Lee v. Dow

• Decision Date: 01 April 1902
• Citation: 71 N.H. 326,51 A. 1072
• Parties: LEE et al. v. DOW.
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

51 A. 1072

71 N.H. 326

LEE et al.

v. DOW.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire. Grafton.

April 1, 1902.

Exceptions from Grafton county.

Action by Egbert Lee and others against Louis H. Dow. To a ruling striking off the Jury marking, plaintiffs excepted, and the case was transferred. Exception sustained.

Assumpsit for the breach of an alleged contract by which the defendant agreed to employ the plaintiffs for the term of one year. Transferred from the superior court. The writ is dated October 20, 1899, and the ad damnum is $500. It was agreed, for the purposes of the case, that there was a valid contract between the parties, by which the plaintiffs were to work for the defendant for one year from April 17, 1899, for $50 a month, payable monthly; that the plaintiffs worked under the contract from the date aforesaid until October 20, 1899, when the defendant discharged them without cause; and that their wages to September 17th were paid. At the November term, 1901, of the superior court, the defendant's motion to strike off the jury marking was allowed on the ground that the amount involved was less than $100, —the court being of opinion that the plaintiffs could not recover damages in excess of the wages earned and not paid at the date of the writ,—and to this ruling the plaintiffs excepted.

Alonzo L Chamberlin and Ira Colby, for plaintiffs.

Charles A. Dole, William H. Cotton, and Batchellor & Mitchell, for defendant.

CHASE, J. If the "value in controversy" exceeded $100, the exception must be sustained, as in that case the plaintiffs had a right to a trial by jury. Bill of Rights, art. 20. The "value in controversy" was the damage to the plaintiffs arising from the defendant's breach of the contract in discharging the plaintiffs from his service before the expiration of the term. The court ruled that the damage was limited to the sum due the plaintiffs for wages at the date of the writ, which was $55, or thereabouts. This ruling cannot be sustained. The contract was entire and indivisible. There was an absolute and unjustifiable breach of it by the defendant. The plaintiffs were authorized to treat the breach as ending the contract, and they have done so. The moment the breach occurred, an action accrued to them to recover a just recompense for the injury they sustained by reason of it Payment of the wages already earned would not be full recompense. The contract was valuable to the plaintiffs. It assured them of an opportunity to earn $50 a month during the unexpired part of the term. The defendant's act in taking away this assurance injured the plaintiffs. The extent of the plaintiffs' injury would not necessarily be measured by the amount of the wages that would be earned if the contract continued in force. They would be obliged to perform the service stipulated in the contract, to be entitled to the wages. Although the defendant prevented them from performing the service, they could not claim the wages in full without making any effort to employ their time elsewhere to some advantage. It was their duty to make reasonable efforts to curtail their injury. The value of their contract, so far as the future was concerned, was the difference between the wages which it assured them and the amount of money that they earned, or by reasonable efforts might earn, during the unexpired part of the term. This they were entitled to recover of the defendant, in addition to the wages due at the date of the breach of the contract.

When the trial of the action occurs before the expiration of the term, there is more or less difficulty in determining what will be, or reasonably ought to be, earned between the trial and the end of the term. Various contingencies—the death of one or the other of the parties, the health of the employé, the uncertainty as to the demand for labor, etc.— render the question difficult to be determined satisfactorily; and in some jurisdictions it is held, for this reason, that the employé shall not have recompense for this part of his injury. The difficulty of determining the sum which will recompense a person for the wrongful act or omission of another is not ordinarily regarded as a sufficient reason for not allowing the injured party any damages. In most actions for personal injuries the damages cannot be determined with complete satisfaction to the tribunal charged with the duty of assessing them. A party is not deprived of his right altogether simply because the measure of it in dollars and cents can be made only imperfectly. The justice administered by human tribunals is imperfect, at best, but this fact does not excuse them from deciding the questions that come before them. There is nut sufficient reason for excepting a case like the present one from the general rule applicable to cases in which the damages cannot be determined with absolute satisfaction as to the justice of their amount. On the other hand, there is a very good reason why the exception should not be...