Lee v. Gulf Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 28 July 1966 |
| Docket Number | No. 18541,18541 |
| Citation | 149 S.E.2d 639,248 S.C. 296 |
| Parties | J. Archie LEE, Respondent, v. GULF INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Burroughs & Green, Conway, for appellant.
Winston W. Vaught, Conway, for respondent.
The plaintiff-respondent instituted this action against the defendant-appellant for recovery of a judgment previously obtained by him against one Kirby Dix. The judgment was obtained in an action predicated on the negligence of Dix in the operation of his automobile and the resulting property damage to a building owned by the respondent. The appellant is the liability insurance carrier for Dix. The complaint alleges the existence of the liability insurance policy with Dix as the named insured and the procurement of the judgment against him as above stated. The answer of the appellant insurance carrier alleges, Inter alia, non-coverage by reason of its contention that Dix was an employee of the respondent and in charge of the building that was damaged and sets forth a provision of the policy to the effect that destruction of property 'in the charge of the insured' is excluded from coverage. The case was tried before a jury and resulted in a verdict for the respondent in the amount of the judgment previously obtained.
During the course of the trial, the appellant attemped to introduce into evidence the signed statement of Kirby Dix through identification by one Tanner, an adjuster for the appellant company. The Court excluded the statement, ruling that it was hearsay. The appellant then attempted to elicit from Tanner certain statements alleged to have been made to him by Dix. This was likewise excluded by the trial judge on the ground of hearsay. Dix was not offered by either litigant as a witness in the case nor is his absence explained in the record. The sole question presented on this appeal is whether or not the exclusion of this evidence by the trial judge constitutes error.
The appellant argues that such evidence is admissible against the respondent on the theory that the respondent 'stepped into the shoes' of the insured Dix when he instituted the present action, and that he is thereby rendered subject to all disabilities and the beneficiary of all rights accruing to the insured. It is the position of the appellant that since the evidence offered would have been admissible had Dix been the plaintiff, it would necessarily be admissible against the respondent in his substituted role. The law is well settled in this jurisdiction that an injured party who brings suit against a liability carrier in order to collect on a judgment previously acquired against an insured is possessed of all rights of the insured and subject to all defenses that exist as between the insured and the insurance carrier. Crook v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 231 S.C. 257, 98 S.E.2d 427. While the principle of law above stated is well settled, there is no case in this jurisdiction supporting the contention of the appellant that the same evidence would be rendered admissible regardless of whether the suit be brought by the insured or the injured party. To say that the respondent had the same substantive rights and is subject to the same defenses as...
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Welch v. Whitaker
...Moreover, the document involved much inadmissible hearsay and was therefore excludable on that ground alone. Lee v. Gulf Ins. Co., 248 S.C. 296, 149 S.E.2d 639 (1966); Cooper Corp. v. Jeffcoat, 217 S.C. 489, 61 S.E.2d 53 (1950); 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 193a at 520 (1964); Id. § 194a at 547; s......
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State v. Galloway
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