Lee v. Sec'y, Case No. 3:15-cv-113-J-34JBT

• Decision Date: 16 January 2018
• Docket Number: Case No. 3:15-cv-113-J-34JBT
• Parties: VALENTINO BERNARD LEE, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

VALENTINO BERNARD LEE, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondents.

Case No. 3:15-cv-113-J-34JBT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

January 16, 2018

ORDER

I. Status

Petitioner Valentino Bernard Lee, an inmate of the Florida penal system, initiated this action on January 29, 2015, pursuant to the mailbox rule, by filing a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Petition; Doc. 1) under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In the Petition, Lee challenges a 2011 state court (Duval County, Florida) judgment of conviction for burglary with assault or battery, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and aggravated assault. Respondents have submitted a memorandum in opposition to the Petition. See Respondents' Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Response; Doc. 10) with exhibits (Resp. Ex.). On February 6, 2015, the Court entered an Order to Show Cause and Notice to Petitioner (Doc. 5), admonishing Lee regarding his obligations and giving Lee a time frame in which to submit a reply. Lee submitted briefs in reply. See Petitioner's Answer (Doc. 14); Amended Answer (Doc. 15). This case is ripe for review.

II. Procedural History

On June 9, 2010, the State of Florida charged Lee with burglary with assault or battery (count one), possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (count two), and aggravated assault (count three). See Resp. Ex. 2, Information. Lee entered a guilty plea to the charges on April 27, 2011. See Resp. Exs. 4; 5, Transcript of the Plea Proceeding (Plea Tr.). In handwritten letters addressed to the trial court, see Resp. Exs. 6; 8A; 8B, Lee expressed his desire to withdraw his plea and obtain additional discovery. With the benefit of conflict counsel, Lee filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.170(f) on June 27, 2011. See Resp. Ex. 7. The court held an evidentiary hearing on August 3, 2011, see Resp. Ex. 9, Transcript of the Evidentiary Hearing (EH Tr.), and on August 11, 2011, denied the motions to withdraw the plea, see Resp. Ex. 11. Lee submitted another handwritten letter to the court on August 29, 2011. See Resp. Ex. 12. On August 30, 2011, the court sentenced Lee to a term of imprisonment of twenty-five years for count one, a term of imprisonment of twenty-five years for count two, and a term of imprisonment of ten years for count three, to run concurrently with each other. See Resp. Exs. 13, Transcript of the Sentencing Hearing (Sentencing Tr.) at 12; 15, Judgment.

On direct appeal, Lee, with the benefit of counsel, filed an initial brief, arguing that the trial judge abused her discretionwhen she denied Lee's motions to withdraw his plea. See Resp. Ex. 17. The State filed an answer brief. See Resp. Ex. 18. On August 20, 2012, the appellate court affirmed Lee's conviction and sentence per curiam, see Lee v. State, 95 So.3d 218 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012); Resp. Ex. 19, and later denied Lee's motion for rehearing, see Resp. Ex. 21. The mandate issued on September 6, 2012. See Resp. Ex. 19.

Lee filed pro se motions for post-conviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 (Rule 3.850 motions) on November 30, 2012, see Resp. Ex. 22, March 1, 2013, see Resp. Ex. 23, and August 1, 2013, see Resp. Ex. 24. In his Rule 3.850 motions, he asserted that counsel (Scott D. Leemis) was ineffective because he failed to: interview and depose Gussie Lee, a key exculpatory witness (ground one); retrieve and investigate the victim's phone records (ground three), and cell phone messages that the victim left on Lee's cell phone (ground two); file a motion to dismiss and motion to conduct an adversary preliminary hearing (ground four); and conduct a reasonable pretrial investigation (ground five). He also stated that the court promised to sentence him to no more than ten years of imprisonment for both cases (the instant case, 2010-CF-3684, and his other case, 2010-CF-739).¹ OnDecember 16, 2013, the court denied his Rule 3.850 motions. See Resp. Ex. 25. On appeal, Lee filed a pro se initial brief, see Resp. Ex. 27, and the State filed its notice that it did not intend to file an answer brief, see Resp. Ex. 28. On May 23, 2014, the appellate court affirmed the court's denial of post-conviction relief per curiam, see Lee v. State, 141 So.3d 185 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014); Resp. Ex. 29, and later denied Lee's motion for rehearing, see Resp. Ex. 30. The mandate issued on July 23, 2014. See Resp. Ex. 29.

