's employees loading customer's wagon knew purpose of loading, company was liable even if their action concurred with driver's in causing injury to one struck by falling cotton.

Evidence disclosed that it was custom of gin company to have employees load their customer's cotton on wagons after it was ginned, since so to do would expedite their business of ginning cotton, and that employees in question who loaded two bales of cotton across frame of empty wagon, instead of loading them end down within wagon, on bottom thereof, knew that they were loading the cotton for purpose of being transported on an up grade from gin.

4 TRIAL. Error could not be predicated upon plaintiff's question concerning jurors' interest in insurance companies in view of defendant's counsel's remarks.

After defendant's objection to the question was overruled counsel for defendant stated to jury, "We don't object to that, though; the insurance company we had our insurance in is 'busted.'"

5. TRIAL.

Argument that it was lawsuit between soulless corporation and old negro man, in answer to opponent's argument, held not prejudicial.

Division A

Suggestion Of Error Overruled November 16, 1931

APPEAL from circuit court of Lee county HON. C. P. LONG, Judge.

Action by Aub Middlebrooks against the Lee County Gin Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Affirmed.

Blair & Anderson, of Tupelo, for appellant.

Appellee's attorney did not have a right in qualifying the jury to ask whether or not they had any stock in any insurance company or interest therein. The action of the appellee in propounding this question to the jurors amounted to an insinuation that the appellant was protected by liability insurance and if the judgment were procured against the appellant the liability company would have to pay it.

36 C. J. 1128; Lambert v. Daley, 80 Miss. 340; Yazoo City v. Loggins, 145, Miss. 794, 110 So. 833.

When an instrumentality passes out of the control of a person, his responsibility for injuries inflicted by it ceases forthwith.

20 R. C. L., p. 53.

In order for the appellant to have been liable it was necessary that the injury must have been the natural and probable consequence of the negligent loading of the cotton.

Rook v. A. & V. R. R. Co., 70 Miss. 1, 28 So. 821; 45 C. J. 911; Stone v. Boston R. R. Co., 51 N.E. 1, 41 L. R. A. 794; Leonard v. Enterprise Realty Co., 187 Ky. 578, 219 S.W. 1066; Saxon v. St. Louis Transfer Co., 145 Mo.App. 693, 123 S.W. 104; McKenzie v. Waddell Coal Co., 89 A.D. 415, 85 N.Y.S. 819; Veldon v. Hooper, 115 Kansas, 678, 224 P. 34.

The court erred in not sustaining objections to appellee's argument and granting it a mistrial. Appellee's attorney in his argument to the jury stated that this was a case between a soulless corporation and an old negro and appellant objected to said argument which objection was overruled and appellant asked for a mistrial, which was refused.

Appeals to prejudice are condemned and constitute reversible error.

38 C. J. 1500.

It is reversible error to state that a corporation has no soul, etc.

Western R. R. Co. v. Cox, 115 Ga. 715, 42 S.E. 74; B. & W. Co. v. Wiggins, 113 Ga. 842, 39 S.E. 551; L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Payne, 138 Ky. 274, 127 S.W. 993; Kirby v. Western Union, 77 S.C. 404, 58 S.E. 10.

S. H. Long and Mitchell & Clayton, all of Tupelo, for appellee.

Appellee's attorney has a right in qualifying the jury to ask whether or not they had any stock in any insurance company, or interest therein.

Yazoo City v. Loggins, 145 Miss. 793; Cooper v. Auman, 122 So. 122; Baker v. Baker, 124 So. 740; Ryan v. Noble, 116 So. 766; Mississippi Ice & Utilities Co. v. Pierce, 134 So. 164.

To constitute a proximate cause creating liability for negligence the injury must have been the natural and probable consequence of the negligent act.

45 C. J., p. 911, par. 482.

It is the cause, which unbroken by any intervening independent agency, naturally produces a given result.

