Lee v. Lee

• Decision Date: 09 July 1991
• Citation: Lee v. Lee, 595 A.2d 408 (Me. 1991)
• Parties: Mary E. LEE v. Edward D. LEE.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 408

595 A.2d 408

Mary E. LEE v.Edward D. LEE.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Submitted on Briefs June 19, 1990.

Decided July 9, 1991.

John F. Barnicle, Moncure & Barnicle, Brunswick, for plaintiff.

Susan R. Kominsky, Vafiades, Brountas & Kominsky, Bangor, for defendant.

Before McKUSICK, C.J., and ROBERTS, WATHEN, GLASSMAN, COLLINS and BRODY, JJ.

WATHEN, Justice.

Mary E. Lee("wife"), appeals the judgment of the Superior Court(Piscataquis County, Browne, J.), affirming the judgment of the District Court(Dover-Foxcroft, Calkins, J.) granting her a divorce from Edward D. Lee("husband").Wife argues that the District Court erred in its division and valuation of property, in awarding alimony of one dollar per year, in ordering wife to pay her own attorney fees, and in fixing the nature and extent of husband's contact with the couple's daughter.Finding no error, we affirm.

The parties, who were married in 1976, have one daughter, born in 1986.Five years before the marriage, wife's father set up a revocable trust comprised primarily of Massachusetts real estate to benefit wife and her three siblings.From this trust, the couple jointly received three parcels of land during their marriage.The couple invested the $250,000 proceeds from the sale of this land in some land and a house in Beaver Cove, Maine.They sold their Massachusetts house, which was largely built by husband's uncle, for $100,000.Although husband and wife dispute the extent of the compensation, they agree that the uncle was paid for his services.The couple also jointly purchased land in Weld for $28,000.

Husband, who was unemployed at the time of the divorce hearing, had previously earned approximately $40,000 per year.He testified that he had few financial assets and several debts, including an $8,000 car loan, a $2,500 debt to his sister, and a $5,600 debt to his parents.At the time of the divorce hearing, he needed to borrow $75 per week to pay for child support.Wife, who has not worked since 1986, formerly earned between $12,000 and $20,000 per year.

Wife asked the court to award only supervised visitation rights to husband, based on his history of substance abuse and domestic violence.She testified, and husband confirmed, that he had been convicted twice for drunk driving, the most recent incident resulting in a serious automobile accident.She also described two instances in which husband had threatened her with bodily harm, once while wielding a vase and another time a fireplace poker, and three incidents in which husband asked her to shoot either him or herself, once when their daughter was present.

A licensed psychologist who had evaluated both wife and husband in connection with the custody dispute testified that husband's drinking problem needed to be addressed before the court should grant him either custody of or extended visitation with his daughter.In response to the psychologist's report, husband had begun to attend Alcoholics Anonymous prior to the divorce hearing, but continued to express ambivalence about the seriousness of his problem.Aside from his drinking problems, however, wife did not challenge husband's fitness as a parent and characterized him as a "participating father."

Wife filed a complaint for divorce, claiming that there were differences between the parties which were irreconcilable and that the marriage had broken down.Following a divorce hearing, the District Court found that the marital estate had been augmented by the parties' earnings, their real estate holdings, including the three parcels contributed by wife's family through the trust, and the building services contributed by husband's family.Based on this assessment, the court awarded wife $126,285 in marital property and the first $50,000 plus one-half of the proceeds over $50,000 from the sale of the house.It also set apart, as nonmarital, any interest wife might have in her father's trust.To husband the court awarded marital property valued at $124,132, plus one-half of the proceeds over $50,000 from the sale of the house, and ordered him to pay the marital debts.The court found "this roughly equal division to be an equitable division of marital property in light of the contribution of the parties' families to the marital assets, the contributions of both parties to the estate and the present financial situation of the parties."

Based on a determination that the parties are "in roughly equal financial circumstances,"the court declined to order husband to pay wife's attorney fees and determined that husband should pay weekly child support, but only $1.00 per year in alimony to wife.The court did not find that supervised contact between husband and daughter is necessary so long as husband remains "sober and refrain[s] from the use of intoxicating liquor during the periods of contact."Lengthy summer visitation was conditioned on husband's completion of an alcohol treatment program.Wife appealed the District Court's judgment to the Superior Court which, finding no abuse of discretion, affirmed the judgment.Wife appeals.

Division and valuation of property

In a divorce proceeding, the disposition of property is governed by 19 M.R.S.A. § 722-A(1981& Supp.1990).Section 722-A(3) provides a presumption that all property acquired after marriage, regardless of how title is held, is marital.That presumption, however, can be overcome by a number of methods, including a showing that the property was acquired in exchange for property acquired by one of the spouses by gift.Seeid.§§ 2(A) & 3.The party claiming that certain property acquired during the marriage is nonmarital bears the burden of overcoming the statutory presumption.SeeCushman v. Cushman, 495 A.2d 330, 334(Me.1985).Because the showing required to overcome the presumption is one of fact, " 'the decision of the divorce court whether the burden was successfully carried is reviewable only for clear error.' "Id.(quotingMoulton v. Moulton, 485 A.2d 976, 978(Me.1984)).Wife contends that she satisfied her burden of showing that her interest in the trust established by her father was nonmarital and remained so throughout the conveyances that resulted in joint ownership of land in Maine at the time of the divorce hearing.The District Court, however found that the transfer of land from the trust were gifts to husband and wife jointly and, thus, formed part of the marital estate.

In Grant v. Grant, 424 A.2d 139(Me.1981), we affirmed, by an evenly divided court, a divorce judgment classifying as marital property certain real estate acquired by a couple during marriage through devise to them as joint tenants.One of the divergent opinions in Grant concluded that the court had erred in not excluding the property from the marital estate because it had been devised by a third party to the couple jointly and not acquired by "either spouse" as specified in sections 722-A(2) & (3).Id. at 141-43.We adopt the contrary view that focuses on the intent of the statute to effectuate the concept of marriage as a partnership rather than on the technicalities of the statute's language.This intent is not furthered by excluding from marital property gifts acquired jointly, unless the transferor had a contrary intention.Smith v. Smith, 472 A.2d 943, 947(Me.1984);see alsoGrant v. Grant, 424 A.2d at 144.Because the land from the trust was conveyed to the parties jointly and wife failed to establish that her father, the transferor, had a contrary intention when making the conveyances, the District Court did not err in finding that she failed to meet her burden of overcoming the presumption that the property is marital.

Moreover, there is no merit in wife's contention that the court failed to consider her contributions as a homemaker in making its findings on property division or erred in its disposition and evaluation of the marital residence.It has long been the rule that a divorce court's decision regarding the disposition of marital property is reviewable only for abuse of discretion.See, e.g., Cushman v. Cushman, 495 A.2d at 334.As a guide to the court, section 722-A orders a division of "marital property in such proportions as the court deems just" after considering such relevant factors as the contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of marital property, including the contribution of a homemaker; the value of the property set apart to each; and the parties' economic circumstances at the time the division is to become effective, including the desirability of awarding the family home to the spouse having custody of any children.The court may also consider any matters peculiar to an individual case in order to obtain a just result.Seeid.

Here, the District Court determined the contributions of each spouse and their families before distributing the property.It found, based on the extensive amount of time wife had been spending in Massachusetts, that the marital residence in Maine should be sold, with the first $50,000 awarded to the wife...