Lee v. Edwards

• Decision Date: 31 October 1996
• Docket Number: No. 1583,D,1583
• Citation: 101 F.3d 805
• Parties: James K. LEE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michael EDWARDS, Defendant-Appellant. ocket 95-9180.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Page 805

101 F.3d 805

65 USLW 2341

James K. LEE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michael EDWARDS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 1583, Docket 95-9180.

United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.

Argued June 6, 1996.

Decided Oct. 31, 1996.

Norman A. Pattis, New Haven, CT, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Cheryl E. Hricko, Office of Corporation Counsel, Waterbury, CT, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before: JON O. NEWMAN, Chief Judge, JACOBS, Circuit Judge, and CHATIGNY, District Judge. ^*

JACOBS, Circuit Judge:

After plaintiff James K. Lee drove his car into a parked truck, defendant Michael Edwards--a police officer in Waterbury, Connecticut--went to the scene, saw that Lee was intoxicated, and tried to arrest him. A confrontation ensued in which Lee suffered cuts and bruises to the head. Lee was charged with assaulting a police officer and resisting arrest, but both charges were later dropped by the State. Thereafter, Lee filed this action against Edwards for, inter alia, malicious prosecution, and assault and battery. On the assault and battery claim (as to which no appeal is taken), the jury awarded $1,000. On the malicious prosecution charge, the jury awarded $1 nominal damages and $200,000 punitive damages. The district court denied Edwards' post-trial motions to reduce the punitive award, and Edwards now appeals on the sole ground that the punitive damage award is excessive. We vacate that award and remand for a new trial on that issue unless Lee agrees to a remittitur of $125,000, and accepts an award of $75,000.

BACKGROUND

Based on the evidence presented at trial, the jury could have found the following:

Early in the a.m. on February 6, 1990, James K. Lee was driving his car through a residential neighborhood of Waterbury, Connecticut, and collided with a parked pick-up truck. The truck's owner, Robert Sprano, ran out of his house, screamed at Lee, then went inside to call the police. Lee and his passenger, Dennis McGuire, were both corrections officers; Sprano was a campus police officer.

A few minutes later, Michael Edwards, a rookie Waterbury police officer, arrived on the scene. Lee admitted that he had been drinking that evening, and Edwards proceeded to administer a series of field sobriety tests, during which Lee (feeling no pain yet) clowned for the benefit of the others present, saluting and marching around in mockery of the young policeman's officiousness. Edwards warned that Lee was flouting his authority and disobeying his orders; Lee protested that he was nervous. When Edwards determined that Lee had flunked the sobriety tests, he advised Lee that he was under arrest for driving while intoxicated.

Lee asked to be handcuffed in front, explaining that he was muscle-bound and would suffer discomfort if he were handcuffed behind his back. After cuffing Lee's hands behind his back, Edwards grabbed Lee's left arm, and propelled him toward the police car. When Lee turned around to renew his petition about the handcuffs, Edwards pulled out a baton, asked Sprano "Did you see him swing at me?", and began beating Lee about the head. According to McGuire, Edwards landed eight or nine blows. Lee blacked out after the second or third, and regained consciousness inside Edwards' police car.

Lee was taken to the hospital, where he was treated for cuts and contusions on his head. He was then transferred to the police department and released later that same morning.

When Edwards returned to the police station, he filed an incident and offense report recording that Lee had assaulted a police officer and resisted arrest. The State declined to prosecute Lee on either charge. Evidence as to proceedings----if any----regarding Lee's arrest for driving under the influence was apparently excluded from the jury's consideration.

On August 22, 1991, Lee filed this action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, alleging malicious prosecution, use of unreasonable force, and denial of due process. Lee also alleged pendent state law claims of assault and battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. At trial, Lee produced medical bills totaling $1,300.77. On June 21, 1995, the jury found for Lee on the malicious prosecution claim and on the assault and battery claim. On the malicious prosecution, the jury awarded $1 nominal damages and $200,000 punitive damages. On the assault and battery, the jury awarded $1,000 in compensatory damages, and determined that punitive damages--in an unspecified amount, as permitted by state law--should be awarded as well. ¹ Lee chose not to seek punitive damages for assault and battery.

