Lee v. Meier & Frank Co.
Decision Date | 17 June 1941 |
Citation | 114 P.2d 136,166 Or. 600 |
Parties | LEE <I>v.</I> MEIER & FRANK CO. |
Court | Oregon Supreme Court |
Duty and liability respecting condition of store or shop notes, 33 A.L.R. 181; 43 A.L.R. 866; 46 A.L.R. 1111; 58 A.L.R 136; 100 A.L.R. 710. See, also, 20 R.C.L. 66 (7 Perm. Supp 4820) 45 C.J., Negligence, § 223.
Before KELLY, Chief Justice, and RAND, LUSK, BAILEY and ROSSMAN, Associate Justices.
Appeal from Circuit Court, Multnomah County.
Death action by Gladys Lee, administratrix of the estate of Katie F. Anderson, against Meier & Frank Company. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.
AFFIRMED.
P.R. Harris, of Portland (A.F. Knight and Goldstein & Harris, all of Portland, on the brief), for appellant.
John F. Reilly, of Portland (Reilly & Davidson, of Portland, on the brief), for respondent.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the circuit court in favor of the defendant based upon a ruling which sustained the defendant's motion for an involuntary nonsuit. The complaint alleges that the defendant maintained a stack of pillows in its store in such a negligent manner that one of them fell to the floor of the aisle where it tripped the plaintiff's decedent while she, as a patron of the store, was walking in the aisle. According to the complaint, the deceased, Katie F. Anderson, sustained injuries which shortly caused her death. The complaint charges that (1) the defendant's pillow rack was not of sufficient size; (2) the rack was not provided with a sufficient guard to prevent pillows from falling into the aisle; and (3) the defendant piled pillows in the rack "at a careless and negligent height, manner and arrangement." The answer denies all averments of negligence.
November 19, 1937, Mrs. Katie F. Anderson, plaintiff's decedent, accompanied by Mrs. Anna K. Hurt, a friend, went in the elevator to the fifth floor of the defendant's store. When they stepped out of the elevator there was directly in front of them and plainly in sight the rack of pillows. The pillow rack was constructed around one of the pillars which supports the sixth floor. The base of the rack was a platform 10 or 12 inches above the floor and 4 or 5 feet square. Around the platform was a protective railing 8 or 9 inches in height. The top of this railing was 21 1/2 inches above the floor. The pillows were about 15 inches square and about 6 inches deep. According to Mrs. Hurt, "the pillows on that rack were piled unusually high." Again referring to them, she said that they "were piled up some two or three pillows high along the edge there and from that on up to between 4 and 5 feet at the post."
Mrs. Anderson, at the time of her injury, was 70 years of age. When she and Mrs. Hurt left the elevator they walked directly ahead with the intention of reaching some department of the store beyond the pillows. Adjacent to the pillow pile the aisle was narrow, and accordingly Mrs. Hurt walked slightly in front of Mrs. Anderson. We now quote from Mrs. Hurt's description of the accident: According to Mrs. Hurt, the woman just mentioned was a customer. She apparently departed at once. Mrs. Hurt had not seen the pillow before the fall occurred, and no other witness mentioned it. The record does not disclose how long it had been upon the floor nor how it happened to be there. Likewise, the record does not indicate whether any customer was examining the pillows at the time of Mrs. Anderson's and Mrs. Hurt's approach.
1-5. In support of her contention that the evidence above reviewed indicated negligence upon the defendant's part, the plaintiff cites and relies upon Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. Diebold, 276 Ky. 349, 124 S.W. (2d) 505; Etta Rogers v. J.C. Penney Co., 127 Neb. 885, 257 N.W. 252; Chalmers v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 172 Md. 552, 192 Atl. 419; Saunders v. Williams & Co., 155 Or. 1, 62 P. (2d) 260; Hovedsgaard v. Grand Rapids Equipment Corp., 138 Or. 39, 5 P. (2d) 86; Lombardi v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 303 Mass. 417, 22 N.E. (2d) 28; Johnson v. Hoffman, 132 Or. 46, 284 P. 567; Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Peterson, 76 Fed. (2d) 243; Fox v. Ben Schechter & Co., 57 Ohio App. 275, 13 N.E. (2d) 730; Terminal Railroad Ass'n v. Farris, 69 Fed. (2d) 779; O'Bauer v. Katz Drug Co., (Mo. App.) 49 S.W. (2d) 1065; Hodge v. Weinstock, L. & Co., 109 Cal. App. 393, 293 P. 80; and annotation in 100 A.L.R. 742. Additional collections of decisions may be found in the following annotations: 58 A.L.R. 136; 46 A.L.R. 1111; 43 A.L.R. 866; and 33 A.L.R. 181. Of the authorities cited by the plaintiff Terminal Railroad Ass'n v. Farris has no application to the duty owed by a storekeeper to his patron. We shall, therefore, exclude it from our further discussion. The other decisions cited by the plaintiff, as well as those collected in the defendant's brief, deem a customer in a mercantile establishment an invitee. They hold that the owner owes to his customers the duty to use the care of a reasonably careful and prudent person to keep the passageways used by his customers in a reasonably safe condition so that they will not be exposed to danger unnecessarily. In stating that rule, many of the decisions add by way of caution that the storekeeper is not an insurer of his customers' safety. In all of the decisions above cited, with the exception of Rogers v. J.C. Penney Co., the customer sustained his injury through a fall which resulted from stumbling over an object in the aisle or slipping upon a foreign substance on the floor. In the Rogers case the customer fell down a concealed stairway. The decisions hold that a storekeeper is not liable unless he placed the object or slippery substance in the aisle, or, if someone else placed it there, they hold that he is not liable unless he had actual knowledge of its presence or constructive notice concerning it arising out of its presence in that place for a sufficiently long time. Since the law exacts of the storekeeper nothing more than the exercise of reasonable care, the patron can not expect to find the aisle always free from danger; therefore, he must employ due care also. But, since this appeal presents no issue of contributory negligence, we shall say no more upon that subject. The legal principle which we stated in the above lines is expressed in somewhat amplified form in Restatement of the Law, Torts (Negligence), § 343, thus:
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