Lee v. City of Harlingen

Decision Date19 December 2011
Docket NumberCIVIL NO. 1-10-233
PartiesCHARLES E. LEE, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF HARLINGEN, TEXAS, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas
AMENDED MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

BE IT REMEMBERED, that on December 19, 2011, the Court considered Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Dkt. No. 19; Plaintiffs response, Dkt. No. 20; and Defendant's reply, Dkt. No. 23.

I. Background

This case involves a dispute over annexed property. The City of Harlingen is a "home rule city" located in Cameron County, Texas. Dkt. No. 19 at 10. The Texas Local Government Code gives cities such as Harlingen authority to extend city boundaries and annex land adjacent to existing city boundaries. See Tex. Loc. Gov't Code Ann. § 43.021 (West 2008). Sometime in November 2005, the Harlingen City Commission placed two adjacent and unannexed tracts of land on Harlingen's 2005 Annexation Plan. See Dkt. No. 19-5 at 6. On June 24, 2006, Harlingen published notice of a public hearing in the legal notices section of the Valley Morning Star. Dkt. No. 19-3 at 2. The notice stated in relevant part:

Notice is hereby given of the 1st public hearing by the City Commission of the City of Harlingen to be held Wednesday, July 5, 2006 at 5:30 p.m. in the City Hall Town Hall, 118 E. Tyler Avenue, Harlingen, Texas to consider the Annexation Plan for annexing the following properties:
TRACT 1: A tract of land containing approximately 392 acres of land
. . .TRACT 2: A tract of land containing approximately 2,754 acres of land
. . . .
A metes and bounds description of Tracts 1 and 2 can be viewed on the city website www.myharlingen.us or the offices of the City of Harlingen Planning Department
. . . .
All interested parties may appear in person or by attorney to show cause for or against the Annexation Plan for annexing the above described tracts of land.

Id. (emphasis in original). On July 5, 2006, the hearing occurred as announced. Dkt. No. 19-5 at 2. The meeting minutes indicate that after the announcement of the annexation plan, the only public comment was an inquiry from a director of a retirement village unrelated to this case. Id.

On July 15, 2006, Harlingen published a second notice of a public hearing in the legal notices section of the Valley Morning Star. Dkt. No. 19-4 at 2. Other than listing a public hearing date of July 26, 2006, the second notice was essentially the same as the first. Id. The second public meeting occurred on July 26, 2006 as scheduled. Dkt. No. 19-6 at 2. The meeting minutes indicate that there were no annexation comments from the public. Id. Harlingen's Mananger of Planning and Zoning states that the Annexation Plan at issue "was made available for inspection at the Planning and Zoning Department and was posted on the City of Harlingen website." Dkt. No. 19-7.

On November 19, 2008, Harlingen enacted Ordinance No. 08-65, which extended Harlingen's city limits by annexing the two tracts of land at issue in this case. See Dkt. No. 19-2. A service plan for extension of municipal services for the newly annexed area was attached to Ordinance No. 08-65 as exhibit A. Id. at 4. The service plan listed divided services as either "provided within 60 days" or "provided within 2-1/2 years." Id. at 5.

On August 10, 2010, Plaintiff Charles Lee ("Plaintiff) filed his Original Petition in the 103rd Judicial District Court of Cameron County, Texas. See Dkt.No. 1-2. According to his Petition, Plaintiff lives in the annexed area and is "one of the signers of a [voter-initiated] [p]etition calling for the disannexation from the City of Harlingen . . . ." Id. Plaintiff filed his First Amended Petition on September 9, 2010, which is essentially unchanged from the Original Petition other than a request for a writ of mandamus as an alternative form of relief. See Dkt. No. 1-3. Plaintiff's Petition contains claims that (1) Harlingen ("Defendant") violated the Texas Open Meetings Act; (2) Defendant violated provisions of Texas Local Government Code Section 43; (3) Defendant's failure to comply with notice requirements violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; (4) Defendant's failure to comply with notice requirements deprieved Plaintiff of due process of law; and (5) Defendant failed to perform the promises in its service plan, or, to the extent that it did perform, it did so in bad faith. See id. Plaintiff petitions, in the alternative, that the court issue a writ of mandamus requiring Defendant to disannex the disputed tracts from the city. Id.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (a)-(b), Defendant filed its Notice of Removal in this Court on September 22, 2010. Dkt. No. 1. Defendant based its removal on federal question jurisdiction, specifically 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. However, the Court found "no overt references to any federal statute or provision of the federal Constitution" and on January 7, 2011, ordered Defendant1 to file a memorandum of law answering the question of whether the case should be remanded for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction." See Dkt. No. 12. On January 11, 2011, Defendant filed its Court-ordered memorandum. Dkt. No. 13. Defendant argued that Plaintiff's petition alleged an equal protection violation without reference to any state authority, thus providing the basis for the Court's federal-question jurisdiction. See id. at 2. Defendant argued that Plaintiff had failed to state a due process claim. As to its prior reference to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Defendant pointed to the jointly-filed case management plan which referenced the statute. However, Defendant failed to answer the Court's concern that the pleadings are devoid of anyreference to the 1983 statute. Nonetheless, based on Plaintiff's equal protection and due process claims the Court retained jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.2

