Lee-Thomas v. Prince George's Cnty. Pub. Sch.

• Decision Date: 11 January 2012
• Docket Number: No. 10–1699.,10–1699.
• Citation: 25 A.D. Cases 1193,666 F.3d 244
• Parties: Hope LEE–THOMAS, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

25 A.D. Cases 1193

666 F.3d 244

Hope LEE–THOMAS, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 10–1699.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued: Sept. 20, 2011.Decided: Jan. 11, 2012.

ARGUED: Abbey G. Hairston, Thatcher Law Firm, Greenbelt, Maryland; Leslie Robert Stellman, Hodes, Pessin & Katz, PA, Towson, Maryland, for Appellant. Lorrianne Jeanette Rice, Bowie, Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Linda H. Thatcher, Robert J. Baror, Thatcher Law Firm, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellant.

Before KING, DAVIS, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge KING wrote the majority opinion, in which Judge DAVIS joined. Judge KEENAN wrote a dissenting opinion.

OPINION

KING, Circuit Judge:

Defendant-appellant Prince George's County Public Schools (the school “Board”) appeals from the district court's partial rejection of the Board's assertion of immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. Although it recognized that the Board enjoys some measure of Eleventh Amendment immunity, the court ruled that the State of Maryland has waived such immunity for damage claims of $100,000 or less. See Lee–Thomas v. Bd. of Educ. of Prince George's Cnty., No. 8:08–cv–03327 (D.Md. Feb. 5, 2010) (the “Opinion”).¹ As explained below, we agree with the district court and affirm.

I.

On December 11, 2008, plaintiff-appellee Hope Lee–Thomas, a Board employee, initiated this proceeding in the District of Maryland, alleging that the Board violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (the “ADA”) by failing to reasonably accommodate her hearing disability. Lee–Thomas's complaint sought back pay, future pay, compensatory damages of $1,000,000, punitive damages of $1,000,000, plus attorney's fees and costs. In October 2009, following discovery, the Board moved for summary judgment, primarily on the contention that the Eleventh Amendment barred an ADA suit against the Board for damages. In acquiescence to the Board's contentions that back pay, future pay, and punitive damages are not recoverable under the ADA, Lee–Thomas moved separately to amend her complaint to jettison those requests for relief. She also sought to reduce her request for compensatory damages from $1,000,000 to $100,000, and to add a request for injunctive relief. Otherwise, Lee–Thomas opposed the Board's claim of Eleventh Amendment immunity.

On February 5, 2010, the district court issued its Opinion, granting the Board's summary judgment motion only insofar as Lee–Thomas's damage claim exceeded $100,000.² In so doing, the Opinion adhered to the precedent of the Court of Appeals of Maryland, the highest court of the State. In 2009, that court concluded that the enactment of a state statute, see Md.Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5–518(c) (the “immunity provision”), effectuated a waiver of a county board of education's Eleventh Amendment immunity “for all claims in the amount of $100,000 or less.” Bd. of Educ. of Balt. Cnty. v. Zimmer–Rubert, 409 Md. 200, 973 A.2d 233, 243 (2009).³ The Opinion also granted Lee–Thomas's motion to amend her complaint. On March 1, 2010, the Board moved for reconsideration of the Opinion, which the court denied on June 8, 2010. On June 22, 2010, the Board filed its notice of appeal.⁴ We possess jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine to review a denial of Eleventh Amendment immunity, in that such a ruling is deemed a final decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144–47, 113 S.Ct. 684, 121 L.Ed.2d 605 (1993).

II.

We ordinarily review for abuse of discretion a district court's denial of a motion for reconsideration. See Cray Comm'ns, Inc. v. Novatel Computer Sys., Inc., 33 F.3d 390, 395 (4th Cir.1994). We review de novo, however, a district court's denial of Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Harter v. Vernon, 101 F.3d 334, 336 (4th Cir.1996). Because the district court's refusal to reconsider the Opinion was based on its determination that the Board was not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, we consider the underlying question anew, without deference to the court's ruling on reconsideration. See Beentjes v. Placer Cnty. Air Pollution Control Dist., 397 F.3d 775, 777 (9th Cir.2005).

III.