During the pendency of the post-conviction proceedings, Lee filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus on May 10, 2013. See Resp. Ex. 31. In the petition, Lee asserted that the State failed to establish probable cause for his arrest and committed manifest error because the State failed to file an information within twenty-one days of his arrest; he stated that the trial court erred when it failed to release him on his own recognizance. Additionally, he asserted that his plea was not voluntary. The circuit court denied the petition on January 16, 2014. See Resp. Ex. 32. On appeal, Lee filed a pro se initial brief, see Resp. Ex. 34, and the State filed its notice that it did not intend to file an answer brief, see Resp. Ex. 35. On May 1, 2014, the appellate court affirmed the court's denial of post-conviction relief per curiam, see Lee v. State, 139 So.3d 304 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014); Resp. Ex. 36, and later denied Lee's motion for rehearing, see Resp. Ex.37. The mandate issued on June 25, 2014. See Resp. Ex. 36. On August 13, 2014, Lee filed a pro se notice to invoke discretionary jurisdiction. See Resp. Ex. 38. The Florida Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction on August 26, 2014. See Resp. Ex. 39.

III. One-Year Limitations Period

The Petition appears to be timely filed within the one-year limitations period. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

IV. Evidentiary Hearing

In a habeas corpus proceeding, the burden is on the petitioner to establish the need for a federal evidentiary hearing. See Chavez v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 647 F.3d 1057, 1060 (11th Cir. 2011). "In deciding whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, a federal court must consider whether such a hearing could enable an applicant to prove the petition's factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief." Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007); Jones v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 834 F.3d 1299, 1318-19 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S.Ct. 2245 (2017). "It follows that if the record refutes the applicant's factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing." Schriro, 550 U.S. at 474. The pertinent facts of this case are fully developed in the record before the Court. Because this Court can "adequately assess [Lee's] claim[s] withoutfurther factual development," Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003), an evidentiary hearing will not be conducted.

V. Governing Legal Principles

A. Standard of Review

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) governs a state prisoner's federal petition for habeas corpus. See Ledford v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic & Classification Prison, 818 F.3d 600, 642 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S.Ct. 1432 (2017). "'The purpose of AEDPA is to ensure that federal habeas relief functions as a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, and not as a means of error correction.'" Id. (quoting Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 38 (2011) (quotation marks omitted)). As such, federal habeas review of final state court decisions is "'greatly circumscribed' and 'highly deferential.'" Id. (quoting Hill v. Humphrey, 662 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted)).

The first task of the federal habeas court is to identify the last state court decision, if any, that adjudicated the claim on the merits. See Wilson v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 834 F.3d 1227, 1235 (11th Cir. 2016) (en banc), cert. granted, 137 S.Ct. 1203 (2017); Marshall v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 828 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2016). Regardless of whether the last state court provided a reasoned opinion, "it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of anyindication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99 (2011) (citation omitted); see also Johnson v. Williams, 568 U.S. 289, 301 (2013).² Thus, the state court need not issue an opinion explaining its rationale in order for the state court's decision to qualify as an adjudication on the merits. See Richter, 562 U.S. at 100.

If the claim was "adjudicated on the merits" in state court, § 2254(d) bars relitigation of the claim unless the state court's decision (1) "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;" or (2) "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Richter, 562 U.S. at 97-98. As the Eleventh Circuit has explained:

First, § 2254(d)(1) provides for federal review for claims of state courts' erroneous legal conclusions. As explained by the Supreme Court in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000), § 2254(d)(1) consists of two distinct clauses: a "contrary to" clause and an "unreasonable application" clause. The "contrary to" clause allows for relief only "if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a casedifferently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Id. at 413, 120 S. Ct. at 1523 (plurality opinion). The "unreasonable application" clause allows for relief only "if the state court identifies the correct

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