Lee v. Miami-Dade Cnty. & Fla. Dep't of Transp.
| Decision Date | 06 December 2018 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 18-21852-Civ-Scola |
| Parties | Sybel W. Lee and others, Plaintiffs, v. Miami-Dade County and State of Florida Department of Transportation, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
This lawsuit arises from a years-long saga stemming from the construction of a noise reduction wall along Interstate 95 ("I-95"). The Plaintiffs are property owners who contend that they were promised that Miami-Dade County would purchase their homes, which are located near the noise reduction wall and I-95, and relocate them. Before the Court now are the motions to dismiss (ECF Nos. 18, 28) filed by Defendants Miami-Dade County (the "County"), and the State of Florida's Department of Transportation (the "FDOT"). Upon consideration of the parties' briefs, the relevant legal authorities, and the record, the Court grants the Defendants' motions to dismiss (ECF Nos. 18, 28).
The facts described below stem from the Plaintiffs' Complaint and the contents of the exhibits they attached to the Complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c) (). The Court has relied on the contents of the exhibits to the extent they conflict with the allegations presented in the Complaint. Reed v. Clough, 694 F. App'x 716, 721 (11th Cir. 2017). Despite being represented by counsel, the Plaintiffs' Complaint lacks relevant information regarding critical events and misconstrues certain of the exhibits attached to the Complaint. Notwithstanding this, the Court has attempted to piece together the relevant facts.
The Plaintiffs are a group of senior citizens who own property in Miami-Dade County near I-95 and the corresponding noise reduction wall that was built more than 10 years ago. (See, e.g., Compl., ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 5, 6.) The Plaintiffs allege that the noise reduction wall has affected their living conditions and has impacted the value of their homes. (See, e.g., id. at ¶ 7.) They claim that they had initially agreed with the State of Florida's proposal to condemn their homes, but that this plan never came to fruition. (See, e.g., id. at ¶ 8.) Eventually, the plan for their homes became part of the County's grant application to the FDOT to build I-95 Linear Park, a one and a half acre linear park that was going to be built where the Plaintiffs' homes are located. (See, e.g., id. at ¶¶ 8, 13-14; Sept. 2006 Letter, ECF No. 1-5.)
As of August 2005, the County was in discussions with Karen McGuire from the District VI Planning Office of the FDOT about I-95 Linear Park and how much it would cost to acquire, relocate, and demolish the sites needed to create the park. (August 2005 Letter, ECF No. 1-4.) In a letter from August 15, 2015 from Barbara Falsey, the Chief of the County's Planning and Research Division to McGuire, Falsey asked McGuire for an updated estimate of the relevant costs. (Id.) It was her understanding at the time that the project would cost more than the then-budgeted $781,000 and that they had discussed a figure of $1.2 million instead. (Id.) Although the Plaintiffs cite to this letter as proof that the State of Florida had earmarked $1.2 million to relocate them, see, e.g., ECF No. 1 at ¶ 9, the letter neither states nor suggests that. The Plaintiffs allege that some point, however, in a meeting with Commissioner Dr. Barbara Carey-Schuler's assistant, Oscar Brannon, it had been confirmed that some funds had been distributed to the County to relocate them. (See, e.g., id. at ¶ 20.)
In a letter dated September 25, 2006, Vivian Donnell Rodriguez, the Director of the County's Park and Recreation Department informed McGuire that the County's Park and Recreation Department was withdrawing its grant application for the I-95 Linear Park. (Sept. 2006 Letter, ECF No. 1-5.) The letter stated that the properties that the Park and Recreation Department intended to purchase for the project were "no longer for sale." (Id.)
The Plaintiffs, who had not yet been relocated, then appeared before the County's Metropolitan Planning Organization ("MPO") at a hearing in 2007. (See, e.g., Compl., ECF No. 1 at ¶ 10.) The Plaintiffs claim that at the 2007 hearing, "the Miami Dade Commission and MPO confirmed receipt of the $1.2 Million to relocate the Plaintiffs but did not perform." (See, e.g., id.)
In December 2007, emails were exchanged between employees from the FDOT and the County regarding the cost of purchasing the Plaintiffs' homes, among others, as part of the I-95 Linear Park proposal. (See Emails, ECF No. 1-3). On December 18, 2007, the FDOT estimated that the cost of the project would be $3,410,700. (Id.) It is unclear from the Complaint or the exhibits whether the I-95 Linear Park project was revived at this point.
