Lee v. Godinez

• Decision Date: 20 June 2014
• Docket Number: Nos. 3–13–0677,3–13–0889.,s. 3–13–0677
• Citation: 13 N.E.3d 214
• Parties: Lincoln A. LEE, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Salvador A. GODINEZ, Director of the Department of Corrections; Ty Bates, Deputy Director of the Department of Corrections; Sandra Funk; Marc Hodges, Warden of the Department of Corrections; Randy Stevenston, Defendants–Appellees.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

13 N.E.3d 214

Lincoln A. LEE, Plaintiff–Appellant

v.Salvador A. GODINEZ, Director of the Department of Corrections; Ty Bates, Deputy Director of the Department of Corrections; Sandra Funk; Marc Hodges, Warden of the Department of Corrections; Randy Stevenston, Defendants–Appellees.

Nos. 3–13–0677

3–13–0889.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District.

June 20, 2014.

Nate Nieman, Moline, for Appellant.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Chicago (Terry A. Mertel, State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor's Office, of counsel), for Appellees.

OPINION

Justice SCHMIDT delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

On May 1, 2013, plaintiff, Lincoln Lee, filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the Rock Island County circuit court against defendants, Department of Corrections Director Salvador Godinez, Deputy Director Ty Bates, transfer coordinator Sandra Funk, Warden Marc Hodges, and head counselor Randy Stevenston (hereinafter defendants). The petition, brought pursuant to section 14–101 of the Code of Civil Procedure (the Code) (735 ILCS 5/14–101 (West 2012) ), alleged that defendants abused their discretion in denying plaintiff good-time credits, work release, and electronic home detention based upon his prior domestic battery conviction, and that section 3–6–3(a)(3) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Unified Code) (730 ILCS 5/3–6–3(a)(3) (West 2012)) violated the ex post facto clause. U.S. Const., art. I, §§ 9, 10; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 16.

¶ 2 The trial court, sua sponte, denied the petition without hearing on August 12, 2013. The court appointed counsel on October 22, 2013. Plaintiff's appointed counsel filed a notice of appeal on November 14, 2013.

¶ 3 Plaintiff's counsel has now filed a motion indicating that the instant appeal presents no issues of merit. This motion, filed in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), requests that counsel be permitted to withdraw. Plaintiff opposes the motion. For reasons set forth below, we allow the motion and dismiss this appeal.

¶ 4 ANALYSIS

¶ 5 I. Supplemental Sentencing Credit

¶ 6 Plaintiff first argues that he was wrongfully denied a 180–day supplemental sentencing credit (SSC) to which he was entitled. Plaintiff argues that defendants prevented him from receiving said credits based on an unwritten policy denying SSC to inmates with previous domestic violence convictions, which is arbitrary and constitutes an abuse of discretion.

¶ 7 Rules and regulations for sentencing credit are governed by section 3–6–3 of the Unified Code (730 ILCS 5/3–6–3 (West 2012) ). At issue here is section 3–6–3(a)(3), which provides in pertinent part as follows:

“(3) The rules and regulations shall also provide that the Director may award up to 180 days additional sentence credit for good conduct in specific instances as the Director deems proper. The good conduct may include, but is not limited to, compliance with the rules and regulations of the Department, service to the Department, service to a community, or service to the State.” (Emphasis added.) 730 ILCS 5/3–6–3(a)(3) (West 2012).

¶ 8 The section then goes on to enumerate those offenses for which the Director shall not award more than 90 days of sentence credit for good conduct.

¶ 9 Finally, section 3–6–3(a)(3) provides:

“Eligible inmates for an award of sentence credit under this paragraph (3) may be selected to receive the credit at the Director's or his or her designee's sole discretion. Consideration may be based on, but not limited to, any available risk assessment analysis on the inmate, any history of conviction for violent crimes as defined by the Rights of Crime Victims and Witnesses Act, facts and circumstances of the inmates's holding offense or offenses, and the potential for rehabilitation.” (Emphases added.) 730 ILCS 5/3–6–3(a)(3) (West 2012).

The Rights of Crime Victims and Witnesses Act defines “any offense involving * * * domestic battery” as a violent crime. 725 ILCS 120/3(c) (West 2012). A reading of section 3–6–3(a)(3) makes it clear that good behavior in prison renders an inmate eligible for good-time credit at the Director's sole discretion.

¶ 10 The trial court relied solely on section 3–6–3(a)(3) in denying the petition, noting that because the award of good-time credit is at the Director's sole discretion, there is no statutory right to good-time credit, nor is the Director required to have a written policy. The court found that the fact plaintiff did not receive such a credit did not entitle him to a writ of mandamus.

¶ 11 Plaintiff's counsel relies on the same language in his motion to withdraw, contending that plaintiff's argument for SSC does not state a claim for mandamus relief because the award of meritorious good-time credit is discretionary.

