Lee, Mark A. v. City of Chicago, 052203 FED7, 02-1503
| Docket Nº: | 052203 FED7, 02-1503 |
| Party Name: | Lee |
| Case Date: | May 22, 2003 |
| Court: | United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit |
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________
No. 02-1503
MARK A. LEE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CITY OF CHICAGO,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 01 CV 6751Charles P. Kocoras, Chief Judge.
____________
ARGUED OCTOBER 28, 2002DECIDED MAY 22, 2003 ____________
Before KANNE, DIANE P. WOOD, and EVANS, Circuit Judges.
KANNE, Circuit Judge. Mark A. Lee was struck by stray gunfire while driving his car down a Chicago, Illinois street on June 9, 2001. In hopes of tracking down the shooter, Chicago police officers promptly impounded Lees car so that they could later search for, retrieve, and analyze any bullets that might have become lodged in it. Ten days later on June 19, 2001, the City of Chicago informed Lee that they no longer needed his car for evidentiary pur- poses. But in a notice entitled, Vehicle on Hold for Investi- gation, which the City had sent Lee two days after the shooting and impoundment, it had informed him that before he could retrieve his car, Lee either had to pay all applica-
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ble towing and storage fees or request a hearing. If he didnt pay or pursue this hearing process within thirty days of the date of the cars impoundment, the City told him it could dispose of his cara euphemism for either crushing it or selling it at auction.
Lee wanted to retrieve his car as soon as possible, but he was unable to pay the amount the City demanded. So, he got a lawyer, and through him was able to negotiate an acceptable payment amount. But when he retrieved his car, thirty-one days after it had been impounded, he found that the City had spray painted large, bright-red, six-digit inventory numbers on its hood and its passengers and drivers side panels. The City didnt pay for this damage, nor did it offer to discount or refund the money Lee had just paid the City to retrieve his newly redesigned car.
Lee sued. On August 29, 2001, Lee filed a complaint in federal court against the City of Chicago pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the City had violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and under Fourteenth Amendment substantive-due-process principles in two ways: (1) by requiring him, as the owner of a vehicle impounded for evidentiary purposes, to pay towing and storage fees, and (2) by spray-painting inventory num- bers on his car without consent and without compensation. Lee also brought pendant state-law claims for implied bailment, trespass, and conversion. Lee filed an amended complaint on behalf of two classes of similarly situated individuals (those who had to pay fees and those whose cars were repainted).
The City moved to dismiss the amended complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The district court granted the motion on January 30, 2002, holding that Lee lacked standing to challenge his cars spray painting because he presented no evidence that he
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maintained a cognizable property interest in the car at the time it was painted, and that he could not make out a claim under either the Fourth or Fourteenth Amend- ment regarding the Citys practice of charging towing and storage fees. Lee appeals. We reverse in part, holding that Lee has satisfied his burden in establishing facts sufficient to withstand a Rule 12(b)(1) motion and to confer standing to challenge the Citys spray painting of his car, but affirm, on alternate grounds, the district courts dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of the claims challeng- ing the Citys practice of charging towing and storage fees.
ANALYSIS
I. Rule 12(b)(6) We examine a district courts grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion de novo. Johnson v. Martin, 943 F.2d 15, 16 (7th Cir. 1991). In reviewing the grant of the motion, we view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, taking as true all well-pleaded factual allegations and making all possible inferences from those allegations in his or her favor. Id. A motion to dismiss is to be granted only if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
The Citys Rule 12(b)(6) arguments addressed only the Citys practice of charging towing and storage fees to car owners whose cars had been impounded for investigatory purposes. We therefore address Lees two claims under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment challenging this practice separately and in turn.
A. Fourth Amendment The parties do not dispute that the initial impoundment of Lees car for evidentiary purposes was a reasonable
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seizure. Nor does Lee claim that the delay between the Citys seizure of his car and the Citys completion of its search rendered that subsequent search unreasonable. Rather, Lee claims that the Citys refusal to return his car to him unless he paid the cars towing and storage fees or requested a hearing, when the City had already con- cluded its search, constituted an additional seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.1 Alternatively, he argues that the otherwise reasonable seizure of his car became unreasonable when the governments law- enforcement interest in his car ceased but his possessory interest in the property survived. In either case, he ar- gues the continued possession of the property by the government became a meaningful interference with his possessory interest and, thus, must be interpreted as a Fourth Amendment seizure. Lee then argues that this failure-to-return seizure cannot be deemed reasonable when its sole purpose was to enforce a demand, under threat of loss or destruction of the car, for payment of the cars towing and storagea cost of law enforcement Lee argues should be spread among the public as a whole, who all both bear the risk of violent crime and receive the benefits of crime solved, rather than assessed to him alone, the unfortunate victim of this random occurrence.
In response, the City argues that when it concluded its investigation, the car became available for retrieval. At that moment, all seizure of the car had in effect ended. The subsequent conditioning of the cars release upon the payment of fees or the successful pursuit of a hearing is, in the Citys view, a mere dispute about moneythat is, how much the City was entitled to charge Lee for towing
1 Of course, Lee recognizes that the amendment does not apply to the Citys actions directly, but rather vis-a-vis its incorpora- tion through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend- ment. See generally Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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and storageand does not raise Fourth Amendment concerns. Even if it did, the city argues that its policy of apportioning some of its law-enforcement costs of pursu- ing criminals to the victims who are most likely to benefit from that pursuit is reasonable.
The Fourth Amendment protects the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . . U.S. CONST. amend. IV. In clarifying that the amendment addressed property interests in addition to privacy con- cerns, the Supreme Court defined the amendments use of the term seizure as some meaningful interference with an individuals possessory interests in [his] property. Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 61 (1992) (citing United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)). Whether, under this definition, a state actors refusal to return once lawfully obtained property can amount to an unreasonable seizure, or, alternatively, transform a seizure from rea- sonable to unreasonable, is an issue of first impression in this Circuit, and to our knowledge has been addressed by only two other circuitsthe Sixth, see Fox v. Van Oosterum, 176 F.3d 342, 351 (6th Cir. 1999), and the Second, see United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 802 (2d Cir. 1992)both of which held that when the police hold onto evidence longer than it is needed for investigatory pur- poses, the owner has no recourse under the Fourth Amend- ment.2
2 The Tenth Circuit has noted that the continued deprivation of property may raise statutory or constitutional violations. Davis v. Gracey, 111 F.3d 1472, 1477 (10th Cir. 1997). It found support for potential statutory violations in provisions such as Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(e), which allows a criminal defendant aggrieved by an unlawful search, seizure, or depriva- tion of property to petition for its suppression or return. Id. And
(continued...)
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The Second Circuit reached this position with rather limited discussion in Jakobetz. 955 F.2d at 802. In that case, the prosecution sought to introduce photographic evidence that the New York City police department had retained from an earlier investigation involving unrelated charges against Jakobetz. After those initial, unrelated charges had been dropped, New York law directed the police to return the photos, which the police failed to do. On that basis, Jakobetz argued that the failure to return the photos constituted an unreasonable seizure and that the prosecution should therefore be barred from introducing the photos as evidence against him in the subsequent pro- ceeding. The Second Circuit disagreed. It didnt think that the seizure alleged [was] one that deserve[d] the special protections provided by the fourth amendment, noting there was no authority for the contrary position. Id. At most, the court thought Jakobetz might be able to establish a violation of a statutory right. Id. The court went on to note that even if they were to find an unrea- sonable seizure, Jakobetz had failed to allege any wilful intent on the part of the police to retain the property...
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