Lee v. Sony Bmg Music Entertainment, Inc.
| Decision Date | 15 May 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 07 Civ. 6733(CM).,07 Civ. 6733(CM). |
| Citation | 557 F.Supp.2d 418 |
| Parties | Patricia Harris LEE, Plaintiff, v. SONY BMG MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT, INC., and Barbara Warnock-Morgan, Individual, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Michael John Borrelli, The Law Office of Borrelli & Associates, PLLC, Carle Place, NY, Matthew J. Blit, Levine & Blit, PLLC, New York City, for Plaintiff.
Jonathan David Davis, Jonathan D. Davis, P.C., New York City, for Defendants.
DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT
Plaintiff Patricia Harris Lee ("plaintiff'), sued her former employer for violations of a number of federal and state statutes, after she allegedly became disabled and was discriminated against on the basis of her race, national origin and/or disability following an altercation with her supervisor. Specifically, the amended complaint alleges that the defendants (i) discriminated and retaliated against plaintiff on account of her disability in violation of the ADA, New York State Executive Law § 290 et seq. ("NYHRL"), and New York City Admin. Code § 8-801 et seq. ("NYCHRL") by constructively terminating plaintiffs employment, forcing plaintiff to work in a hostile environment, and refusing to accommodate plaintiff because of her disability; (ii) discriminated and retaliated against plaintiff, on account of her race arid national origin and subjected her to a hostile environment in violation of Title VII, Section 1981, NYHRL, and NYCHRL; and (iii) intentionally inflicted emotional distress on plaintiff. Plaintiff also alleges that defendant Warnock-Morgan "aided and abetted" defendant SONY'S disability discrimination against plaintiff in violation of NYHRL. Defendants Barbara Warnock-Morgan ("Warnock-Morgan") and SONY BMG Music Entertainment, Inc. ("SONY") (collectively, the "defendants") have moved to dismiss plaintiffs complaint, or alternatively for summary judgment.
While both sides have submitted affidavits in connection with this motion, the Court declines to treat this as a motion for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, defendants' motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part.
The following well-pleaded facts in the four corners of the amended complaint are presumed true. The Court notes that plaintiffs affidavit in opposition to defendants' motion contains statements that are inconsistent with some of the allegations in her amended complaint,1
Plaintiff Patricia Harris Lee is an African-American female who worked at SONY and its predecessor in New York, N.Y. for sixteen years.
Defendant Barbara Warnock-Morgan was plaintiffs immediate supervisor at SONY at all relevant times.
Defendant SONY, plaintiffs employer at all relevant times, is a domestic corporation, with its principal place of business in New York. SONY employs more than fifteen individuals and is a "covered entity" within the meaning of the ADA.
SONY hired plaintiff as a Promotion Assistant on or about September 1991. During the course of her employment, plaintiff was never written up or disciplined formally, informally, or otherwise. (Am.Cplt.¶ 19.)
In 2005, plaintiff assumed the position of Associate Director of Advertising Management in the Advertising and Marketing Services Department. Ms. Warnock-Morgan was her direct supervisor.
On March 30, 2006, Warnock-Morgan held a meeting with members of SONY'S Creative Group, which plaintiff attended. During this meeting, the staff members, responding to rumors of a departmental merger, questioned Warnock-Morgan about the security of their employment positions. Warnock-Morgan became extremely angry, confrontational and hostile. (Am.Cplt.¶ 22.) She yelled and cursed at plaintiff. (Am.Cplt.¶ 23.)
The following day, plaintiff and defendant Warnock-Morgan had an altercation (the "altercation"). The altercation was, in part, a carry-over from the pervious day. Warnock-Morgan, unprovoked, physically attacked plaintiff, causing her to sustain back, neck and psychological injuries. (Am.Cplt.¶ 24.)
On April 3, 2006, three days after the altercation, Warnock-Morgan accused plaintiff of orchestrating the March 30th meeting in her absence so as to undermine her management decisions. (Am. Cplt.¶ 29.)
Shortly after the attack, Warnock-Morgan left a message on plaintiffs answering machine asking for her forgiveness for the argument, and blaming the incident on steroid medications she was taking. (Am. Cplt.¶ 25.)
On or about April 3, 2006 and April 17, 2006, plaintiff reported the altercation to Kathleen Kelly ("Kelly") and Dan Alcock ("Alcock") in the Human Resources Department. (Am.Cplt.¶ 26.) Plaintiff alleges that the Human Resources Department told her that she had to await the outcome of their investigation into the assault, (Am. Cplt.¶ 36), but was "never informed of any resolution of the investigation" (Am.Cplt, ¶ 37). However, plaintiff never affirmatively alleges that there was any investigation. From her allegation, I assume some sort of investigation occurred.