“ ‘Mandamus is an extraordinary civil remedy that will be granted to enforce, as a matter of right, the performance of official nondiscretionary duties by a public officer. [Citation.] * * * Mandamus will issue only where the plaintiff has fulfilled his burden [citation] to set forth every material fact needed to demonstrate that (1) he has a clear right to the relief requested, (2) there is a clear duty on the part of the defendant to act, and (3) clear authority exists in the defendant to comply with an order granting mandamus relief. [Citation.]’ ” Dupree v. Hardy, 2011 IL App (4th) 100351, ¶ 22, 355 Ill.Dec. 558, 960 N.E.2d 1 (quoting Rodriguez v. Illinois Prisoner Review Board, 376 Ill.App.3d 429, 433–34, 315 Ill.Dec. 347, 876 N.E.2d 659 (2007) ).

¶ 12 We find Helm v. Washington, 308 Ill.App.3d 255, 241 Ill.Dec. 871, 720 N.E.2d 326 (1999), instructive. Donald Helm brought a mandamus action against the Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections. Helm claimed he was entitled to 180 days of meritorious good-time credit, which the Director arbitrarily denied. Id. at 256, 241 Ill.Dec. 871, 720 N.E.2d 326. He alleged that he was serving an eight-year sentence for burglary and had subsequently completed educational programs and work assignments, qualifying him for 180 days of meritorious good-time credit, pursuant to section 3–6–3(a)(3) of the Unified Code (730 ILCS 5/3–6–3(a)(3) (West 1998)). According to Helm, the Director denied his request for good-time credit on the grounds that he had a prior order of protection filed against him.

¶ 13 The Director moved to dismiss the petition on the grounds that the award of meritorious good-time credit is discretionary. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the cause. In affirming the dismissal, this court found that Helm did not adequately state a claim for mandamus relief. Specifically, the petition alleged only that he qualified for consideration of good-time credit against his sentence, which could be granted or denied at the Director's discretion. Helm, 308 Ill.App.3d at 257, 241 Ill.Dec. 871, 720 N.E.2d 326. As such, Helm failed to allege a clear duty to act on the part of the Director, and the trial court did not err in dismissing the petition. Id. at 258, 241 Ill.Dec. 871, 720 N.E.2d 326. The court emphasized that the decision to award good-time credit is discretionary under section 3–6–3(a)(3), and that “[d]efendant is not required to grant the credit or even consider it.” Id. at 257, 241 Ill.Dec. 871, 720 N.E.2d 326 (citing Brewer v. Peters, 262 Ill.App.3d 610, 198 Ill.Dec. 555, 633 N.E.2d 17 (1994) ).

¶ 14 Similarly, the plaintiff here has failed to allege either a clear right to relief or a clear duty to act by defendants. The plain language of section 3–6–3(a)(3) vests the Director with full discretion to award or deny good-time credit as he deems proper. Plaintiff has no right to good-time credit and, thus, has no clear right to the relief requested. The fact that the denial of good-time credit might be based on a past conviction for domestic battery is rendered inconsequential. Nonetheless, the 2012 amendments to section 3–6–3(a)(3) make it clear that the Director may consider such a conviction in determining whether to grant early release to an otherwise eligible inmate. Therefore, plaintiff's basic premise that the Director relied upon an unwritten rule is a false premise. The “unwritten rule” upon which plaintiff alleges defendants relied is written within the statute.

¶ 15 In reaching this conclusion, we would be remiss not to mention Guzzo v. Snyder, 326 Ill.App.3d 1058, 261 Ill.Dec. 94, 762 N.E.2d 663 (2001). In Guzzo, this court affirmed the trial court's immediate release of plaintiff pursuant to a writ of mandamus, where it found that the Director's refusal of Guzzo's good-time credit, pursuant to section 3–6–3(a)(3) of the Unified Code, was based on an unwritten policy that excluded inmates with domestic battery arrests from eligibility. Id. at 1063, 261 Ill.Dec. 94, 762 N.E.2d 663. In making its determination, the Guzzo court noted that the formulation of a good-time policy was within the Director's discretion, but that the discretion was “restricted” by both the enabling statute and the related parts of the Illinois Administrative Code. Id. at 1062, 261 Ill.Dec. 94, 762 N.E.2d 663 ; 5 ILCS 100/5–20 (West 2000). It, therefore, found that the Director's policy of denying good-time credit based solely on an inmate's domestic battery arrest was both unwritten and unrelated to prison discipline, thus the use of the policy was an abuse of discretion, which implicated the mandamus exception. Guzzo, 326 Ill.App.3d at 1064, 261 Ill.Dec. 94, 762 N.E.2d 663.

¶ 16 The Guzzo court declined to follow the rationale of Helm v. Washington, or rather, attempted to distinguish it. It observed that Helm affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's request for mandamus relief, and held that because the award of meritorious good-time credit was discretionary, mandamus was inappropriate. The court explained, however, that the plaintiff in Helm did not allege an abuse of discretion by the Director implicating the mandamus exception, nor did he assert...