The Board contends that the district court erred in deferring to the decision of the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Board of Education of Baltimore County v. Zimmer–Rubert, 409 Md. 200, 973 A.2d 233 (2009), on the question of whether the immunity provision waived the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Board posits that no such deference is owed because the question is one of federal law, on which the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States are controlling. More specifically, the Board relies on Supreme Court precedent recognizing a statutory waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity only where the relevant state statute utilizes express language of consent to suit in federal court. The Board maintains that the words “any claim” in the immunity provision are insufficient to constitute an express waiver under federal law, contrary to the conclusion reached by Maryland's highest court in Zimmer–Rubert.

We begin our analysis with the threshold issue of whether federal law or state law controls the question of a state's statutory waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity. Guided by the precepts of Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, we conclude that, although the federal courts must apply federal law as embodied in Supreme Court precedent, when a state's highest court has applied federal law and determined that a state statute effects a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity, the federal courts must accord deference to that state court decision. Applying these principles to this case, the district court properly deferred to the decision of the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Zimmer–Rubert.

A.

Pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment, “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. The Supreme Court “has drawn on principles of sovereign immunity to construe the Amendment to establish that an unconsenting State is immune from suits brought in federal courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens of another State.” Port Auth. Trans–Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 304, 110 S.Ct. 1868, 109 L.Ed.2d 264 (1990) (internal quotation marks omitted). The States' immunity also extends to “state agents and state instrumentalities.” Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429, 117 S.Ct. 900, 137 L.Ed.2d 55 (1997).⁵ “The Eleventh Amendment bar to suit is not absolute,” however. Feeney, 495 U.S. at 304, 110 S.Ct. 1868. There are three exceptions to that constitutional bar.

First, “Congress may abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity when it both unequivocally intends to do so and acts pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority.” Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363, 121 S.Ct. 955, 148 L.Ed.2d 866 (2001) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). The applicability of the first exception is not a point of contention in this appeal because Congress did not abrogate the States' immunity from money damage claims under Title I of the ADA. See id. at 374, 121 S.Ct. 955.⁶ Second, “the Eleventh Amendment permits suits for prospective injunctive relief against state officials acting in violation of federal law.” Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 437, 124 S.Ct. 899, 157 L.Ed.2d 855 (2004). The second exception is also inapplicable here, because the complaint does not name as defendants any officials of the State of Maryland. Third, “[a] State remains free to waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in a federal court.” Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613, 618, 122 S.Ct. 1640, 152 L.Ed.2d 806 (2002). The third exception, that of waiver, is at issue in this proceeding. The Board maintains that the waiver exception is inapplicable because Supreme Court precedent compels the conclusion that the State of Maryland has not forgone its Eleventh Amendment immunity.

The Board acknowledges that the Supreme Court long ago decided that the question of waiver of sovereign immunity by a state constitutional provision or statute is a matter of state law, “as to which the decision of the [state's highest court] is controlling.” Palmer v. Ohio, 248 U.S. 32, 34, 39 S.Ct. 16, 63 L.Ed. 108 (1918). The Board contends, nevertheless, that the Court effectively overruled Palmer in its unanimous 2002 Lapides decision, by virtue of the following statement:

As in analogous contexts, in which matters are questions of federal law, cf., e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429, n. 5 [117 S.Ct. 900, 137 L.Ed.2d 55] (1997), whether a particular set of state laws, rules, or activities amounts to a waiver of the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity is a question of federal law.

535 U.S. at 622–23, 122 S.Ct. 1640.

In Lapides—initiated as a state court action alleging state law claims against Georgia's Board of Regents—the plaintiff sought to avail himself of a statutory waiver of Georgia's immunity from suit in the courts of that State. Georgia's Attorney General joined in the removal of the state proceeding to federal court, however, and then sought dismissal of the claims on Eleventh Amendment grounds. The question the Supreme Court “agreed to decide [was] whether a state waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity by its affirmative litigation conduct when it removes a case to federal court.” Lapides, 535 U.S. at 617, 122 S.Ct. 1640 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). Limiting its holding to state law claims that the State had already consented to defend in its own courts, the Court ruled that Georgia's act of removal constituted a waiver of its Eleventh Amendment immun...