From April 4, 2006 to May 26, 2006, plaintiff sent emails and left phone messages for Kelly "continually voicing her fears and her displeasure at working hand-in-hand on a daily basis with Warnock-Morgan." (Am.Cplt. ¶ 35.) Her complaints went unanswered, except for once when Kelly told plaintiff to "endure through her work assignments with Warnock-Morgan, make herself more accessible to Warnock-Morgan and to make sure to report her comings and goings to Warnock-Morgan." (Am.Cplt.¶ 36.) Warnock-Morgan remained plaintiffs direct supervisor after the altercation, and, plaintiff alleges, upon information and belief, that no disciplinary action was taken against Warnock-Morgan for physically attacking her. (Am.Cplt.¶¶ 33, 34.)
Plaintiff also alleges that SONY has a policy that obligates employees to report any drug use, legal or illegal, that may prohibit job performance or fitness for duty. Violation of this policy may result in immediate termination or suspension without pay. Plaintiff alleges that no disciplinary action was taken against Warnock-Morgan for violating SONY'S drug policy. (Am.Cplt.¶¶ 32, 33.)
Each day plaintiff came to work after the altercation, plaintiff feared for her safety and well-being. (Am.Cplt.¶ 38.) The lack of support from the Human Resources Department compounded plaintiff s fears. (Am.Cplt.¶ 38.)
On May 30, 2006, plaintiff took a medical leave of absence on the advice of her physician. The amended complaint alleges that plaintiff took this leave because of the emotional stress of working in a hostile work environment. (Am.Cplt.¶ 40.) In addition, her fear of working with Warnock-Morgan, along with the lack of support from Sony and its Human Resources Department, was further exacerbating her mental and physical condition. (Am. Cplt.¶ 40.)
Plaintiff alleges that "she became non-responsive to the medical treatments she was receiving after the altercation." (Am. Cplt.¶ 41.) Nowhere in the amended complaint does plaintiff indicate what medical treatments she was receiving, or what mental and physical condition she is referring to (other than the "back, neck, and psychological injuries" she experienced immediately after the altercation or the "emotional stress" of working in a hostile environment).
On or about June 6, 2006, plaintiff unexpectedly learned that she had been removed from SONY's payroll, and except for fifteen days of vacation pay, received no paychecks after this date. (Am. Cplt.¶ 42.)
Thereafter, plaintiff applied for short-term disability, which was denied by SONY's insurance carrier. (Am.Cplt.¶ 43.) Plaintiff alleges that, due to SONY's objections, plaintiff long-term disability and plaintiff initial application for worker's compensation benefits were both denied. (Am.Cplt.¶¶ 44, 45.) Again, plaintiff does not allege what her disability was.
On or about July 18, 2006, plaintiff filed a Verified Complaint pursuant to Executive Law, Article 15 with the New York State Division of Human Rights ("NYSDHR"), which also appears to have been filed with the EEOC pursuant to New York's dual filing arrangements.2 On April 30, 2007, the EEOC issued plaintiff a notice of right to sue with respect to the allegations in this complaint.
On or about December 23, 2006, plaintiff filed a second charge of discrimination directly with the EEOC. On June 1, 2007, the EEOC issued plaintiff a notice of right to sue with respect to the claim in this second charge.
Neither party has submitted a copy of the charges to the Court. As a result, I have no idea what types of discrimination plaintiff alleged in either of the charges, or why there are two of them. Since defendants do not move to dismiss on the ground of failure to exhaust administrative remedies, I assume that at least those aspects of her complaint that require exhaustion — all claims but plaintiffs IIED claim — were submitted to the EEOC for review in connection with one of her charges. I also assume the charges were timely filed.
On July 26, 2007, plaintiff filed the complaint in this action with the Clerk of the Southern District of New York. On November 30, 2007, plaintiff filed an amended complaint.
The amended complaint alleges that the defendants (i) discriminated and retaliated against plaintiff on account of her disability in violation of the ADA, New York State Executive Law § 296 ("NYHRL"), and New York City Admin. Code § 8-107 et seq. ("NYCHRL") by constructively terminating plaintiffs employment, forcing plaintiff to work in a hostile environment, and refusing to accommodate plaintiff because of her disability; (ii) discriminated and retaliated against plaintiff on account of her race and national origin and subjected her to a hostile environment in violation of Title VII, Section 1981, NYHRL, and NYCHRL; and (ii...
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