Lee v. Grandcor Medical Systems, Inc.
Citation | 702 F. Supp. 252 |
Decision Date | 13 December 1988 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 88-C-315. |
Parties | Miles D. LEE and Lee Clinic, P.C., Plaintiffs, v. GRANDCOR MEDICAL SYSTEMS, INC., and Versacor, Inc., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Colorado |
Donald F. Lozow and Kevin F. Hughes, Lozow, Lozow & Hughes, Denver, Colo., for plaintiffs.
John R. Trigg and Kenneth A.B. Roberts, Jr., Hall & Evans, Denver, Colo., for defendants.
Plaintiffs Miles D. Lee and Lee Clinic, P.C. ("Lee Clinic") commenced this action by filing a complaint in the state district court for Weld County, Colorado, alleging state law claims for breach of contract, fraudulent inducement, and tortious interference with business relations. Defendants are Grandcor Medical Systems, Inc. ("Grandcor") and Versacor, Inc. ("Versacor"). Defendants have filed a verified petition for removal of the action to this court. Diversity jurisdiction is alleged to exist under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
The complaint alleges the following facts: On August 16, 1983, the defendant Grandcor entered into a Transfer Agreement with Northern Colorado Osteopathic Hospital and Foundation, d/b/a Memorial Hospital. Pursuant to the Transfer Agreement, the defendants agreed to adequately staff and maintain Memorial Hospital, to promote and expand the practice of osteopathic medicine in Greeley, Colorado, and to operate Memorial Hospital so as to provide the plaintiffs with a hospital facility for the treatment of patients. Plaintiffs allege that they were intended third party beneficiaries of the Transfer Agreement.
The complaint further alleges that on September 26, 1983, the plaintiff Lee, and his predecessor in interest — the plaintiff Lee Clinic — entered into a Lease Management Services Agreement ("Management Agreement") with the defendant Versacor. Pursuant to this agreement, Versacor agreed to manage the physical plant of Lee Clinic.1
The complaint contains four claims for relief. The first asserts that the defendants breached the Management Agreement. The second claim alleges that the defendants breached the Transfer Agreement. The third claim alleges that the defendants fraudulently induced the plaintiffs to execute the Management Agreement, and to consent to the Transfer Agreement, by falsely representing that Memorial Hospital and the Lee Clinic would be properly managed. The fourth claim alleges that the defendants intentionally operated the hospital and clinic in a manner intended to interfere with the relationships between and among the plaintiffs, their patients, and other physicians in the Greeley, Colorado area.
The fifth "claim for relief," is actually a prayer for exemplary damages rather than a separate claim, and it will be treated as such.
Currently pending is the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(h)(3), Fed.R.Civ.P., for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The parties have briefed the issues and oral argument would not materially assist my decision.
Defendants contend that valid and unwaived arbitration agreements in both the Management Agreement and the Transfer Agreement preclude this court's having subject matter jurisdiction until the plaintiffs' claims have been submitted to arbitration, and the arbitrator has rendered a decision.
Because this is a diversity case, state law must be applied to the substantive issues. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938). The parties apparently agree that Colorado law controls.
Under Colorado law, a valid and unwaived arbitration clause deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction until the dispute has been submitted to arbitration. See Guthrie v. Barda, 188 Colo. 124, 533 P.2d 487 (1975).
Section 8.09 of the Management Agreement (p. 26) provides:
Paragraph 22 of the Transfer Agreement (p. 27) states as follows:
Settlement of disputes through arbitration is strongly favored by Colorado courts. See, e.g., Red Carpet Armory Realty Company v. Golden West Realty, 644 P.2d 93, 94 (Colo.App.1982).
Section 13-22-203, Colo.Rev.Stat., provides, in relevant part:
"A written agreement to submit any existing controversy to arbitration or a provision in a written contract to submit to arbitration any controversy thereafter arising between the parties is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist in law or equity for the revocation of any contract."
Significantly, where, as here, a party does not contest the validity of the arbitration clause itself, the phrase "save upon such grounds as exist in law or equity for the revocation of any contract" does not preclude arbitration of the claim that the underlying contract was induced by fraud. National Camera, Inc. v. Love, 644 P.2d 94 (Colo.App.1982).
Plaintiffs respond to the defendants' motion by arguing that: (1) the defendants have waived any rights they had under the arbitration provisions; (2) even if the defendants did not waive their rights under the arbitration clauses, the plaintiffs cannot be bound by the Transfer Agreement because they were not signatories to that agreement; and (3) even if the arbitration provisions are enforceable with respect to the plaintiffs' claims for the breach of contract, they do not apply to the plaintiffs' tort law claims. I shall consider the plaintiffs' arguments in the order just presented.
Plaintiffs first contend that under Rule 8(c), Fed.R.Civ.P., the defendants were required to assert the existence of the arbitration clauses as an affirmative defense in their answer.
Rule 8(c) provides, in relevant part:
Clearly, Rule 8(c) is limited to the situation where a dispute already has been arbitrated and an award has been obtained. Neither has occurred in this case.
Plaintiffs next assert that by petitioning for removal, filing an answer, and requesting a jury trial, the defendants waived any rights they may have under the arbitration clauses. Specifically, the plaintiffs state:
(Opposition brief, at 3.)
Vespe Contracting Co. v. Anvan Corp., 399 F.Supp. 516, 522 (E.D.Pa.1975); see also Sibley v. Tandy Corp., 543 F.2d 540, 542 (5th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 824, 98 S.Ct. 71, 54 L.Ed.2d 82 (1977) ().
The cases cited by the plaintiffs in their opposition brief do not support the plaintiffs' contention that by filing a petition for removal, answering a complaint, and requesting a jury trial, a party waives its right to arbitration. To the contrary, courts generally have held that rights under an arbitration agreement are only waived where the parties have engaged in extensive pre-trial discovery, and where the party opposing the arbitration will suffer material prejudice as the result of the other party's delay in asserting its rights to arbitration. See, e.g., McDonnell v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 620 F.Supp. 152, 159 (D.Conn.1985) ().
Plaintiffs have not alleged, much less demonstrated, that they have been materially prejudiced by any delay caused by the defendants' petitioning for removal, filing an answer, and requesting a jury trial. This case was commenced recently and no substantive proceedings have occurred. No trial date has been set,...
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