45 C. J., p. 912, par. 482; 45 C. J., p. 913, etc., par. 483.

A person is bound to anticipate the reasonable and natural consequences of his own conduct if he was informed, or by ordinary observation would have been informed of the facts and circumstances attending the negligence.

45 C. J., p. 917, par. 483; 45 C. J., p. 918, par. 484; 45 C. J., p. 920, par. 485; 7 A. L. R. 129; 99 Miss. 318.

It is well settled that the mere fact that other causes, conditions, or agencies have intervened between defendant's negligence and the injury for which recovery is sought is not sufficient in law to relieve defendant from liability. In other words, an intervening cause will not relieve from liability where the prior negligence was but the efficient cause of the injury.

45 C. J., p. 926, par. 489; 45 C. J., p. 928, par. 489; L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Daniels, 99 So. 434; 45 C. J., p. 929, par. 490; 45 C. J., p. 931, par. 490; 45 C. J., p. 933, par. 492; 45 C. J., p. 934, par. 493.

It is not necessary under the law, that the exact result could be foreseen. It is only necessary that appellant's agents could have seen that someone was liable to get hurt by them loading two bales of cotton negligently across a cotton frame, which was obviously constructed to carry cotton in a different manner, and not in the manner in which it was loaded.

45 C. J., pp. 1321 and 1322, pars. 880 and 881; Alabama & V. R. R. Co. v. Barnett, 28 So. 820; D'Antoni v. Albritton, 126 So. 836; Brooks v. De Soto Oil Co., 57 So. 228; So. R. R. Co. v. Floyd, 99 Miss. 519, 55 So. 287; Shager v. Kelly Ice Cream Co., 38 A. L. R. 1528; Arizona Binghampton Copper Company v. Dickson, 44 A. L. R. 888.

On the question whether the court erred in not sustaining objections to certain statements made by counsel for appellee in his closing argument, the statement complained of which was in effect, as follows: This is a lawsuit not between Mr. Strain and the appellee, but between a soulless corporation and that old negro man over there; this is the only language complained of. The verdict is not excessive and there is nothing in the record to show that counsel persisted in such argument, or in any way repeated same, after his attention was called to the objection of counsel for appellant.

OPINION

McGowen, J.

The appellee, Middlebrooks, sued the appellant, the Lee County Gin Company, for damages for personal injuries, the cause was submitted to a jury, a substantial verdict was rendered, and there was a judgment against the gin company, from which judgment appeal is prosecuted here.

The appellee, Middlebrooks, had carried his cotton to the gin, where his loaded wagon was waiting in line while the cotton from other wagons ahead of him was being unloaded, ginned, and the cotton in bales reloaded in the wagons and moved on. While appellee was standing in the gin yard near the road which was used as an exit from the gin, Henry Miller drove his wagon up grade near the appellee, and a bale of cotton rolled from the wagon, striking appellee and knocking him to the ground with the bale upon him. As a result he suffered painful injuries, had a broken leg, and incurred hospital bills. The evidence for the plaintiff showed that Henry Miller had two bales of cotton ginned, that he sold the seed therefrom, and, while in the office settling for his seed, the employees of the gin company loaded the two bales of cotton across the frame of the empty wagon, instead of loading them end down within the wagon, on the bottom thereon. The frame was suitable for carrying seed cotton in the wagon, but when the ginned cotton was loaded across the frame it was not strong enough to stand the strain, and would "sway." When Miller discovered the method of loading the cotton by the employees of the gin company, he said to them, "This cotton is not loaded right, and should be reloaded end-down on the bed of the wagon," to which the employee replied, in substance, that it would ride as far as he (Miller) was going, so loaded.

It is quite clear that the employees knew that they were loading the cotton on the wagon for the purpose of being transported away from the gin, and that the drive from the gin beyond the gin lot was up grade. Plaintiff's evidence also showed that it was the custom of the gin company to have its employees load their customers' cotton on the wagons after it was ginned, since so to do would expedite their business of ginning cotton.

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