Years later, on July 9, 2012, the MPO again considered the Plaintiffs' issues at a hearing. At that hearing, Commissioner Audrey Edmonson referredto the September 25, 2006 letter from Rodriguez to McGuire and raised concerns about the lack of clarity regarding what happened to the plans of purchasing the Plaintiffs' homes since it appeared that the County had initially promised to purchase them. (See, e.g., Compl., ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 12-15.) Zevin Auerbach, an MPO member, stated that this "smell[ed] like corruption." (See, e.g., id.. at ¶ 11.)
In 2015, Commissioner Edmonson proposed purchasing the homes at their current, nominal values. (See, e.g., id. at ¶ 16.) However, the Plaintiffs allege that at this point, the homes were valueless and they would not be able to afford adequate housing. (See, e.g., id.)
In 2016, the Plaintiffs made complaints to the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"), who transferred the matter to the Miami-Dade Office of Inspector General ("OIG"). (See, e.g., ECF No. 1 at ¶ 17.) The OIG then dropped the matter because of Rodriguez's letter and its belief that the Plaintiffs no longer wanted to relocate. (See, e.g., id.)
Then, that same year, the Plaintiffs filed a pro se complaint regarding these matters. Judge Jose E. Martinez dismissed that case because the Plaintiffs failed to properly serve the defendants. See Case No. 16-23651, ECF No. 19.
Now, the Plaintiffs, represented by counsel, present five claims against the FDOT and the County: (1) a federal inverse condemnation claim (Count I); (2) a state-law inverse condemnation claim (Count II); (3) a breach of contract claim (Count III); (4) a tortious interference claim (Count IV); and (5) a claim under the Federal Aid Highway Act, 23 U.S.C. § 101 (Count V).
The FDOT and the County filed motions to dismiss (ECF No. 18, 28). Although the Plaintiffs responded to the FDOT's motion (ECF No. 21), the Plaintiffs did not file a response to the County's motion. Instead, the Plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to amend their Complaint (ECF No. 34), which Magistrate Judge Edwin G. Torres denied after full briefing from the parties (ECF No. 42).
In its motion to dismiss, the FDOT mainly argues that it is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment and sovereign immunity principles. The County presents several arguments in its motion to dismiss. It contends that the Plaintiffs' claims are all barred by their corresponding statutes of limitations, that the complaint is a shotgun pleading, and that the Plaintiffs have failed to state a single claim. The County also argues that punitive damages cannot be asserted against it.
The FDOT's motion is submitted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Attacks on subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) come in two forms: "facial attacks" and "factual attacks." Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1528-29 (11th Cir. 1990). Facial challenges to subject matter jurisdiction are based solely on the allegations in the complaint. Carmichael v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 572 F.3d 1271, 1279 (11th Cir. 2009). Thus, the court will "look at the face of the complaint and determine whether the plaintiff has alleged a sufficient basis for subject matter jurisdiction." Scelta v. Delicatssen Support Servs., Inc., No. 98-2578-CIV-T-17B, 1999 WL 1053121, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 7, 1999) (citations omitted). Factual attacks, on the other hand, challenge "the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact, irrespective of the pleadings," and the court will consider "matters outside the pleadings, such as testimony and affidavits." Lawrence, 919 F.2d at 1529 (internal quotation marks omitted). Since the FDOT's motion is based primarily on Eleventh Amendment immunity, the Court construes the FDOT's motion as a facial attack on subject matter jurisdiction. See Madison v. Dep't of Juvenile Justice, No. 1:18-cv-00484-TWT-JFK, 2018 WL 4214421, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 18, 2018), report and recommendation adopted in No. 1:18-cv-484-TWT, 2018 WL 4078436 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 27, 2018).1
The County relies on Rule 12(b)(6) in its motion. Courts considering a motion to dismiss filed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) must accept all of the complaint's allegations as true, construing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff(s). Pielage v. McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008). Although a pleading need only contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, a plaintiff must nevertheless articulate "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not shown—that the pleader is entitled to relief." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)) (internal punctuation omitted). Acourt must dismiss a plaintiff's claims if he or she fails to nudge her "claims across the line from conceivable to plausible." Twombly, ...
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