Lee v. City of Gadsden
Court | Supreme Court of Alabama |
Writing for the Court | MADDOX; HORNSBY |
Citation | 592 So.2d 1036 |
Decision Date | 24 January 1992 |
Parties | Larry J. LEE v. CITY OF GADSDEN. 1901468. |
Page 1036
v.
CITY OF GADSDEN.
Page 1037
Donald R. Rhea of Rhea, Boyd & Rhea, Gadsden, for appellant.
George P. Ford of Ford & Hunter, P.C., Gadsden, for appellee.
MADDOX, Justice.
The issue presented by this case is whether the trial court erred in entering a summary judgment for the defendant, the City of Gadsden ("the City"), against the plaintiff, Larry Joe Lee, in a breach of contract action based on an alleged implied employment contract for a specified term.
After a careful review of the record, we are convinced that Lee failed to meet his burden of showing that his employment contract was other than one terminable at will. The judgment of the trial court is, therefore, due to be affirmed.
In January 1985, Lee was hired by the City as an "Equipment Operator I" 1 for the City's "Nuisance Abatement Department." 2 In October 1985, Lee was injured while on the job, and was told by his doctor that he could return to work only on a light-duty basis. In order to help Lee return to his normal duties sooner, and to keep Lee gainfully employed, Lee's supervisor, Marion Wise, wrote Lee a letter offering him a job as a night watchman at a joint Recreation and Parks Department-Nuisance Abatement Department equipment storage facility. Lee was to be paid at the same salary level, and the term of employment was until "you [Lee] are able to return to [the] Nuisance Abatement work force."
In December 1989, Gadsden's city council passed an ordinance adopting a budget that effectively eliminated the Nuisance Abatement Department. All of the Nuisance Abatement Department positions, except one, were left unfunded. The Department's work was either assigned to other City departments or contracted out to private companies.
City officials then offered Lee the same position he held, as night watchman, but at a lower rate of pay. Lee sued, claiming that he had relied upon the letter from his supervisor, Wise, and that the letter constituted an implied contract of employment. 3
Following substantial discovery, Lee filed a motion for summary judgment, with supporting affidavits. Soon thereafter, the
Page 1038
City also filed a motion for summary judgment. After considering the evidentiary submissions and oral arguments of counsel, the trial court entered a summary judgment for the City. The trial court stated in its order:"The Court has reached the conclusion that, even when examined in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, the communications which took place between the defendant and plaintiff were insufficient to create a binding contract of employment for a definite time, or of permanent employment, such as would prevent the defendant from taking the actions it took in respect to plaintiff's employment."
Lee appealed to this Court.
Initially, we note that our review of a summary judgment is de novo; that is, we must examine all the evidentiary submissions that were presented to the trial court. Tolbert v. Gulsby, 333 So.2d 129 (Ala.1976). The two-tiered standard of review for summary judgment has been repeatedly stated: 1) there must be no genuine issues of material fact, and 2) the movant must be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Ala.R.Civ.P. 56(c), Tripp v. Humana, Inc., 474 So.2d 88 (Ala.1985). Further, on review of a summary judgment, we must view all the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmovant and we must entertain all reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the nonmovant. Fincher v. Robinson Bros. Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 583 So.2d 256 (Ala.1991). See, also Hanners v. Balfour Guthrie, Inc., 564 So.2d 412 (Ala.1990).
The party moving for a summary judgment must make a prima facie showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that he is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fincher, 583 So.2d at 257. If this showing is made, the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to rebut the movant's prima facie showing by "substantial evidence." 4 The City met its prima facie burden by submitting the pleadings; the affidavits of Jerry Gladden and Roger Kirby, the City's personnel director and attorney, respectively; the depositions of Gladden and Jan Kilgore, the City's risk manager, and Marion Wise, Lee's supervisor; the letter from Wise to Lee; and a memorandum...
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Southtrust Bank v. Jones, Morrison, Womack, 2030272.
...as a matter of law." Rule 56(c)(3); see Ex parte General Motors Corp., 769 So.2d 903, 909 (Ala.1999); and Lee v. City of Gadsden, 592 So.2d 1036, 1038 (Ala.1992). If the movant meets this burden, "the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to rebut the movant's prima facie showing by `substant......
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Gray v. Liberty Nat. Life Ins. Co.
...issue of material fact and that moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56, Ala.R.Civ.P; Lee v. City of Gadsden, 592 So.2d 1036 (Ala.1992). If the moving party makes a prima facie showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists, then the burden shifts to the no......
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P.J. Lumber Co. v. City of Prichard, 2160627
...issue as to any material fact and that [it] is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’ Rule 56(c)(3) ; see Lee v. City of Gadsden, 592 So.2d 1036, 1038 (Ala. 1992). If the movant meets that burden, ‘the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to rebut the movant's prima facie showing by "su......
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Finish Line v. J.F. Pate & Assocs. Contractors, Inc., 2100006.
...issue as to any material fact and that [it] is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Rule 56(c)(3); see Lee v. City of Gadsden, 592 So.2d 1036, 1038 (Ala.1992). If the movant meets this burden, “the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to rebut the movant's prima facie showing by ‘subs......
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Southtrust Bank v. Jones, Morrison, Womack, 2030272.
...as a matter of law." Rule 56(c)(3); see Ex parte General Motors Corp., 769 So.2d 903, 909 (Ala.1999); and Lee v. City of Gadsden, 592 So.2d 1036, 1038 (Ala.1992). If the movant meets this burden, "the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to rebut the movant's prima facie showing by `substant......
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P.J. Lumber Co. v. City of Prichard, 2160627
...issue as to any material fact and that [it] is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’ Rule 56(c)(3) ; see Lee v. City of Gadsden, 592 So.2d 1036, 1038 (Ala. 1992). If the movant meets that burden, ‘the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to rebut the movant's prima facie showing by "su......
-
Gray v. Liberty Nat. Life Ins. Co.
...issue of material fact and that moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56, Ala.R.Civ.P; Lee v. City of Gadsden, 592 So.2d 1036 (Ala.1992). If the moving party makes a prima facie showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists, then the burden shifts to the no......
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Finish Line v. J.F. Pate & Assocs. Contractors, Inc., 2100006.
...issue as to any material fact and that [it] is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Rule 56(c)(3); see Lee v. City of Gadsden, 592 So.2d 1036, 1038 (Ala.1992). If the movant meets this burden, “the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to rebut the movant's prima facie showing by ‘subs......