On June 30, 1995, Edwards filed motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, remittitur, and a new trial, on the ground, inter alia, that the $200,000 punitive damage award for malicious prosecution was excessive. On October 27, 1995, the district court denied all three motions. As to the punitive damage award, the court concluded:

While the incident could be perceived by others as relatively minor, the jury obviously felt that defendant's abuse of official power here was intolerable and wished to deal with it severely. The account of plaintiff and defendant left little or no room for innocent misrepresentation. Any misrepresentation had to be intentional. It is possible that this element of intention--of a police officer intentionally submitting a false report that could lead to conviction of a serious felony--is what the jury sought to punish.

(Internal quotation marks and citation omitted.)

DISCUSSION

The sole issue on this appeal is whether the jury's $200,000 punitive damages award for malicious prosecution is excessive.

Punitive damages are available in a § 1983 action "when the defendant's conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others." Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56, 103 S.Ct. 1625, 1640, 75 L.Ed.2d 632 (1983). Although a jury has wide discretion, a district court may refuse to uphold a punitive damage award when the amount is "so high as to shock the judicial conscience and constitute a denial of justice." Hughes v. Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n of New York, Inc., 850 F.2d 876, 883 (2d Cir.) (quoting Zarcone v. Perry, 572 F.2d 52, 56-57 (2d Cir.1978)), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 967, 109 S.Ct. 495, 102 L.Ed.2d 532 (1988). "If a district court finds that a verdict is excessive, it may order a new trial, a new trial limited to damages, or, under the practice of remittitur, may condition a denial of a motion for a new trial on the plaintiff's accepting damages in a reduced amount." Tingley Sys., Inc. v. Norse Sys., Inc., 49 F.3d 93, 96 (2d Cir.1995).

We review for abuse of discretion a district court's ruling that a punitive damage award does not "shock the judicial conscience." Hughes, 850 F.2d at 883. " 'We must give the benefit of every doubt to the judgment of the trial judge; but surely there must be an upper limit, and whether that has been surpassed is not a question of fact with respect to which reasonable men may differ, but a question of law.' " Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., --- U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 116 S.Ct. 2211, 2223-24, 135 L.Ed.2d 659 (1996) (quoting Dagnello v. Long Island R.R. Co., 289 F.2d 797, 806 (2d Cir.1961)).

In gauging excessiveness, we must keep in mind the purpose of punitive damages: "to punish the defendant and to deter him and others from similar conduct in the future." Vasbinder v. Scott, 976 F.2d 118, 121 (2d Cir.1992) (citing Smith, 461 U.S. at 54, 103 S.Ct. at 1639). Thus, our task is "to make 'certain that the punitive damages are reasonable in their amount and rational in light of their purpose to punish what has occurred and to deter its repetition.' " Id. at 121 (quoting Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 21, 111 S.Ct. 1032, 1045, 113 L.Ed.2d 1 (1991)); see also BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, --- U.S. ----, ----, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 1595, 134 L.Ed.2d 809 (1996) (punitive damages vindicate a state's legitimate interests in punishment and deterrence).

Subsequent to Judge Eginton's ruling in this case, the Supreme Court erected three guideposts that should assist us in the application of our standard, by which we deem excessive a punitive damage award that "shocks our judicial conscience," Hughes, 850 F.2d at 883. These guideposts include: (1) the degree of reprehensibility of the tortious conduct; (2) the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages; and (3) the difference between this remedy and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases. Gore, --- U.S. at ---- - ----, 116 S.Ct. at 1598-99. ²

We examine each of the three Gore factors in turn.

I. The Gore Factors

A. Reprehensibility

In this context, "reprehensibility" is not a question of whether the conduct is acceptable or unacceptable; the jury's finding of liability has already settled that question. "That conduct is sufficiently reprehensible to give rise to tort liability, and even a modest award of exemplary damages, does not establish the high degree of culpability that warrants a substantial punitive damages award." Gore, --- U.S. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 1601. Rather, punitive damages "should reflect the enormity of [a defendant's] offense." Id. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 1599 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

The Supreme Court in Gore noted that reprehensibility is "perhaps the most important" factor in assessing a punitive damage award. Id. The Court then identified certain types of "aggravating factors" that are "associated with particularly reprehensible conduct" and contribute to the sense that "some wrongs are more blameworthy than others." --- U.S. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 1599. Aggravating factors include (1) whether a defendant's conduct was violent or presented a threat of violence, (2) whether a defendant acted with deceit or malice as opposed to acting with mere negligence, and (3) whether a defendant has engaged in...