Defendant filed its motion for summary judgment on April 4, 2011. Defendant argues that (1) a quo warranto proceeding is the proper method for attacking any procedural irregularites that occur when a city annexes a territory; (2) whether Defendant's service plan was adequate is a question that also must be addressed in a quo warranto proceeding; (3) the statutory time for an annexation service plan to be implemented has not passed and thus Plaintiff's claim is not ripe; and (4) Plaintiff is precluded from asserting due process and equal protection claims because annexation is a purely political matter. See Dkt. No. 19. Defendant moves for summary judgment on all of Plaintiff's claims. Id. Plaintiff responds that (1) his annexation claims are ripe because Defendant promised certain services within 60 days; (2) he has standing pursuant to Tex. Loc. Gov't Code Ann. § 43.056; (3) quo warranto proceedings are not necessary here; (4) Ordinance No. 08-65 is void; (5) the alleged open meeting violation renders Ordinance No. 08-65 void. See Dkt. No. 20. Defendant replied to Plaintiff's response generally arguing again that Plaintiff lacks standing and arguing that Plaintiff offers no proof to support his claims. See Dkt. No. 23.

The Court first addresses whether Plaintiff's equal protection and due process claims—which ostensibly form the underlying basis of this Court's jurisdiction—are prohibited by application of the political question doctrine. Plaintiff claims that Defendant committed due process and equal protection violations by disregarding a variety of Texas Local Government Code requirements. See Dkt. No. 1-3 at 9-10. Defendant argues that Plaintiff's constitutional claims are not justiciable because the political question doctrine precludes Plaintiff from asserting them. See Dkt. No. 19. Plaintiff did not respond to Defendant's argument.

II. Legal Standard

Article III of the Constitution limits federal court jurisdiction to "cases and controversies." Spectrum Stores, Inc. v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 632 F.3d 938, 948 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 215, 94 S.Ct. 2925, 41 L.Ed.2d 706 (1974) ("the concept of justiciability, as embodied in the political question doctrine, expresses the jurisdictional limitations imposed upon federal courts by the case or controversy requirement of Art[icle] III.") (internal quotation marks omitted). "No justiciable 'controversy' exists when parties seek adjudication of a political question." Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 516, 127 S.Ct. 1438, 167 L.Ed.2d 248 (2007); Lane v. Halliburton, 529 F.3d 548, 557 (5th Cir.2008); see also Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 503 F.3d 974, 982 (9th Cir. 2007) ("We hold that if a case presents a political question, we lack subject matter jurisdiction to decide that question.") Thus, Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff's constitutional claims is essentially a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Spectrum Stores, 632 F.3d at 948 (motion to dismiss on political question grounds treated as a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss); Moody Nat'l Bank of Galveston v. GE Life and Annuity Assur. Co., 383 F.3d 249, 251 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Edwards v. City of Houston, 78 F.3d 983, 995 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc) ("[A] motion's substance, and not its form, controls."); see also Stanley v. Central Intelligence Agency, 639 F.2d 1146, 1157 (5th Cir. Unit B Mar. 1981) ("Since the granting of summary judgment is a disposition on the merits of the case, a motion for summary judgment is not the appropriate procedure for raising the defense of lack of subject matter jurisdiction.").

The issue of subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at any point in the proceedings. Burks v. Texas Co., 211 F.2d 443, 445 (5th Cir. 1954). A district court may determine subject-matter jurisdiction based on (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's factual findings on disputed facts. Rodriguez v. Christus Spohn Health...

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