Lee v. State
| Decision Date | 30 June 1905 |
| Citation | 143 Ala. 93,39 So. 366 |
| Parties | LEE v. STATE. |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Appeal from Criminal Court, Jefferson County; D. A. Greene, Judge.
Robert E. Lee was charged, by a warrant sworn out before a justice of the peace of beat 37 of Jefferson county, with the offense of unlawfully presenting a pistol to another. The warrant was made returnable before the criminal court of Jefferson county, where defendant objected that the warrant was improperly made so returnable and that the court was without jurisdiction. A demurrer to such plea was sustained, and defendant was convicted, and appeals. Reversed.
B. M Allen, for appellant.
H. P Heflin, J. T. Glover, and A. B. Perdue, for the State.
The ruling of the lower court in sustaining the demurrer to the defendant's plea presents for review the constitutionality of the act entitled "An act to limit the criminal jurisdiction of justices of the peace and notaries public with the powers of justices of the peace in precincts twenty-one (21) and thirty-seven (37) in Jefferson county, and in all the wards of the city of Birmingham," approved February 9, 1895. Acts 1894-95, p. 498. The constitutional objection first urged to the act is that it violated that provision of the Constitution of 1875 requiring that "each law shall contain but one subject which shall be clearly expressed in its title." Const. art. 4, § 2. The first section of the act provides that justices of the peace and notaries public with powers of justices of the peace in the territory named in the title shall not have or exercise jurisdiction of or over any criminal case or matter whatever, except to take affidavits and to issue warrants thereon returnable to the police court of Birmingham in all cases in which that court has jurisdiction, and to take affidavits and issue warrants and examine all persons charged with offenses of which the police court has not jurisdiction. The second section provides a penalty for a violation of the first. The third (page 499), repeals all laws, general or special, conferring jurisdiction of criminal matters or causes on justices of the peace or notaries public with powers of justices of the peace, other than hereinbefore excepted, and an act entitled "An act to alter and amend the law relating to the territorial jurisdiction and pay of justices of the peace in precincts 21 and 37 in Jefferson county and the several wards of the city of Birmingham and to provide a punishment for the violation thereof," approved December 13, 1894. Acts 1894-95, p. 155.
The first contention is that the title of the act indicates that its body would deal with and treat of the jurisdiction of the justices and notaries public, while in fact the first section deals with the authority or power of those officers. It is argued that the word "jurisdiction" has a well-defined legal meaning when applied to courts; that its meaning is "the power to hear and determine." This is undoubtedly true, but neither the title nor the act under consideration purports or in fact deals with courts, but only with certain judicial officers and their power or authority as such. It is clear, therefore, that the word "jurisdiction," as used in the title and body of the act, is synonymous with "power" or "authority." But, aside from this consideration the section accomplished just what is indicated by the title it was expected to be accomplished. It limits the former jurisdiction possessed by these justices and notaries to taking affidavits and the issuance of warrants thereon. It is further urged that the third section offends this provision of the Constitution. This might be conceded, and yet the first and second section of the act would stand. But the third section is perfectly valid. It does not affect, as is supposed, all justices of the peace. Manifestly it only repeals all laws in so far as they affect the jurisdiction of justices and notaries in the territory named in this act.
The next contention is that the act is not uniform, but partial and discriminating, and is an arbitrary interference with the power and authority of these officers; that the act cuts down the authority of those officers and leaves other justices and notaries with powers of justices throughout the state unaffected. If justices of the peace derived their jurisdiction in criminal matters from the Constitution, the contention, perhaps, would be sound. But as they do not, and their jurisdiction is conferred by statutory enactments, it is entirely within legislative competency to limit it, or deprive them of it altogether; and this the Legislature may do as to any particular ones or all,...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Witte v. Dowd
...State ex rel. v. Home Brewing Co., 1914, 182 Ind. 75, 96, 97, 105 N.E. 909, 917. See also 7 C.J.S., Authority, p. 1290. Lee v. State, 1904, 143 Ala. 93, 95, 39 So. 366. Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd Ed. p. 171. The word 'authorize' means 'to empower, to give a right or authority to act. To cl......
- Collins v. State
- State ex rel. Harrington v. Randle
-
Murphy v. State
...jurisdiction with the circuit courts in certain designated territorial limits to try criminal cases. Const. 1901, § 139; Lee v. State, 143 Ala. 93, 39 So. 366. provision for a transfer of cases from one court to another having concurrent jurisdiction is manifestly to expedite justice and se......