Lee v. City of Fayetteville
| Decision Date | 30 March 2016 |
| Docket Number | NO. 5:15-CV-638-FL,5:15-CV-638-FL |
| Parties | GREGORY MAURICE LEE, by and through his Guardian, LINDA SHELTON, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF FAYETTEVILLE; HAROLD MEDLOCK, individually and in his official capacity as City of Fayetteville Police Chief; and JOHN DOES, Police Officers of the City of Fayetteville whose identities are unknown to Plaintiff at this time, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of North Carolina |
This matter is before the court on defendants' motion to dismiss for insufficient process, insufficient service of process, and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, made pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(4), 12(b)(5), and 12(b)(6). (DE 21). Also before the court is plaintiff's motion for hearing, embedded within his response in opposition to defendants' motion to dismiss. (DE 29). The issues raised have been briefed fully and are ripe for ruling. For the reasons stated more specifically below, the court grants defendants' motion in part and denies it in part. Further, the court denies plaintiff's motion for hearing. Plaintiff shall have 90 days in which to effect proper service on the defendants remaining in this matter.
On November 13, 2012, plaintiff allegedly was beaten by several unknown members of the police force of defendant City of Fayetteville ("Fayetteville"), and, as a result, was left with severe cognitive impairments. On November 9, 2015, plaintiff, through his guardian, Linda Shelton, filed this suit in the Cumberland County, North Carolina, Superior Court, against defendant Fayetteville; defendant Harold Medlock ("Medlock"), defendant Fayetteville's chief of police, in his individual and official capacities; and the unknown police officers, as "John Doe" defendants, also in their individual and official capacities. Against each defendant, plaintiff asserts claims for negligence and gross negligence under North Carolina law, as well as claims for excessive force, deliberate indifference, and violation of civil rights, pursuant to the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, as enforced by 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff prays for punitive damages.
On December 7, 2015, defendants timely removed plaintiff's suit to this court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1446, invoking this court's subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's § 1983 claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. On January 6, 2016, defendants Fayetteville and Medlock filed the instant motion to dismiss on behalf of themselves and the John Doe defendants. Therein, defendants argue that plaintiff's official capacity claims against defendant Medlock and the John Doe defendants should be dismissed because they are duplicative of plaintiff's claims against defendant Fayetteville. Further, defendants argue that plaintiff's punitive damages claim as to defendant Fayetteville should be dismissed because defendant Fayetteville is immune from imposition of punitive or exemplary damages.
In any event, defendants also argue that process improperly was served on defendant Fayetteville and defendant Medlock, in his individual capacity. With respect to defendantFayetteville, defendants argue that process was served improperly because the Cumberland County, North Carolina, Sheriff's Deputy (the "deputy") serving the complaint and summons failed to leave those papers with defendant Fayetteville's mayor, clerk, or city manager. As to defendant Medlock, defendants contend that process was served improperly where the deputy attempted to serve defendant Medlock at his place of employment, rather than his residence.
In addition, defendants contend that plaintiff's claims against the John Doe defendants individually must be dismissed. Defendants Fayetteville and Medlock argue, on behalf of the John Does, that plaintiff has failed to timely serve process on any police officer, and thus, that the 90 day service period, provided by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m), has expired. Defendants Fayetteville and Medlock further argue that plaintiff is not entitled to any extension of time in which to serve the John Doe defendants because, even if plaintiff learns the John Does' identities, his claims against them are time barred. In particular, defendants contend that any amendment to the complaint to drop the place-holder John Doe defendants in favor of actual, named individuals, would be barred by the statute of limitations and would not relate back to the complaint's original date of filing under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c).
A motion under Rule 12(b)(4) challenges the sufficiency of process, while a motion under Rule 12(b)(5) challenges the sufficiency of service of process. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(4), (b)(5). "When the process gives the defendant actual notice of the pendency of the action, the rules . . . are entitled to a liberal construction" and "every technical violation of the rule or failure of strictcompliance may not invalidate the service of process." Armco, Inc. v. Penrod-Stauffer Bldg. Sys., Inc., 733 F.2d 1087, 1089 (4th Cir. 1984). Nevertheless, "the rules are there to be followed, and plain requirements for the means of effecting service of process may not be ignored." Id. The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that process properly has been served. Dalenko v. Stephens, 917 F. Supp. 2d 535, 542 (E.D.N.C. 2013); see also Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Akzo, N.V., 2 F.3d 56, 60 (4th Cir. 1993) ().
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint but "does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses." Republican Party v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992); see also Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243-44 (4th Cir. 1999). A complaint states a claim under 12(b)(6) if it contains "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id.
"Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. In evaluating the complaint, "[the] court accepts all well-pled facts as true and construes these facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff," but does not consider "legal conclusions, elements of a cause of action, . . . bare assertions devoid of further factual enhancement[,] . . . unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments." Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 255 (4th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted).
Defendants first move to dismiss the complaint against defendant Medlock and the John Doe defendants insofar as plaintiff asserts claims against them in their official capacities. Defendants contend that plaintiff's official-capacity claims are duplicative of plaintiff's suit against defendant Fayetteville, where plaintiff seeks only monetary damages.
"[A] plaintiff seeking to recover on a damages judgment in an official-capacity suit must look to the government entity itself." Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). "While personal-capacity suits seek to impose personal liability upon a government official for actions he takes under color of state law, official-capacity suits generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent and in essence are suits against the entity." Andrews v. Daw, 201 F.3d 521, 525 (4th Cir. 2001) (alterations and internal quotations omitted) (citing Graham, 473 U.S. at 165-66). Where a plaintiff interposes a claim for damages against both a municipality and a municipal officer in her official capacity, the official-capacity claim properly is dismissed in favor of a single claim against the municipality. See Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 783 (4th Cir. 2004); Williams v. Guilford Tech. Cmty. Coll. Bd. of Trustees, 117 F. Supp. 3d 708, 716 (M.D.N.C. 2015); Hicks v. Halifax Cty. Bd. of Educ., 93 F. Supp. 2d 649, 667 (E.D.N.C. 1999). Thus, because plaintiff's official capacity claims seek only damages, they are duplicative of his claims against defendant Fayetteville and will be dismissed.
Defendants next move to dismiss plaintiff's claims against defendant Fayetteville for insufficient process and insufficient service of process, or, should the court determine that defendant Fayetteville properly has been served, defendants move to dismiss plaintiff's punitive damages claim against defendant Fayetteville.
Defendants contend that plaintiff failed to serve the summons and complaint on the city's mayor, clerk, or manager, as is required by North Carolina law. In support of their motion, defendants direct the court to the affidavit of Deanna Wiuff ("Wiuff"), an administrative assistant employed by defendant Fayetteville. In her affidavit, Wiuff avers that on November 12, 2015, plaintiff employed a deputy to serve process on defendant Fayetteville's mayor, Nat Robertson, but, that the deputy left process with her because the mayor was out of the office. (Wiuff Aff., DE 21-3, ¶¶3-5).
When the deputy attempted to serve process on defendant Fayetteville, this case was pending before the Cumberland County Superior Court. Accordingly, the sufficiency of plaintiff's attempted service is judged under North Carolina law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(c)(1); Wolf v. Green, 660 F. Supp. 2d 738, 745-46 (S.D. W. Va. 2009); see also Wallace v. Microsoft Corp., 596 F.3d 703, 706-07 (10th...
To continue reading
Request your trial